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ABSTRACT
This thesis is concerned with some issues arising in relation to the capital structure
and pricing of credit risk of a firm partly financed by debt. Three related models
are presented. The first extends the existing literature on structural credit models
of firms financed by the so called roll-over debt structure to allow for dependence
between interest rates, asset volatility and the probability of default by incorporating
regimes via the introduction of a Markov chain. The asset returns of a firm are
modelled by a regime-switching geometric Brownian motion. An optimised capital
structure is generated and the associated credit spreads analysed. The second model
adds to recent work on regime-switching in the case of consol, or infinite maturity
debt, by incorporating jumps into the asset process. The asset process of the firm is
modelled as a phase-type Lévy process which aﬀords a flexible framework capable of
accommodating a wide range of stochastic dynamics. An optimal capital structure
is identified. The contribution of the first two models is that that they are highly
flexible and allow for an arbitrary number of market regimes to be combined in an
intuitive way. The final model extends the literature on endogenous default to a firm
which is partly financed by a single finite maturity bond. The assets of the firm are
modelled as a geometric Brownian motion which pays a continuous dividend. By
solving the associated optimal stopping problem, a default boundary is characterised
in terms of an integral equation.
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xNOMENCLATURE
⇤b Identity matrix with vector b across the diagonal
{A} Indicator function of the event A
EA [· | A] Conditional expectation given the event A
F Filtration generated by F , F = {Ft}t 0
LX Infinitesimal generator of the stochastic process X
N Set of integers, {1, 2, . . . }
PA (·) Probability given the event A
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TA Set of F-measurable stopping times in the set A
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{Xt}t 0 Stochastic process X
1 Column vector of 1s
1k Column vector with 1 in row k and zero elsewhere
Ea Matrix E   ⇤a
I Identity Matrix
1CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION
This thesis is concerned with some issues arising in relation to the capital structure
and pricing of credit risk of a firm partly financed by debt. This subject remains of
topical interest in financial mathematics particularly in view of recent financial market
events. In early 2009, observed credit spreads1 rose to levels not seen since the Great
Depression of the 1930s. Poor lending standards, particularly in housing finance,
coupled with a high level of leverage in the banking system, itself associated with
the introduction of new and innovative financial instruments, resulted in significant
financial distress. What had been regarded as normal financial market relationships
appeared to breakdown, significantly exposing potential weaknesses in both asset
pricing models and financial risk systems.
The primary objective of this thesis is to contribute to the understanding of the
underlying mechanisms which determine firm capital structure and credit spreads.
Ever since Modigliani and Miller [1958], economists and financial mathematicians
have devoted considerable eﬀort to understanding firms’ financing policies. Structural
models of credit risk provide a framework within which to explore issues related to
corporate capital structure, and, for this reason, occupy a pivotal role in this report.
The structural approach to credit risk attempts to model the default event2 of a
firm under varying conditions upon assuming the assets of the firm obey some given
stochastic dynamics. Structural models are characterised by a default event occurring
when the value of a firm’s assets fall below some boundary. The so called reduced-form
credit approach, which attempts to model the default probability of a firm directly,
1The term credit spread refers to interest paid by an entity in excess of the risk free interest rate.
2Default event refers to a situation in which an entity is unable, or unwilling, to repay contractual
debt obligations.
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will not be considered. In Chapter 2, following a brief description of corporate bonds
terminology, a literature review of the major developments in structural models of
credit risk is presented.
That historically observed financial market behaviour has been so at odds with re-
cent experience has lead to the question as to whether existing models are flexible
enough to capture financial market behaviour in a wide range of circumstances. Being
necessarily an abstraction, arguably financial models may never be able to capture
the complexity of the real world. Recent interest in the literature to model economic
regime shifts has largely been motivated by the work of Hamilton [1989] in which
it was suggested that economies are subject to period regime-shifts between distinct
business cycles. In the latter regard, there may be some advantage in viewing finan-
cial markets as operating in a variety of diﬀerent regimes at diﬀerent times. Allowing
model parameters that are otherwise typically fixed, to vary according by regime,
may provide a convenient mechanism to capture changing behaviour in an elemental
way and provide a framework within which to accommodate a wide range of financial
market conditions.
The topic of endogenously determined optimal capital structure also remains an active
area of research. Understanding how and when companies refinance and the associ-
ated implications for default risk continues to be of significant interest. In an eﬀort to
understand long term financing behaviour, and to avoid the technical complications
related to time dependencies, many authors have sought to examine optimal cap-
ital structure in the context of an assumption of a stationary, or time-independent,
debt framework3. The so called roll-over debt model introduced by Leland [1994b],
which will be outlined in Chapter 2, has become the benchmark upon which many
recent contributions in the area of structural credit models have been based. The
main advantage of the roll-over debt framework, as will be explained in sequel, is
that it aﬀords a mechanism to analyse corporate debt profiles of diﬀering structure
or maturity.
3In a stationary debt framework, a firm’s debt repayments are constant through time.
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Chapter 3 builds on the roll-over debt framework literature by presenting a model
of corporate capital structure under a regime-switching setting, which, potentially,
aﬀords a convenient mechanism to be able to combine a number of diﬀerent market
conditions in a simple and intuitive way. The model will focus on only two regimes,
but allows firm asset volatility, risk free interest and dividend rates to be regime-
dependent, via the firm’s asset value process being modelled as a regime-switching
geometric Brownian motion4. Tax relief on interest payments is known to be an
important element in determining corporate capital structure, since it eﬀectively gen-
erates a stream of positive future cash flows that add to a firm’s net worth. Indeed,
the essence of the contribution of Modigliani and Miller [1958] is that, without any
tax advantages, there may be little incentive for corporate entities to leverage their
balance sheets at all. In Chapter 3 the case of also allowing tax rates and bankruptcy
costs to vary by regime is investigated. Default is modelled as the first time that the
asset value process of the firm falls below a barrier, also regime-dependent, whether
given exogenously and fixed, or, endogenously determined by the firm in order to
optimise equity value. An optimised capital structure and associated financing costs
are identified.
In Chapter 4, the model of Chapter 3 is extended to allow the asset price process
of the firm to jump in the negative direction. Moreover, the jump process is also
allowed to be regime-dependent motivated by the conjecture that during times of
economic stress, negative jumps of the asset process might be expected to be larger
in magnitude. Unlike Chapter 3, however, the firm in Chapter 4, is financed by a
single infinite maturity, or consol, bond. While the latter assumption unfortunately
loses the richness of term structure inherent in the roll-over model, it implies that
the debt profile is fully stationary, which allows an optimal capital structure to be
identified. The model also allows firm asset volatility, risk free interest and dividend
rates as well as tax rates and bankruptcy costs to be regime-dependent. An interesting
4A geometric Brownian motion where one, or more, of the process parameters are regime-
dependent
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feature of the model is that the payout5 a firm might expect to receive on default also
becomes regime-dependent, which has the implication that, under certain conditions,
it may never be optimal for a firm to endogenously declare default in certain regimes.
When an optimal default boundary is known to exist, optimal capital structure and
credit spreads are also identified.
Naturally, the assumption of time-homogeneity outlined above aﬀords significant ana-
lytical benefits and allows insights to be gained in relation to aspects of corporate
capital structure that persist through time. However, the fact that the vast ma-
jority of lending agreements mature at a fixed date implies that there may also be
significant time dependencies to consider in relation to the determination of capital
structure. Not only does virtually all debt issued by corporate entities mature at a
fixed date, finite maturity debt contracts are also prevalent in areas such as private
equity, infrastructure finance and the insurance industry.
For the above reason, in Chapter 5, attention is turned to focus on a firm financed by
finite maturity debt. As in the earlier chapters, the firm is assumed to be endowed
with an asset process, but one which is modelled by a single geometric Brownian
motion. The firm still receives tax advantages on coupon payments and is assumed
to choose a default policy which maximises the equity value of the firm or structure.
The main implication of time dependence in the structure of debt for the model in
Chapter 5 is that the endogenously determined level of asset at which it is optimal to
declare default is also time dependent. The primary focus of the analysis, is therefore,
in identifying the time dependent default boundary for a firm’s asset process.
It has been typical of structural models in the recent literature to restrict the benefit
accrued to a firm in terms of tax relief on coupon payments to situations in which
the asset value of a firm is in excess of some boundary level. The latter restriction
has typically been motivated by the observation that tax relief on interest payments
is only aﬀorded to companies in many cases under the proviso that positive profits
5The payout on default will include the value of debt that the firm would otherwise have been
obligated to pay.
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are being generated. While such an assumption is entirely reasonable, in view of the
complications of incorporating regime shifts into the analysis described above, the so
called tax-threshold restriction on tax relief related to debt servicing costs will not
feature in the analysis presented in this thesis, and in the context of regime-switching
models, remains an area for future research. Other such potential areas of future
study arising from the conclusions of this thesis are oﬀered in Chapter 6 along with
some concluding remarks.
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6CHAPTER 2 STRUCTURAL MODELS OF
CREDIT RISK
2.1 Modelling Credit Risk
The term to default refers to the event under which a counterpart to a financial
contract fails to meet an obligation under the terms of the contract. An obvious
example would be that of a debtor failing to meet a payment specified in a loan
agreement. More generally, the term credit risk refers to an event which directly
eﬀects the likelihood of a default occurring. Examples of the latter might be an
increase in the amount of debt owed by a company or perhaps a deterioration in the
economic performance of a company, both of which may impair the ability to repay
debt. Naturally one might expect that higher credit risk should be associated with
an increased cost of borrowing.
There have been two distinct approaches taken towards pricing securities which are
subject to credit risk. The so called reduced form or hazard rate approach is based on
the idea that default events occur by surprise and therefore focuses on modelling the
probability of default directly (see for example Turnbull and Jarrow [1995], Lando
et al. [1997], Duﬃe and Singleton [1999] and the associated literature). Typically, the
default event is modelled using a hazard process where the intensity of the process
reflects the infinitesimal likelihood of a default. The intensity associated with the
default of a given financial contract may be, for example, estimated by an empirical
analysis of historical default events. Such models will not be considered in this report.
By contrast, structural models concentrate on modelling financial characteristics of
the borrower which may influence whether a default event occurs. The probability
Structural Models of Credit Risk
of default is determined within the framework of the model itself, and in this sense,
the structural approach attempts to model not only when a default will occur but
also why a default occurs. Section 2.3 onwards of this chapter will focus on the
major developments in the literature on structural models as they pertain to pricing
corporate bonds. Before doing so, some salient terminology and definitions relating
to corporate bonds are outlined.
2.2 Corporate Bonds
A bond is a financial contract under which a borrower commits to making future re-
payments in return for receiving a payment when the contract is issued. The maturity
date of a bond refers to the date of the final promised payment of the bond and the
maturity to length of time until that final payment. The par value or face value of
a bond is repaid at maturity. Typically, a bond will pay a sequence of smaller inter-
mediate payments at regular intervals, for example annually, called coupons, which
may be either a fixed or variable amount. Bonds which pay no coupons are referred
to as discount bonds. Bonds which never mature and pay coupons in perpetuity are
refereed to as perpetual or consol bonds. The price paid to acquire ownership of a
bond is referred to as its market value.
Corporate bonds are issued by companies to raise funds and form part of the capital
structure of a company. Since a corporation may fail to deliver the payments promised
under the terms of a bond, corporate bonds are subject to risk of default and therefore
to credit risk as well. Clearly, a bond cannot be defaulted upon after its maturity
date.
2.2.1 Recovery Rules Under the circumstances of a default a creditor will at-
tempt to recover debt which is owed, the sum recovered being referred to as the
recovery value. In practice, the procedures surrounding the recovery process can be
very complex and will depend upon both the terms of the financial contract which
7
Structural Models of Credit Risk
has been defaulted upon, together with applicable laws in force in the jurisdiction of
the default. For example, certain debt may be classified as senior, which will receive
priority over junior debt, and may therefore attract a higher recovery value. Some
classes of debt may be secured against another asset allowing the debtor to take full
or partial control of the asset, while other debt may be subordinated, meaning that it
is not secured or has a lower priority than another claim.
Factors such as those above will eﬀect the recovery payment which is the amount
that will be paid to creditors following a default. Typically, the recovery payment
is defined in terms of a recovery rate which specifies the fraction of some valuation
of the debt outstanding which will be paid to the creditor should a default occur.
In practice, a wide variety of recovery rules are applied. For example, the recovery
amount can be paid for valuation at either maturity of the debt, or at the time of
default, and the recovery rate may be applied to either the face or market value of the
debt. The loss given default refers to loss in value suﬀered by the creditor following
a default and is often specified as one minus the recovery rate.
2.2.2 Exogenous Default and Safety Covenants Borrowers are often forced
to incorporate covenants into a bond contract which aﬀord creditors a certain degree
of protection over and above the commitment of the borrower to repay its debt. For
example, creditors may be aﬀorded the right to take control of a company should
the net worth of a company fall below a specified level. In this case, the decision
to default is referred to as being exogenous to the company. A decision taken by a
company to default of its own volition is referred to as an endogenous default.
2.3 Structural Models
The rest of this chapter is concerned with the major developments in the literature on
structural models of corporate default. The majority of the models in the literature
share the same following general framework.
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2.3.1 General Framework A single firm is assumed to hold tradeable1 assets,
the total value of which can be represented by a single stochastic process, V = {Vt}t 0.
The value of the firm refers to the total value of all future contingent claims of the
firm. The firm is partly financed by debt with a value process given by D = {Dt}t 0
which is also a tradeable asset. The Equity value of the firm is simply the value of
the firm minus the total value of debt and the holders of equity are referred to as
the shareholders. For the most part, shareholders and the firm can be regarded as
synonymous. Firms can raise finance either by issuing more debt or dilute existing
shareholders by selling more equity. Some models will assume the existence of taxes
and costs associated with bankruptcy as well as restrictions on the ability of firms to
raise additional finance.
The structural approach to pricing corporate bonds is concerned with directly model-
ling the capital structure of a firm. The behaviour of the asset price and the associated
implications for the net worth of the firm in relation to the level of debt outstanding,
is naturally a key determinant of the probability that a firm will default. However, as
will be seen, restrictions on how firms can raise additional finance, bankruptcy costs
and taxes all play key roles in the valuation of corporate debt.
2.3.2 Technical Considerations The market is assumed to contain a savings
account process with the value at time t of a deposit maturing at time T given by
B (t, T ) = E

exp
✓
 
ˆ T
t
r (s) ds
◆
|Ft
 
, (2.3.1)
where r = {rt}t 0 is the risk free interest rate process and E [·] is the expectation
taken under the risk neutral measure. In many cases r will be assumed to be either
constant or deterministic. It is also assumed that the stochastic processes (V,B) are
defined on some filtered probability space (⌦,F ,P,F) where F = {Ft}t 0 denotes the
completed filtration generated by (V,B). In addition, the financial market is assumed
1Tradeable assets can be hedged in the financial market and therefore priced using standard no
arbitrage pricing techniques.
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to be frictionless2 and complete3.
2.3.3 Merton (1974) In a seminal paper by Merton [1974], it was shown that
the value of a finite maturity discount debt obligation of a firm, which can only default
at maturity, can be characterised as the value of a risk free bond minus the value of
a European put on the assets of the firm with a strike equal to the nominal value of
the debt. The classical solution to the European option problem in the case of asset
prices being assumed to follow a log-normal distribution, originally outlined by Black
and Scholes [1973], was then applied to provide an explicit formula for the value of a
corporate discount bond.
The rich literature on the subject of corporate capital structure is testimony to the
insight provided by the model in Merton [1974] which captures the very essence of
the problem of pricing corporate debt. In view of the central role played in the
literature, the model presented in Merton [1974] is outlined below using the now
familiar techniques of risk neutral pricing. Expressions for bond prices, yields and
credit spreads are derived and the sensitivity of these metrics to changes in leverage,
asset volatility and interest rates, as well as implications for the term structure are
examined.
The value of the assets of the firm is assumed to evolve under the risk neutral measure
according to a geometric Brownian motion
dVt
Vt
= (r    ) dt+  dWt, (2.3.2)
where r > 0 is a constant risk free rate,   > 0, W = {Wt}t 0 is a standard Brownian
motion,   > 0 represents the dividend rate and Vt = v. The firm is partly financed by
a single discount bond with face value fixed at K which is non-callable and matures
2A frictionless market supports unlimited borrowing and lending at the same interest rate, allows
short sales of all assets with full use of proceeds, has no transactions costs or indivisibilities of assets
and trades continuously in time.
3The market is complete if every contingent claim can be hedged by a tradeable asset.
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at time T > 0. The firm can only default at time T if VT < K, in which case the
residual assets become the property of the bond holder.
According to standard financial theory, the value of the firm’s debt at time t will be
given by
D (v, t, T ) = e r(T t)
 
Et,v
⇥
{VT>K}K
⇤
+ Et,v
⇥
{VTK}VT
⇤ 
= Ke r(T t)   e r(T t)Et,v
⇥
(K   VT )+
⇤
= KB (t, T )  P (v, t, T ) , (2.3.3)
where (·)+ = max(·, 0), {A} is the indicator function of the set A, Et,v [·] = E [·|Vt = v]
and
P (v, t, T ) = e r(T t)Et,v
⇥
(K   VT )+
⇤
is the value of a European put option on the assets of the firm with strike equal to
the face value of debt, in this case fixed at K, also maturing at time T .
Equation (2.3.3) shows the value of the debt is equal to a risk free discount bond
maturing at time T minus the value of a put option on the assets of the firm with a
strike equal to the value of the debt with maturity T . If the probability of default is
zero, the price of a corporate bond is equal to the price of a risk free discount bond.
If the probability of default is one, a corporate bond represents a claim on the assets
of the firm. Clearly, as the probability of default increases, a corporate bond becomes
more and more like a claim on the firm’s assets.
Using (2.3.2), the value of the firm’s debt in equation (2.3.3) can be expressed expli-
citly as
D (v, t, T ) = Vt (Lt  (⇣2) +   ( ⇣1)) , (2.3.4)
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where leverage4 is defined as Lt = KB(t,T )Vt ,
⇣1 =
  log (Lt) +
 
r     + 12 2
 
(T   t)
 
p
T   t ,
⇣2 = ⇣1    
p
T   t,
and   (·) is the standard normal distribution. Merton [1974] worked primarily with
an adjusted bond price
D¯ (v, t, T ) = D (v, t, T ) /B (t, T )
=   (⇣2) + L
 1
t   ( ⇣1) , (2.3.5)
which is the discounted value of the risky bond price, a quantity which features in
the formula for the credit spread or term premium associated with the firm.
The yield of the firm’s debt at time t which matures at time T , y (v, t, T ), is defined
by the relation D (v, t, T ) = Ke y(t,T )(T t) from which it follows that
y(v, t, T ) =   log (D (v, t, T ) /K)
T   t . (2.3.6)
The term premium or the credit spread at time t for a bond which matures at time
T , s (v, t, T ) , which is the additional yield a firm must oﬀer on risky debt over and
above the risk free interest rate, is given by
s (v, t, T ) = y (v, t, T )  r (2.3.7)
=   log
 
D¯ (v, t, T )
 
T   t ,
where the latter equality follows directly from (2.3.4).
One of the key characteristics of Merton [1974] is that credit spreads either converge
to zero or infinity as time converges to maturity. To see this observe from (2.3.4) and
4A firm is typically regarded as leveraged when the value of debt exceeds the value of the firm.
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(2.3.7) that
lim
t!T
  ( ⇣1) =
(
1, {VT < K} ,
0, {VT > K} ,
lim
t!T
  (⇣2) =
(
0, {VT < K} ,
1, {VT > K} ,
from which it easily follows that
lim
t!T
s (v, t, T ) =
(
+1, {VT < K} ,
0, {VT > K} .
The cause of this predicted behaviour of spreads is the assumption of a geomet-
ric Brownian motion for the asset price process, (2.3.2), from which the continuity
properties of Brownian motion imply that the asset value at maturity will be revealed
immediately prior to maturity. Once the asset value at maturity is known, the default
event becomes predictable.
Table 2.3.1 details the static sensitivities of bond prices, yields and credit spreads
to changes in leverage, asset volatility and interest rates. As would be intuitively
expected, bond prices/yields fall/rise in response to increases in leverage, asset volat-
ility and interest rates. Higher interest rates make distant cash flows less valuable
and therefore reduce bond prices (increase yields). Greater volatility or leverage both
act to make default more likely, and therefore, a higher yield (lower bond price)
is required to compensate for increased risk, which is also reflected in higher credit
spreads. Contrary to yields however, higher interest rates act to reduce credit spreads.
2.3.4 Critiques of Merton’s Approach The approach taken in Merton [1974]
is attractive from the perspective of analytic tractability but has been criticised in
terms of the unrealistic nature of the required assumptions of the model. In particular,
the model assumes that asset price returns are normally distributed and that the asset
price process is continuous, implying that for un-leveraged firms credit spreads are
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Bond Price (D) Yield (y) Spread (s)
Leverage
@/@L  0   0   0
Volatility
 
 2
 
@/@
 
 2
   0   0   0
Interest Rate (r)
@/@r  0   0  0
Table 2.3.1: Merton (1974) Comparative Static Analysis
This table shows the directionality of the sensitivity of Merton [1974] bond prices, yields
and credit spreads to changes in leverage, asset volatility and interest rates.
approximately zero for very short maturities which is wholly at odds with observed
data. Furthermore, default may only occur in the model at maturity, and, only if
the asset price is less than outstanding nominal debt. Whereas in practice, firms
routinely declare bankruptcy prior to the maturity of their debt. In addition, both
volatility and interest rates are assumed to be constant which also implies that the
probability of default is independent of the risk free term structure. Since default
depends on the economic performance of the firm, which may in turn be related to
the economy as a whole, the latter assumption would appear to be unrealistic.
In response to these criticisms, Merton [1974] has been extended in the literature in
a number of ways. For example, Geske [1977, 1979] applied methodology associated
with valuing compound options to address the issue of multiple bonds, each maturity
being viewed as one of the compound options. Ho and Singer [1982] examine the
eﬀect of a number of bond indenture provisions, concluding that risk is transferred
from stockholders to bondholders, as the tenor and size of debt increase.
One major diﬃculty is the unobservable nature of the asset value process which may
be contrary to the assumption in Merton [1974] that the asset value can be hedged
in the market. Moreover, diﬃculties arise from an empirical standpoint in relation to
calibrating models to market data. Since data for the asset process is not normally
available, typically some filtering method is used to extract estimates of the volatility
14
Structural Models of Credit Risk
of the asset value from proxy data, normally equity prices. As an alternative to
modelling the value of a firm’s assets, Buﬀet [2000] instead proposed to maximise the
value of equity based on assumed stochastic dynamics of a firm’s profits. As a result,
expressions for the value of debt were obtained that depended only on the current
value of assets and the stochastic dynamics of profits, both of which are observable
in the market.
Perhaps the most important extensions to Merton [1974] have been to allow for both
early and endogenously determined default, the addition of stochastic risk free interest
rates and for discontinuities in the asset price process. In the subsequent sections
some of the major contributions which have been suggested in the literature in these
regards are reviewed.
2.4 First Passage Models
First passage models allow default to occur at any time prior to the maturity of debt.
Such models focus on the first passage time of a random process related to a relevant
financial metric, typically the net worth of the borrower, below some specified barrier
level. The barrier may be deterministic or random and either determined exogenously
or endogenously to the firm.
The introduction of first passage times greatly enriches the structural approach in
allowing not only the probability, but also the timing of the default event to be
determined within the context of the model. In addition, more realistic recovery
payments can be modelled by specifying that the securities of a firm take on specific
values at the time of first passage.
First passage models for credit risk were first introduced by Black and Cox [1976] and
have subsequently been extended by many authors. See for example, Longstaﬀ and
Schwartz [1995], Cathcart and El-Jahel [1998], Hsu et al. [2004], Zhou [1997] amongst
many others. In addition, first passage models laid the foundations for developments
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in relation to optimal capital structure 5. In view of the importance of the contribution
of Black and Cox [1976] to the understanding of credit risk, the model is outlined
below.
2.4.1 Black and Cox (1976) In Merton [1974] the value of the firm could rise
and fall to arbitrarily high and low levels without triggering any reorganisation of
the finances of the firm. Black and Cox [1976] suggested that this was unrealistic
and argued that some mechanism to force a reorganisation, should the firm perform
poorly according to some set standard, should be adopted.
One standard for enforcing a reorganisation of the firm prior to maturity could be the
omission of interest payments on the debt. However, such a restriction would not be
very eﬀective if the company were allowed to sell assets to meet interest payments.
For this reason Black and Cox [1976] introduced boundaries for the value of the firm’s
assets at which the securities of the firm could take on specific values, and in doing
so, extended Merton [1974] to allow for safety covenants.
To incorporate safety covenants, Black and Cox [1976] introduced a time dependent
deterministic barrier, Kˆe  (T t) for some Kˆ,   > 0, and assumed that default occurred
if the value of the firm’s assets fell below this barrier prior to maturity. Following
Merton [1974], it was also assumed that the firm would only default at maturity
should the face value of debt exceed the value of the firm.
More specifically, for a firm financed by a single bond with face value K maturing
at time T , default occurred the first time, ⌧ , that the value of the firm falls below a
barrier b (t)
⌧b = inf {t 2 [0, T ] | Vt < b (t)} , (2.4.1)
5See 2.5 below.
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where
b(t) =
(
Kˆe  (T t) for t < T
K for t = T, Kˆ  K.
The usual convention that inf {;} = 1 is adopted in (2.4.1) meaning that, if the
value of the firm does not fall below the barrier, default does not occur. It is natural
to assume that the barrier is no greater than the face value of the debt.
Under the assumptions in Black and Cox [1976], the value of a discount bond with
face value K maturing at time T is given by
D (v, t, T ) = Et,v
⇥
Ke r(T t) {⌧b T,VT K}
⇤
+ Et,v
⇥
VT e
 r(T t) {⌧b T,VT<K}
⇤
+Et,v
h
Kˆe  (T ⌧)e r(⌧ t) {⌧b<T}
i
. (2.4.2)
The first two terms in (2.4.2) are analogous to Merton’s model. The last term in
(2.4.2) reflects the payment the debt holder receives should default occur prior to
maturity. Under the assumption that the value of the firm obeys (2.3.2), the expect-
ations in (2.4.2) can be readily explicitly calculated using standard results pertaining
to the first passage times of Brownian motion. 6
Black and Cox [1976] observed that the basic properties of company debt such that
D (v, t, T ) is an increasing function of v and a decreasing function of  2 and r remain
the same as in Merton [1974]. However, while in Merton [1974], the value of a corpor-
ate debt can be zero at maturity, Black and Cox [1976] showed that safety covenants
provide a floor for the value of the bond which limits the gains that can be made by
stockholders by somehow circumventing other indenture provisions.
Firms frequently issue debt with diﬀerent levels of seniority whereby the claim of
a junior debt holder will be subordinated to that of a senior debt holder. In the
event of a default, the junior debt holders will only receive a payment after the senior
debt holders have been paid in full. Such an arrangement is often referred to as the
6The explicit formula is somewhat complex and is therefore omitted here for purposes of clarity.
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Claim VT < Ks Ks  VT  Ks +Kj VT > Ks +Kj
Senior Bonds VT Ks Ks
Junior Bonds 0 VT  Ks Kj
Equity 0 0 VT  Ks  Kj
Table 2.4.1: Debt Subordination: Values of Claims at Maturity
This table shows the shareholder and bondholder claims at maturity where total debt outstanding
is comprised of senior, Ks, and junior, Kj , under the strict priority rule.
strict priority rule: The senior debt holders having strict priority over the junior debt
holders.
For example, assume that the principal values of senior and junior debt outstanding
are Ks and Kj respectively. At maturity, the payoﬀ to the respective classes of bonds
will be as shown in Table 2.4.1
Black and Cox [1976] showed the value of junior debt could easily be written in terms
of the diﬀerence between value of total and senior debt. Using (2.4.2) and the notation
D (v, t, T,K) for the value of a (T   t) maturity corporate bond with principle value
K, the total value of debt is given by D (v, t, T,Ks +Kj), whereas the value of senior
debt is given by D (t, T,Ks). Therefore, the value of junior debt is clearly equal to
D (v, t, T,Kj) = D (v, t, T,Ks +Kj) D (v, t, T,Ks) .
Black and Cox [1976] observed that subordination aﬀords senior bond holders larger
value than would be obtained from an undiﬀerentiated bond issue. Junior bonds,
however, have characteristics which are diﬀerent from those normally associated with
bonds. While the value of senior bonds is always an increasing function of asset
value, the same is not true of junior bonds. This means that bondholders as a
group may under certain circumstances have conflicting interests. In highly leveraged
circumstances, junior bondholders may be incentivised to act more like shareholders
than senior bondholders.
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2.5 Optimal Capital Structure
A debt financed firm which in not constrained in any way by safety covenants will
only declare bankruptcy when required repayments cannot be made by issuing new
equity. The latter case will only occur when the value of equity falls to zero. However,
under the conditions of an absolute priority rule, any level of the assets of the firm
that triggers bankruptcy will also imply that the value of equity at that asset value
is zero.
This latter observation led Black and Cox [1976] to argue that restrictions on a firm’s
financing arrangements could mean that there is a critical value of the assets of a
firm below which no additional equity can be sold. For example, in the case where
a firm pays a continuous coupon, should the value of the firm fall below the coupon,
under a strict priority rule, equity value may fall to zero even though the value of
the firm’s assets may still be substantially positive. Since the firm will be unable to
sell more equity, if raising funds by selling assets is prohibited, the firm will be forced
into bankruptcy.
The level of assets at which a firm is declared bankrupt can either be specified exo-
genously, for example as a term in the indentures of the bond, or determined endo-
genously by the firm in the course of some optimisation procedure. Black and Cox
[1976] derived the optimal value of assets at which to declare bankruptcy for a firm
financed by a single continuous (fixed) coupon perpetual bond for an asset process
given by (2.3.2) with   = 0 based on the assumption of absolute priority. Under these
assumptions, Black and Cox [1976] were also able to show that the value of debt is
always less when asset sales are permitted than when they are not. Leland [1994a]
replicated and extended Black and Cox [1976] in an important paper which will now
be outlined in some detail.
2.5.1 Leland (1994) Following Black and Cox [1976], Leland [1994a] also con-
sidered the case of a firm financed by a single consol bond, of face value P , paying
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a continuous fixed coupon rate, c, so long as the firm remains solvent, where the
assets of the firm obey the stochastic dynamics given in (2.3.2) with   = 0. The
latter condition ensures that any net cash outflows from the firm must be financed by
selling additional equity, while the chief advantage of assuming a constant perpetual
coupon rate is that the value of debt has no time dependency. It will become appar-
ent in sequel that the assumption of a time homogeneous debt structure represents a
significant modelling advantage.
Leland [1994a] also extended Black and Cox [1976] in two ways. First, a fraction ⇠ 2
[0, 1] of asset value is lost to costs associated with reorganising the firm if bankruptcy
occurs. Second, the firm benefits from tax relief at a rate ⇡ 2 [0, 1] on coupon
payments made prior to default. The latter assumption means the the firm receives
an additional continuous income stream at a fixed rate equal to c (1  ⇡) where
0  ⇡  1 is a constant tax rate.
Default occurs the first time, ⌧b, that the value of assets falls below a constant barrier,
b,
⌧b = inf {t   0 | Vt < b} . (2.5.1)
The convention that inf {;} =1 is adopted in (2.5.1). Default does not occur if the
value of the firm does not fall below the barrier.
The value of debt, D (v, b), is the present value of the sum of all coupon payments
paid up until the time of bankruptcy plus the residual value of the assets of the firm
should default occur,
D (v, b) = Ev
ˆ 1
0
cPe ru {u<⌧b}du
 
+ Ev
⇥
(1  ⇠) e r⌧bV⌧b
⇤
(2.5.2)
=
cP
r
+
✓
(1  ⇠) b  cP
r
◆⇣v
b
⌘  2r
 2 (2.5.3)
where ⇠ is cost of reorganising the firm on default.
The value of the firm, F (v, b), is made up of the assets of the firm and the present
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value of future tax rebates minus the reorganisation costs incurred in the event of
bankruptcy
F (v, b) = v + Ev
ˆ 1
0
(1  ⇡) cPe ru {u<⌧b}du
 
  Ev
⇥
⇠e r⌧bV⌧b
⇤
= v +
⇡cP
r
✓
1 
⇣v
b
⌘  2r
 2
◆
  ⇠b
⇣v
b
⌘  2r
 2
, (2.5.4)
where ⇡ is the tax rate.
The explicit formulas in (2.5.2) and (2.5.4) follow directly from well known results
pertaining to the first passage time of a Brownian motion with drift to a constant
boundary 7.
The equity value of the firm, Q (v, b), is simply the total value of the firm minus the
value of debt
Q (v, b) = F (v, b) D (v, b)
= v   (1  ⇡) cP
r
+
✓
(1  ⇡) cP
r
  b
◆⇣v
b
⌘  2r
 2
. (2.5.5)
It is interesting to note from (2.5.5) that cost of reorganisation on bankruptcy does
not feature in the value of equity and is thus borne entirely by the bond holders.
In the case where there are no protective covenants, the firm will endogenously de-
termine the optimal asset level at which to declare bankruptcy. An inspection of
(2.5.5) indicates that equity value will be maximised by setting b as low as possible.
However, as discussed above, the strict priority rule prevents b from being arbitrarily
small because Q (v, b) must be non-negative for all v > b. Leland [1994a] observes
that since Q (v, b) is convex in v when b < (1  ⇡) cP/r, the lowest possible value
for b consistent with positive equity value for all v > b must be consistent with the
smooth pasting condition, dQ (v, b) /dv|v=b = 0, which applied to (2.5.5), yields the
7See for example Borodin and Salminen [2002].
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optimal default boundary
b⇤ =
(1  ⇡) cP
r + 12 
2
. (2.5.6)
The optimal default barrier is proportional to the coupon rate, c, decreases in the
corporate tax rate, ⇡, the risk free interest rate, r, and the riskiness of the firm,  2,
but is independent of the bankruptcy costs, ⇠, and the current value of assets, v.
The latter fact is significant in that it allows the barrier to be estimated from the
coupon payment without needing to know the firm’s current asset value. And, as
expected, Q (b⇤, b⇤) = (1  ⇠) b⇤. Using (2.5.6), (2.5.5) and (2.5.4), and (2.5.2) closed
form equations for the values of the firm, equity and debt can also easily be derived8.
Table 2.5.1 is an excerpt from Leland [1994a] which summarises the eﬀects on debt
value, yields and credit spreads of changes in the coupon rate, volatility of assets,
risk free interest rate and current asset value9. Since Leland [1994a] is an extension
of Black and Cox [1976] and Merton [1974], it is to be expected that the comparative
statics of the model are broadly in line with prior results, and, for low leverage10
firms, this is indeed the case. Bond prices/yields fall/rise in response to increases in
leverage (i.e. lower asset value), asset volatility and interest rates. Credit spreads
also increase as the probability of default rises (higher asset volatility or lower assets)
but fall as interest rates increase.
However, as the asset value approaches the default boundary, meaning that the firm
becomes more leveraged, provided that either bankruptcy costs or the tax rate are
positive, the eﬀect of higher asset volatility and risk free interest rates are reversed:
higher asset volatility and risk free interest rates increase the value of debt (and
reduce yields). In addition, for highly leveraged firms, an increase in volatility can
8See the original paper, Leland [1994a] for formulae.
9The table in Leland [1994a] also includes the sensitivities of firm and equity value to the
same variables as well as to changes in tax rates and bankruptcy costs. Higher/lower bankruptcy
costs/taxes reduce the value of the debt.
10 Low leverage in the sense that v is substantially higher than b⇤.
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Variable Sign of Change in Instrument for Increase In
c  2 r v
Bond Price > 0 < 0 < 0 > 0
D (v, b⇤) < 0 as v ! b⇤ > 0 as v ! b⇤ > 0 as v ! b⇤
Yield > 0 > 0 > 0 < 0
y (v, b⇤) < 0 as v ! b⇤ < 0 as v ! b⇤
Spread > 0 > 0 < 0 < 0
s (v, b⇤) < 0 as v ! b⇤
Table 2.5.1: Leland (1994) Comparative Static Analysis
This table shows the directionality of the sensitivity of Leland [1994a] bond prices, yields
and credit spreads to changes in coupon rate, asset volatility, interest rates asset value under
endogenous bankruptcy.
reduce credit spreads. Moreover, while as would be expected, bond prices are typically
increasing in the coupon rate, for highly leveraged firms a higher coupon can cause
bond prices to fall. Thus the behaviour of the bond prices of highly leveraged firms can
be quite diﬀerent to that of firms with a low level of leverage when either bankruptcy
and/or taxes are positive11.
The reason for these apparently counter intuitive results is that a lowering of the
default boundary will make the arrival of bankruptcy costs less imminent and the
value of debt will be very sensitive to such changes when v is close to b⇤. Higher risk
free rates, higher asset volatility and a lower coupon rate all act to lower b⇤ which has
a dominating positive eﬀect on D (v, b⇤) at values of v close to b⇤. Leveraged debt
holders are thus incentivised to act like shareholders.
2.5.2 Leland and Toft (1996) Leland and Toft [1996] extend Leland [1994a]
to examine the optimal capital structure of a firm financed by debt with a specific
maturity profile, by introducing a model which assumes that a firm refinances itself
in a rather ingenuous way. At time t, it is assumed that debt of a given par value p is
11The bonds of highly leveraged firms are typically referred to as ’junk’ bonds or high yield bonds
and normally trade at much lower prices than less leveraged investment grade bonds
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redeemed, and new debt instantaneously issued, with the same par value, according to
a specific maturity profile, with the face value of debt issued with maturity s given by
p (s) where  (s)  1 and ´10  (s) ds = 1. The latter approach, which is commonly
referred to in the literature as roll-over debt, has subsequently been used by many
authors. The primary advantage of the roll-over debt model is that, as is the case
with a single infinite maturity bond, principal value of outstanding debt remains fixed
at a given level P and debt service costs are time invariant12. However, because debt
is being issued with a specific maturity profile, the model is rich enough to permit an
analysis of the term structure of debt.
Apart from the assumption of roll-over debt, the firm structure in Leland and Toft
[1996] remains the same as Leland [1994a]. The value of assets is assumed to obey
(2.3.2) with   > 0. On default, a proportion of assets ⇠ 2 [0, 1] is lost in the reor-
ganisation of the firm and prior to default, the firm receives a tax relief benefit at a
rate of (1  ⇡) c, where 0  ⇡  1. Default is again assumed to occur at time ⌧b as
in (2.5.1).
The price of a risky bond at time 0, paying 1 at maturity time t, is made up of the
discounted value of coupon income up until maturity or default, the principle value
of the bond if default does not occur before maturity and the recovery value should
default occur prior to maturity given by
d (v, b, t) =
ˆ t
0
Ev
⇥
e rs {s<⌧b}
⇤
ds+ Ev
⇥
e rt {t<⌧b}
⇤
+
(1  ⇠)
P
Ev
⇥
e r⌧bV⌧b {t ⌧b}
⇤
. (2.5.7)
The total value of all outstanding debt is then given by integrating (2.5.7) over all
12A formal description of the roll-over debt approach is outlined in Subsection 3.2.2.
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possible maturity times
D (v, b) =
ˆ 1
0
p (s) d (v, b, s) ds
=pcEv
ˆ ⌧b
0
e rsb (s) ds + pEv ˆ ⌧b
0
e rs (s) ds
 
+
(1  ⇠) p
P
Ev
h
e r⌧bV⌧b b (⌧b)i , (2.5.8)
where b (t) := ´1t  (s) ds.
Leland and Toft [1996] assumed a form of the maturity profile was given by,  T ,
the Dirac delta function concentrated at time T . Leland [1994a] assumed that the
maturity profile given by
 (t) = me mt (2.5.9)
from which it follows that  (t) = mb (t) = exp ( mt) , and in which case, the total
value of debt simplifies to,
D (v, b) =
(m+ c)
(m+ r)
PEv
⇥
1  e (m+r)⌧b⇤+ (1  ⇠)Ev ⇥e (m+r)⌧bV⌧b⇤ , (2.5.10)
with the total value of the firm is given by
F (v, b) = v + Ev
ˆ 1
0
(1  ⇡) cPe ru1{u<⌧b}du
 
  Ev
⇥
⇠e r⌧bV⌧b
⇤
= v +
⇡cP
r
Ev
⇥
1  e r⌧b⇤  ⇠Ev ⇥e r⌧bV⌧b⇤ . (2.5.11)
The firm is assumed to choose the bankruptcy level, b, to maximise the value of equity
Q (v, b) = F (v, b) D (v, b). Leland and Toft [1996] also achieve this by invoking the
smooth fit condition
@Q (v, b)
@v
    
v=b
= 0
and solve to derive a constant barrier at which it is optimal for the firm to declare
default. Using this barrier Leland and Toft [1996] then proceed to investigate optimal
leverage, debt capacity and credit spreads deriving broadly similar conclusions to
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Leland [1994a].
2.6 Stochastic Interest Rates
It is well known that empirical observation is broadly consistent with the negative
relationship between risk free interest rates and credit spreads which is a feature of
Merton [1974] 13. Attempts to incorporate this feature have led many authors to
assume that risk free interest rates obey stochastic dynamics of the general form
dr = ↵ (rt) dt+   (rt) dWt. (2.6.1)
In order to introduce a dependence between the risk free rate and the asset price
process it has been suggested that the Brownian motions in (2.3.2) and (2.6.1) can
be correlated. It is worth noting that this latter assumption has typically been im-
plemented as a constant instantaneous correlation which has the obvious implication
that the relationship between interest rates and asset valuations remains invariant
through time.
There have been a number of popular interest rate models which are distinguished
by the form of the drift and volatility terms in (2.6.1). Vasicek [1977] assumed that
↵ (rt) =  (✓   rt) where ✓, > 0 and   (rt) =   whereas in Cox et al. [1985], the
so called CIR model, the drift term is the same but the volatility term is given
by   (rt) =  
p
rt. In the generalised Vasicek model, ↵ (rt) =  (t) (✓ (t)  rt) and
  (rt) =  r (t) where a, b,   : [0, T ]! R+\ {0} are deterministic functions.
Many authors have extended structural models to include stochastic interest rates.
For example, Jamshidian [1989], Shimko et al. [1993], Briys and de Varenne [1997],
Longstaﬀ and Schwartz [1995], all assume the interest rates follow Vasicek dynamics
whereas Wang [1999], Kim et al. [1993a], Cathcart and El-Jahel [1998] assume interest
13See Table 2.3.1.
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rates follow the CIR model. Hsu et al. [2004], on the other hand, assumed that interest
rates follow a simple Itô process driven by a Brownian motion.
Some authors have suggested that interest rates have significant eﬀects on credit
spreads. Longstaﬀ and Schwartz [1995], for example, numerically verified model pre-
dictions that credit spreads exhibited a negative relationship with interest rates and
that the durations of risky bonds can significantly depend on the correlation of a firm’s
assets with interest rates. Other authors have found weaker relationships between in-
terest rate volatility and spreads 14.
2.7 Discontinuous Asset Price Processes
The assumption that assets follow a diﬀusive process in Merton [1974] results in credit
spreads for solvent firms being close to zero for short maturities, which is at odds with
empirically observed behaviour. Brownian motion is a continuous process which in
turn implies that the asset value process associated with (2.3.2) is also continuous.
As a result, immediately prior to maturity, the value of assets at maturity is already
revealed, at which point, if the value of assets exceeds the level of debt, the bond
becomes eﬀectively risk free and the credit spread collapses to zero.
In order to overcome this issue many authors have suggested incorporating discon-
tinuities into the asset value process. Intuitively, if the asset process can jump at
unpredictable times, then even if the asset value exceeds the level of debt immedi-
ately prior to maturity, there may still be a chance that the asset process can jump
below the level of debt before maturity. Positive credit spreads may be required
to compensate for this gap risk even for apparently solvent firms. In some respects,
structural models with jump risk represent somewhat of a reconciliation with reduced
form models in the sense that the default event may come by surprise.
14See Kim et al. [1993b], Brennan and Schwartz [1980]
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While discontinuities in asset price processes were studied as early as Merton [1976]
they have only been applied in the context of structural models of credit risk more
recently. Typically, in order to introduce jumps into structural models, the asset
value process (2.3.2) is replaced by a process of the form
dVt
Vt
=(r    ) dt+  dWt + dJt, (2.7.1)
where {Jt}t 0 is some jumping process. Naturally there is a wide range of modelling
possibilities for the jumping process and the choice of such has varied amongst authors
and diﬀerentiated recent contributions.
In terms of first passage models, Zhou [2001] extends Black and Cox [1976] to incor-
porate jumps by including a Poisson process into the asset value process and assuming
a normal distribution for the value of the jumps. The resulting model is seen to be
able to generate credit spreads and credit spread term structures which more closely
reflect those observed empirically. In addition, recovery rates, rather than being exo-
genously specified, are linked to the firm value at default and specifically the overshoot
of the asset value should default occur as a result of a jump in the asset value process.
The capital structure model of Leland and Toft [1996] was extended by Hilberink
and Rogers [2002] and Surya and Kyprianou [2007] to the case of a general Lévy
process with only downward jumps, finding that credit spreads do not collapse to
zero for short maturities. Chen and Kou [2009] and Dao and Jeanblanc [2012] also
extend Leland and Toft [1996] but allow for two-sided jumps where the jump size has
a double-exponential density. Optimal leverage was found to be lower in the presence
of downward jumps, and indeed, Chen and Kou [2009] observed that highly risky
firms would optimally hold very little debt.
2.8 Regime-Switching Models
In the recent literature, there has been considerable interest in so called ’regime-
switching’ models which allow modelling parameters such as asset volatility to be
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dependent of some state of the economy. There has been substantial empirical re-
search reported in the literature going back as far as Hamilton [1989] suggesting that
the aggregated economy is subject to period regime-shifts between distinct business
cycles. It is natural, therefore, to conjecture that regime-shifts between diﬀerent eco-
nomic regimes may have an important influence on the capital decisions and credit
profile of a firm. Academic interest in the relationship between capital structure and
credit quality has only been increased by the advent of the recent global financial
crisis.
Alexander and Kaeck [2008] empirically studied the impact of equity returns and
volatility on Credit Default Swap (CDS)15 spreads and found strong evidence that
theoretical determinants of credit spreads has a regime dependent behaviour. It was
observed that during volatile regimes, credit spreads were more sensitive to changes
in asset volatility, whereas during tranquil regimes, stock market returns were the
influence on credit spreads. Similar results were reported by Tang and Yan [2010] who
empirically studied the interaction between CDS spreads and GDP 16 growth rates
and the volatility of GDP growth rates, identifying investor sentiment at the aggregate
level and asset volatility at the firm level as the most important determinants of credit
spreads. However, evidence was also reported suggesting an important relationship
between economic conditions and firm-specific characteristics. In particular, it was
found that firms with cash flows, that had a positive correlation to GDP growth,
exhibited lower credit spreads during economic expansions and vice versa during
economic contractions.
In terms of capital structure, Lemmon et al. [2008] reported long-term stability and
convergence of leverage ratios across sectors of the economy and a weak relation-
ship between a number of firm specific financial metrics and leverage ratios, leaving
a large unexplained residual. However, building on the latter study, Akhtar [2012],
after incorporating the eﬀect of four diﬀerent stages of the business cycle, including
15Credit Default Swap (CDS) is a type of financial instrument where the seller insures the buyer
against losses accrued as a result of a default type event eﬀecting a firm.
16Gross Domestic Product.
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expansion, peak, contraction and trough, found business cycles to be an important de-
terminant of the unexplained variation in leverage ratios reported earlier by Lemmon
et al. [2008]. In particular, it was found that business cycle phases become far more
important in explaining variation in leverage after having controlled for the eﬀect
of firm specific financial characteristics. The latter study suggests that the business
cycle may indeed have an important impact on firm capital structure decisions and
therefore credit quality.
In one of the more extensive empirical studies conducted in relation to corporate
default risk, Giesecke et al. [2011] reported on a 150-year of history of corporate
default rates. Using a regime-switching framework, the latter study found that both
stock market returns and stock market volatility have significant forecasting power
in relation to default rates. In addition, it was found that changes in GDP have a
strong relationship with subsequent default rates. The latter observations suggest
that important relationships may exist between the macro economy and the firm
credit quality. In a follow-up study. Giesecke et al. [2014] focused more specifically
on the eﬀects of banking crisis and default rates and found that, despite the size of
the corporate bond market being in the same order of magnitude as the bank lending
market, banking crisis appear to have much graver implications for the macroeconomic
environment than crises in corporate bond markets.
Motivated by the above empirical justifications, a number of authors have recently
proposed models of capital structure and credit risk which incorporate regime-switching
features. Hackbarth et al. [2006] considered the eﬀect of a macroeconomic shock on
capital structure and credit risk. The firm’s EBIT17 was modelled as the product
of two random variables, one reflecting the aggregate state of the economy and one
an idiosyncratic shock reflecting firm-level productivity uncertainty. The aggregate
shock was assumed to take one of two values according to two-state Markov chain
and firm level uncertainty was reflected as a geometric Brownian motion. Adopting
the Leland and Toft [1996] rollover debt structure, Hackbarth et al. [2006] derived
17The firm’s profitability defined as earnings before interest and taxes.
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analytic expressions for equity, firm and debt values of a firm and then imposed a
smooth-fit condition to derive endogenous default boundaries which maximised equity
value. The authors found that the firm’s optimal default policy was characterised by
diﬀerent default threshold in each regime. Default was more likely in the recessionary
regime and credit spreads were higher.
Siu et al. [2008] investigated the pricing of CDS using a structural model where the
asset process of the firm was assumed to be Markov modulated with the interest rate
process, firm’s asset volatility and drift being driven by a two state Markov chain to
distinguish between good and bad states of the economy. Based on numerical calcu-
lations for assumed levels of asset volatility, drift and default boundaries, the authors
conclude that CDS spreads increase substantially in the bad state of the economy
characterised by higher asset volatility and lower asset returns. In addition, it was
argued that the inclusion of regime-switching eﬀects provide a potential mechanism
to improve the underestimation of default probabilities which are often associated
with the standard Merton structural model.
Optimal capital structure under regime-switching was also investigated by Elliott
and Shen [2015] using a model in which the firm’s asset process was modelled as a
regime-switching geometric Brownian motion. As in the case of Siu et al. [2008], both
the firm’s asset price volatility and drift, as well as the risk free interest rate, were
assumed to be modulated by an finite state Markov chain. The firm was, however,
assumed to be financed by a single consol bond and to benefit from tax relief on
coupon payments, adding a stream of positive cashflows to the value of the firm.
Once again, assuming a two-state economy with regime shifts being controlled by
a Markov chain, analytic expressions for optimal endogenously determined default
barriers and the optimal capital structure were identified.
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2.9 Summary
The initial seminal paper by Merton [1974] has spawned a rich literature on the subject
of capital structure and credit risk. There have since been considerable advances made
in terms of default at first passage and the inclusion of jumps into the asset value
process. Leland [1994a], Leland and Toft [1996] made significant advances in terms
of characterising the optimal capital structure of a firm financed by debt and thereby
initiated a new line of research enquiry. However, while these initial advances were
now made some time ago, in view of continued contributions in literature, it is clear
that structural models of credit risk remain an active area of interest in financial
mathematics research.
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CHAPTER 3 ROLL-OVER DEBT UNDER
REGIME-SWITCHING
3.1 Introduction
The topic of endogenously determined optimal capital structure remains an active
area of research. Since its introduction by Leland [1994b], the roll-over debt model,
outlined in Subsection 3.2.2 below, has been the motivation a large volume of research
in the area of structural models of credit. The key facet of the roll-over debt framework
is that debt of a given maturity profile is constantly being issued and redeemed in
such a way that the outstanding nominal value of debt remains constant. The main
advantage of the roll-over debt approach is that it combines the analytical tractability
of a time invariant or stationary debt structure with a debt maturity profile. The
latter allows the term structure of debt to be analysed.
The roll-over debt model has been adopted by numerous authors and extended in
many ways. The approach was first introduced by Leland [1994b] first with an ex-
ponentially driven maturity profile and later in Leland and Toft [1996] extended to
the case of a finite maturity profile. Originally formulated with the firm’s asset price
modelled as a geometric Brownian motion Hilberink and Rogers [2002], Surya and
Kyprianou [2007] extended the generality of the approach by modelling the asset price
process as a spectrally negative Lévy process. More recently, Chen and Kou [2009]
and Dao and Jeanblanc [2012] extended further the approach to allow for two-sided
jumps where the jump size had a double-exponential density.
The approach taken in this chapter follows one that has been adopted by many
authors in the literature. The assertion that, on default, the value of a firm’s equity
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should be zero, normally referred to as the strict priority rule, provides a boundary
condition that the equity price process must satisfy on default. The assumption
underlying many implementations of the roll-over debt framework is that default
occurs at first passage of the asset price process below a fixed boundary. If using the
latter two criteria, the value of equity can be identified in terms of the boundary, then
in principle, the boundary can be chosen so as to maximise the value of equity. In
many cases, including the original formulation by Leland [1994b], the value of equity
in terms of the default boundary can be identified in closed form.
Motivated by the empirical research outlined in Section 2.8, the model presented in
this chapter contributes to the literature by presenting the roll-over debt structure
in the context of a regime-switching. The model will focus on a single-asset firm
partly financed by debt in two economic regimes, one good and one recessionary. It
will be assumed that the asset process of the firm follows a regime-switching geo-
metric Brownian motion. Asset volatility, risk free interest and dividend rates will
be assumed to be regime-dependent. Default is modelled as the first time that the
asset value process of the firm falls below a fixed barrier, also regime-dependent.
Capital structure is first identified for fixed boundaries given exogenously before the
boundaries are selected in order to maximise the value of equity in line with the com-
ments above. Credit spreads associated with the maximised capital structure are also
identified.
The firm will also be assumed to benefit from tax relief on interest payments generat-
ing an income stream which is additive to the value of the firm. If the firm defaults,
it is assumed to suﬀer bankruptcy costs modelled as a fixed proportion of asset value
at time of default. The existing literature is extended by also allowing tax rates and
bankruptcy costs to vary by regime. As already noted, it has been customary on the
literature to incorporate a tax threshold for the asset value under which tax relief
on interest payments is not accrued. This feature is not modelled in this chapter.
It has been noted by Leland and Toft [1996] that without this feature, a firm may
be incentivised by the additional cashflows to undertake very high levels of leverage.
In the model presented in this chapter, however, lower tax rates in the recessionary
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regime will act as a disincentive for the firm to undertake leverage.
The outline of this chapter is as follows. The model formulation is outlined in Section
3.2. In Section 3.3, the capital structure associated with exogenously given regime-
dependent boundaries is identified. Endogenously determined regime-dependent bound-
aries which maximise equity value are characterised along with optimised credit
spreads in Section 3.4. Finally, Section 3.5 presents some numerical calculations.
Auxiliary results are collected in Section 3.6.
3.2 Model Formulation
3.2.1 Asset Processes Let W = {Wt}t 0 be a standard Brownian motion and
{Zt}t 0 a continuous time Markov chain with finite state space E = {1, 2} and gen-
erator matrix G given by
G =
 
  1  1
 2   2
!
with  i > 0, i 2 E which is independent of W . It is assumed the value of a firm’s
assets, V = {Vt}t 0, evolve according to a regime-switching geometric Brownian
motion with stochastic dynamics given by
dVt
Vt
= (r (Zt)    (Zt))dt+   (Zt) dWt, V0 = v > 0, Z0 = i 2 E, (3.2.1)
where r (i) ,   (i) : E 7! R+\ {0} are the compound risk free interest and dividend
rates respectively and   (i) : E 7! R+\ {0} are the volatility coeﬃcients. The value of
Z represents the state of the economy at a given time in which the compound interest
and dividend rates and the volatility parameter are assumed to be known constants.
Where there is no scope for ambiguity, the notation ai will be used to denote the
value of parameter a in regime i.
It is assumed that the stochastic processes V and Z are defined on some filtered
probability space (⌦,F ,P,F) where F = {Ft}t 0 denotes the completed filtration
35
Roll-over Debt under Regime-Switching
jointly generated by V and Z. Conditional expectations will be denoted by writing
Ev,i [·] = E [·|V0 = v, Z0 = i].
Furthermore, it is assumed that there exists a savings account process {Bt}t 0 satis-
fying
Bt = exp
✓
 
ˆ t
0
r (Zs) ds
◆
. (3.2.2)
Defining X = log(V ), Theorem 1 in Mijatovic and Pistorius [Preprint] implies that
the discounted moment generating function of the process (X,Z) is given by
E0,i

euXt
Bt
{Zj=j}
 
= 1i
0et(K(u) ⇤r)1j, u 2 R,
where k (u) := G + ⇤ (u), ⇤r is a 2 ⇥ 2 diagonal matrix with diagonal elements r(i)
for i 2 E and ⇤ (u) is a 2 ⇥ 2 diagonal matrix where the ith element is equal to the
characteristic exponent of the process X in regime i 2 E given by
 i (u) = u
✓
ri    i   1
2
 2i
◆
+
1
2
 2i u
2.
It follows, therefore, from (3.2.1) that the risk neutral drift of the process V is given
by ri   i, i 2 E. As a consequence, it will be assumed that all expectations in sequel
are taken under the risk neutral pricing measure.
3.2.2 Roll-over debt structure. The firm is partly financed by debt which is
being constantly issued and redeemed in such a way that the face value of debt remains
constant - the so called roll-over debt structure. Originally introduced in Leland
[1994b], the description which follows draws heavily on the exposition in Hilberink
and Rogers [2002]. In the time interval (t, t+ dt), the firm issues debt with face
value pdt and maturity profile  > 0 where
´1
0  (s)ds = 1. Therefore, debt with
face value p (s) dtds will be issued in the time interval (t, t+ dt) which matures in
(t+ s, t+ s+ ds). At time 0, the face value of all debt maturing in (s, s+ ds) will be
given by
p
ˆ 0
 1
 (s  v) dvds := p (s) ds (3.2.3)
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where  (u) :=
´1
u  (t) dt. Taking s = 0 in (3.2.3), the face value of debt maturing
in (0, du) is pdu, which is the same as the face value of newly issued debt, implying
the face value of all debt remains constant and given by
P = p
ˆ 1
0
 (s) ds.
All debt is of equal seniority and pays a fixed coupon rate of c. The importance of
the roll-over debt structure is that it provides a flexible and time-independent debt
profile which permits the analysis of debt maturity.
3.2.3 Default Default occurs the first time, ⌧ (b), that the value of the firm falls
to a level which is dependent upon the regime,
⌧ (b) = inf {t   0 | Vt  b (Zt)} , (3.2.4)
where the boundaries are defined as b = (b1, b2). On default, a regime dependent
fraction ⇠i 2 [0, 1] , i 2 E, of the firm’s assets are lost in the resulting reorganisation.
Following the established literature, it is assumed that assets in place cannot be
liquidated in order to raise funds to pay debt holders.
In Section 3.3 below, the default levels in (3.2.4) are assumed to be known and given
exogenously. Later in Section 3.4, the latter assumption will be relaxed to identify
default levels determined endogenously by the firm in order to maximise the value of
equity.
3.2.4 Bond Prices and Total Debt The price of a bond issued by the firm
at time 0 paying 1 at maturity time t and a fixed coupon rate of c is equal to
the discounted value of coupon income and principal payments, which occur prior
to maturity, together with the discounted value of the residual value of the assets,
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should default occur before maturity of the bond, and is given by
d (v, i, b, t) =
ˆ t
0
Ev,i
h
ce 
´ s
0 r(zu)du {s<⌧(b)}
i
ds
+ Ev,i
h
e 
´ t
0 r(zu)du {t<⌧(b)}
i
+
1
P
Ev,i
h
e 
´ ⌧(b)
0 r(zu)du
 
1  ⇠  Z⌧(b)  V⌧(b) {t ⌧(b)}i , (3.2.5)
where Ev,i[.] = E[. | V0 = v, Z0 = i]. The term 1P in the latter display reflects the
proportion of assets to which a bond of face value 1, in proportion to a total principal
debt outstanding of P , will be entitled on default.
The total value of all outstanding debt at time 0 is then obtained by integrating over
all maturity dates using the roll-over maturity profile,  , to obtain
D(v, i, b) =
ˆ 1
0
p (t) d (x, b, t, j) dt
=pcEv,i
"ˆ ⌧(b)
0
ce 
´ t
0 r(Zu)dub (t) dt#
+ pEv,i
"ˆ ⌧(b)
0
e 
´ t
0 r(Zu)du (t) dt
#
+
p
P
Ev,j
h
e 
´ ⌧(b)
0 r(Zu)du
 
1  ⇠  Z⌧(b)  V⌧(b)b (⌧ (b))i , (3.2.6)
where b (t) := ´1t  (s) ds.
Following Leland and Toft [1996], Hilberink and Rogers [2002], Dao and Jeanblanc
[2012] it is assumed that the form of the roll-over debt maturity profile from Subsection
(3.2.2) is given by
 (t) = m exp ( mt) (3.2.7)
from which it follows that  (t) = mb (t) = exp( mt) and that, after some simple
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manipulations, the total value of debt at time 0 in (3.2.6) simplifies to
D (v, i, b) = P (m+ c)Ev,i
"ˆ ⌧(b)
0
e 
´ t
0 (r(Zu)+m)dudt
#
+Ev,i
h
e 
´ ⌧(b)
0 (r(Zu)+m)du
 
1  ⇠  Z⌧(b)  V⌧(b)i
= P (m+ c) 1i
0 (⇤r+m  G) 1 1
 Ev,i
h
e 
´ ⌧(b)
0 (r(Zu)+m)du
 
⌫˜(Z⌧(b)) 
 
1  ⇠  Z⌧(b)  V⌧(b) i (3.2.8)
for i 2 E, where
⌫˜(k) = P (m+ c) 1k
0 (⇤r+m  G) 1 1, k 2 E, (3.2.9)
⇤a is a 2⇥ 2 diagonal matrix with elements equal to a(i) for i 2 E, 1 is a 2 element
vector of ones and 1k is a 2 element vector with 1 in row k and zero in the alternate
row. The expectations in the first equality in the above display were calculated using
Lemma’s 3.6.1 and 3.6.2 which are included in Section 3.6.
3.2.5 Value of the Firm The firm receives tax relief on the value of coupon
payments made equal to ⇡ (i) 2 [0, 1] in regime i. It follows that the value of the firm
is comprised of the value of assets at time 0 together with the present value of future
tax relief minus the proportion of assets lost in reorganisation of the firm on default
given by
F (v, i, b) = v + cP⇡Ev,i
"ˆ ⌧(b)
0
e 
´ t
0 r(Zu)dudt
#
  Ev,i
h
e 
´ ⌧(b)
0 r(Zu)du⇠
 
Z⌧(b)
 
V⌧(b)
i
= v + cP1i (⇤r  G) 1 ⇡
 Ev,i
h
e 
´ ⌧(b)
0 r(Zu)du
 
 ˜
 
Z⌧(b)
 
+ ⇠
 
Z⌧(b)
 
V⌧(b)
 i
(3.2.10)
for i 2 E with
 ˜(k) = 1k
0cP (⇤r  G) 1 ⇡, k 2 E, (3.2.11)
and ⇡ = (⇡ (1) , ⇡ (2))0 where once again Lemma’s 3.6.1 and 3.6.2 were used to calcu-
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late the expectations in the first equality.
3.2.6 Equity Value The equity value of the firm is simply taken to be the value
of the firm in (3.2.10) minus the value of debt in (3.2.8),
Q (v, i, b) = v + 1i
⇣
cP (⇤r  G) 1 ⇡   P (m+ c) (⇤r+m  G) 1 1
⌘
 Ev,i
h
e 
´ ⌧(b)
0 r(Zu)du
 
 ˜
 
Z⌧(b)
 
+ ⇠
 
Z⌧(b)
 
V⌧(b)
 i
+Ev,i
h
e 
´ ⌧(b)
0 (r(Zu)+m)du
 
⌫˜(Z⌧(b)) 
 
1  ⇠  Z⌧(b)  V⌧(b) i (3.2.12)
for i 2 E where  ˜ (·) and ⌫˜ (·) are given in (3.2.11) and (3.2.9) respectively. It is worth
noting that on default the value of equity is identically zero which is in accordance
with the strict priority rule.
3.3 Capital Structure with Exogenous Boundaries
3.3.1 Exogenous Boundaries With the boundaries in (3.2.4) given exogen-
ously, in order to determine the value of equity, the firm and debt, the key obser-
vation is that at the default boundaries, the value of equity is identically zero, which,
together with an application of Dynkin’s Formula, implies a constraint on the charac-
teristic operator of the process (V, Z) when applied to Q (v, i, b) in (3.2.12). The latter
observations together with Proposition 3.3.2 allows the value of equity, the firm and
total debt identified explicitly in the following Theorem when the default boundaries
in (3.2.4) are known to satisfy b1 > b2. An entirely analogous result for the case when
b2 > b1 can be derived by symmetry in exactly the same manner as Theorem 3.3.1
and is therefore omitted. The case when the default boundaries are the same will not
be addressed in this chapter.
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Theorem 3.3.1. Let b1 > b2 in (3.2.4) then the value of equity in (3.2.12), the firm
in (3.2.10) and total debt in (3.2.8) are given by
Q (v, i, b) = v + 1i
 
cP (⇤r  G) 1 ⇡   P (m+ c) (⇤r+m  G) 1 1
 
 w0 (v, i, b, ⇠,  ˜) + wm (v, i, b, ⇠   1, ⌫˜) (3.3.1)
F (v, i, b) = v + cP1i (⇤r  G) 1 ⇡   w0 (v, i, b, ⇠,  ˜) (3.3.2)
D (v, i, b) = P (m+ c) 1i
0 (⇤r+m  G) 1 1  wm (v, i, b, ⇠   1, ⌫˜) (3.3.3)
where w  is specified in (3.3.4), ⇤a is a 2⇥ 2 diagonal matrix with elements equal to
a(i) for i 2 E, 1 is a 2 element vector of ones and 1k is an 2 element vector with 1
in row k and zero in the alternate row and  ˜ and ⌫˜ are vectors given in (3.2.11) and
(3.2.9) respectively.
Proof. The proof follows directly from an application of Proposition 3.3.2 to (3.2.8),
(3.2.10) and (3.2.12) upon insisting that Q (b, i, b) = 0, i 2 E in (3.2.12).
Proposition 3.3.2. Let h˜, a˜ : E ! R,   > 0 and b1 > b2 in (3.2.4) then
w 
⇣
v, i, b, a˜, h˜
⌘
= Ev,i
h
e 
´ ⌧(b)
0 (r(Zu)+ )du
⇣
h˜(Z⌧(b))  a˜(Z⌧(b))V⌧(b)
⌘i
, i 2 E,
(3.3.4)
where w 
⇣
bi, i, b, a˜, h˜
⌘
= h˜ (i)  a˜ (i) bi, i 2 E, is given by
w 
⇣
x, 1, b, a˜, h˜
⌘
=
8<:C1x⇢ 1 + C2x⇢ 2 , x > b1, 1 (b1) , b1   x, (3.3.5)
w 
⇣
x, 2, b, a˜, h˜
⌘
=
8>>>><>>>>:
G ,1(⇢ 1)
 1
C1x⇢ 1 +
G ,1(⇢ 2)
 1
C2x⇢ 2 , x > b1,
A1x⇣
2
 1 + A2x⇣
2
 2 + '2 (x) , b1 > x > b2,
 2 (b2) , b2   x,
(3.3.6)
where  j (x) = h˜ (j)  a˜ (j) x, the constants C1, C2, A1 and A2 satisfy the linear system
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given by2666664
b
⇣2 1
2 b
⇣2 2
2 0 0
0 0 G ,1(⇢ 1) 1 b
⇢ 1
1
G ,1(⇢ 2)
 1
b⇢ 21
b
⇣2 1
1 b
⇣2 2
1  b⇢ 11  b⇢ 21
⇣2 1b
⇣2 1 1
1 ⇣
2
 2b
⇣2 2 1
1  ⇢ 1b⇢ 1 11  ⇢ 2b⇢ 2 11
3777775
2666664
A1
A2
C1
C2
3777775 =
2666664
 2 (b2) + ' ,2 (b2)
 1 (b1)
' ,2 (b1)
'0 ,2 (b1)
3777775 (3.3.7)
with
' ,j (x) =  j
 
h˜ (3  j)
r (j) +  j
+
a˜ (3  j) x
  (j) +  j +  
!
, j 2 E,
G ,j (z) = 1
2
z2  (j)2 + z
✓
r (j)    (j)  1
2
  (j)2
◆
  ( j + r (j) +  ) , j 2 E,
⇣j 1 and ⇣
j
 2 are positive and negative roots of the equation G ,j (⇣) = 0 for j 2 E
respectively, ⇢ 1 and ⇢ 2 are the negative roots of the equation G ,1 (⇢)G ,2 (⇢)  1 2 =
0 and f 0denotes the derivative of the function f.
Proof. The infinitesimal generator of the process (V, Z) for f (·) 2 C2 is given by
LV,Zf(x, i) =
1
2
 2i x
2@
2f(x, i)
@x2
+(ri    i) x@f(x, i)
@x
+ i (f (x, 1  i)  f (x, i)) (3.3.8)
for i 2 E. When x > b1, if w  solves LV,Zw (x, i) = 0, i 2 E, for the stated boundary
conditions, w 
⇣
bi, i, b, a˜, h˜
⌘
= h˜ (i)   a˜ (i) bi, i 2 E, then Dynkin’s formula implies
that (3.3.4) holds. To solve for w , note that (3.3.8) forms two coupled ODE’s with
characteristic equation given by
G ,1 (⇢)G ,2 (⇢) =  1 2, (3.3.9)
where
G ,i (⇢) = 1
2
 2i ⇢
2 + (ri    i   1
2
 2i )⇢  (ri +  i +  ) , i 2 E, (3.3.10)
which has 4 distinct real roots, ⇢ 1 < ⇢ 2 < 0 < ⇢ 3 < ⇢ 4 with the general form of
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the solution when x > b1 given by
w 
⇣
x, 1, b, a˜, h˜
⌘
=
4X
k=1
Ckx
⇢ k , x > b1, (3.3.11)
w 
⇣
x, 2, b, a˜, h˜
⌘
=
4X
k=1
G ,1 (⇢ k)
 1
Ckx
⇢ k , x > b1. (3.3.12)
However, since w 
⇣
x, i, b, a˜, h˜
⌘
is bounded by maxi2E
   h˜ (i)  a˜ (i) bi   , it follows that
the terms in (3.3.11) and (3.3.12) with positive exponents must be zero.
When b1   x > b2, w 
⇣
x, 1, b, a˜, h˜
⌘
= h˜ (1) a˜ (1) x which implies that w (x, 2, b, a˜, h˜)
solves an inhomogeneous ODE with complementary solution reading as
wc 
⇣
x, 2, b, a˜, h˜
⌘
= A1x
⇣2 1 + A2x
⇣2 2 , (3.3.13)
where ⇣2 1 and ⇣2 2 are the positive and negative roots of G ,2 (⇣) = 0 given in (3.3.10).
The Wronskian for the fundamental set of solutions of (3.3.13) is then given by
W =
      x⇣
2
 1 x⇣
2
 2
⇣2 1x
⇣2 1 1 ⇣2 2x
⇣2 2 1
      = x⇣2 1⇣2 2x⇣2 2 1   x⇣2 2⇣2 1x⇣2 1 1 (3.3.14)
(which is non-zero since ⇣2 1 6= ⇣2 2 ) generating a particular solution
wp 
⇣
x, 2, b, a˜, h˜
⌘
= x⇣
2
 2
ˆ  2
⇣
h˜ (1)  a˜ (1) x
⌘
1
2 
2
2x
2x⇣
2
 2 1 (⇣2 1   ⇣2 1)
dx
 x⇣2 1
ˆ  2
⇣
h˜ (1)  a˜ (1) x
⌘
1
2 
2
2x
2x⇣
2
 1 1 (⇣2 1   ⇣2 2)
dx (3.3.15)
=
2 2
⇣
h˜ (1) (⇣2 1   1) (⇣2 2   1)  ⇣2 1⇣2 2a˜ (1) x
⌘
 22 (⇣
2
 1   1) ⇣2 1 (⇣2 2   1) ⇣2 2
=  2
 
h˜ (1)
 2 + r2
  a˜ (1) x
 2 +  2 +  
!
:= '2,  (x) . (3.3.16)
Collecting results it follows that the general solution to (3.3.4) when b1 > b2 may be
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written
w 
⇣
x, 1, b, a˜, h˜
⌘
= C1x
⇢ 1 + C2x
⇢ 2 , x > b1 > b2, (3.3.17)
w 
⇣
x, 2, b, a˜, h˜
⌘
=
G1,  (⇢ 1)
 1
C1x
⇢ 1 +
G1,  (⇢ 2)
 1
C2x
⇢ 2 , x > b1 > b2, (3.3.18)
w 
⇣
x, 2, b, a˜, h˜
⌘
= A1x
⇣2 1 + A2x
⇣2 2 + '2,  (x) . b1   x > b2. (3.3.19)
At the boundaries, w 
⇣
x, i, b, a˜, h˜
⌘
= h˜ (i)   a˜ (i) bi :=  i (bi) for i 2 E, which,
together with the requirement that (3.3.18) and (3.3.19) are C0 and C1 respectively
at x = b1, generates the system given in (3.3.7).
3.4 Optimised Capital Structure
3.4.1 Optimised Boundaries Following the established literature 1, equity value
in (3.3.1) can be maximised (relative to constant boundaries) by enforcing the heur-
istic of the smooth-pasting condition at the optimised boundaries, b⇤ = (b⇤1, b⇤2),
@
@v
Q (v, i, b⇤)
    
v=b⇤i
= 0, i 2 E, (3.4.1)
which in view of (3.3.1), in the context of the model being presented, translates into
the requirement that
@
@v
(wm (v, i, b
⇤, ⇠ + 1, ⌫˜)  w0 (v, i, b⇤, ⇠,  ˜))
    
v=b⇤i
=  1, i 2 E, (3.4.2)
where  ˜ (·) and ⌫˜ (·) are given in (3.2.11) and (3.2.9) respectively and w  is specified
in (3.3.4). It follows, therefore, that a b⇤ = (b⇤1, b⇤2) with b⇤1 > b⇤2 which satisfies the
two non-linear equations given by (3.4.2), in conjunction with system (3.3.5)-(3.3.7),
will satisfy (3.4.1).
1See for example, Leland [1994b], Hilberink and Rogers [2002], Dao and Jeanblanc [2012].
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It is not known a priori which boundary will be the larger of the two, and therefore,
both possibilities can be numerically checked to see which prior assumption is verified.
Furthermore, in view of the complexity of the system of non-linear equations resulting
from (3.4.2) and (3.3.5)-(3.3.7), it has not been possible to establish existence and
uniqueness properties of the optimised boundaries. To be clear, the term optimised is
being used here in the sense that the boundaries satisfy the smooth fit requirement.
No claim is being made that the latter boundaries are globally optimal. Once the
optimised boundaries, b⇤ = (b⇤1, b⇤2), have been established, it is then possible to invoke
Theorem 3.3.1, or the analogous result for the case when b⇤2 > b⇤1, to calculate the
optimised capital structure in terms of the value of the equity, firm value and debt. In
addition, optimised credit spreads can be computed as outlined in the next section.
3.4.2 Credit Spreads Once again following the established literature, credit
spread is defined as the coupon in excess of the risk-free rate which would encourage
an investor to buy debt at face value. Using (3.2.2), the risk free rate in regime i
until a finite time t may be defined as
r˜ (i, t) =  
log 1i
0E
⇣h
exp 
´ t
0 r(Zs)ds
i⌘
1
t
, i 2 E, (3.4.3)
which allows the risk free rate associated with a given maturity profile to be defined
as
r˜ (i,m) =
8><>: m log
⇣
1i
0 exp
(G ⇤r)
m 1
⌘
m > 0, i 2 E, 
1i
0 (⇤r  G) 1 1
  1
m = 0, i 2 E,
(3.4.4)
after noting that under an exponential maturity profile, t = 1m .
In the context of the roll-over debt framework, credit spreads can be viewed in two
distinct ways 2. First, the firm credit spread is the spread required by the market
to buy total debt at face value for a given selection of the firm’s setup parameters,
including the maturity profilem, and an initial value of assets, v. Second, once the firm
2See for example Hilberink and Rogers [2002].
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has been established, and in particular having selected a maturity profile parameter,
then the term credit spread is the spread required by the market to buy a bond of a
given maturity at par. Both types of spreads may be computed as outlined below. The
analysis of credit spreads will be restricted to cases where the firm remains solvent,
(v, i) 2 {v > b⇤i , i 2 E} . (3.4.5)
3.4.3 Firm Credit Spreads When the firm is set up and debt is first issued,
the parameters of the firm are typically constrained such that at the coupon rate, c,
the market value of debt, D (v, i, b⇤) is equal to the face value of debt, P . If the asset
value of the firm at startup is V0 = v, the latter constraint requires that the coupon
rate, c, be the smallest solution to the equation
D (v, i, b⇤) = P, i 2 E, (3.4.6)
where D (v, i, b⇤) is defined in (3.3.3).
The regime dependent coupon rate which solves (3.4.6) will be denoted cˆ⇤m (v, i, b⇤).
Unlike Leland [1994b], Hilberink and Rogers [2002], Dao and Jeanblanc [2012], the
framework of this chapter does not provide a closed form solution for the barrier b⇤.
Nevertheless, by numerically calculating b⇤ for a given set of startup parameters for
the firm, including the coupon rate, and then evaluating (3.4.6) it is possible to search
for cˆ⇤m (v, i, b⇤) numerically. Computations based on the latter approach are presented
in Section 3.5 below. The firm’s credit spread is then given by
sˆ⇤m (v, i, b
⇤) = cˆ⇤m (v, i, b
⇤)  r˜ (i,m) , (v, i) 2 {v > b⇤i , i 2 E} , (3.4.7)
where r˜ (i, ·) is defined in (3.4.4).
3.4.4 Term Structure Credit Spreads As noted above, term structure credit
spreads are defined as the excess over the coupon rate which would, once the setup
parameters of the firm have been selected and the boundaries fixed, allow a newly
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issued bond of a specific maturity, t, to price at par for a given value of initial assets,
v, in regime i.
Using (3.2.5), the latter calculation amounts to finding the coupon rate which solves
c˜⇤t (v, i, b
⇤) =
1  Ev,i
h
e 
´ t
0 r(Zu)du1{t<⌧(b⇤)}
i
  vP Ev,i

(1  ⇠  Z⌧(b⇤) )eX⌧(b⇤) ´ ⌧(b⇤)0 r(Zu)du1{t ⌧(b⇤)} 
´ t
0 Ev,i
h
e 
´ s
0 r(Zu)du1{s<⌧(b⇤)}ds
i
for (v, i) 2 {v > b⇤i , i 2 E}. Explicit expressions for the expectations in the latter
equality are not available, however, the spread may be computed using inverse Laplace
transforms of expressions established in Proposition 3.3.2 as outlined in Proposition
3.4.1 below for the case when b⇤1 > b⇤2. An entirely analogous result applies for the
case when b⇤2 > b⇤1. Numerical calculations based on the above approach are also
presented in Section 3.5.
Term structure credit spreads are then defined as
s˜⇤t (v, i, b
⇤) = c˜⇤t (v, i, b
⇤)  r˜
✓
i,
1
t
◆
, (v, i) 2 {v > b⇤i , i 2 E} , (3.4.8)
where r˜ (i, ·) is defined in (3.4.4) and c˜⇤t (v, i, b⇤) is defined in (3.4.9).
Proposition 3.4.1. Given b1 > b2 in (3.2.4), the coupon rate of a corporate bond in
(3.2.5) issued at par with maturity t is given by
c˜⇤t (v, i, b) =
1  L 1 (Am1 (v, i, b) ,m)  vPL 1 (Am2 (v, i, b) ,m)
L 1 (Am3 (v, i, b) ,m)
(3.4.9)
for (v, i) 2 {v > bi, i 2 E} where L 1 (., s) is the inverse Laplace transform with
Laplace exponent s,
Am1 (v, i, b) = 1
0
i (⇤r  G) 1 1  wm
⇣
v, i, b, 0, #˜
⌘
,
Am2 (v, i, b) =
1
m
wm (v, i, b, (1  ⇠) , 1) ,
Am3 (v, i, b) =
1
m
Am1 (v, i, b) ,
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w  is specified in (3.3.4) and
#˜(k) = 1k
0 (⇤r+m  G) 1 1, k 2 E.
Proof. Solving d (v, i, b, t) = 1 in (3.2.5) yields
c˜⇤t (v, i, b) =
1  a1 (v, i, b)  vP a2 (x, i, b)
a3 (v, i, b)
(3.4.10)
where
a1 (v, i, b) = Ev,i
h
e 
´ t
0 r(Zu)du {t<⌧(b)}
i
(3.4.11)
a2 (v, i, b) = Ev,i
h 
1  ⇠  Z⌧(b)   e  ´ ⌧(b)0 r(Zu)du+X⌧(b) {t>⌧(b)}i (3.4.12)
a3 (v, i, b) =
ˆ t
0
Ev,i
h
e 
´ s
0 r(zu)du {s<⌧(b)}
i
ds. (3.4.13)
Using Lemmas 3.6.1 and 3.3.2 the Laplace transform of (3.4.11) computes directly as
Am1 (v, i, b) =
ˆ 1
0
e mta1 (x, i, b) dt
=
ˆ 1
0
e mtEv,i
h
e 
´ t
0 r(Zu) {t<⌧(b)}
i
dt
=
ˆ 1
0
e mtEv,i
h
e 
´ t
0 r(Zu)
i
dt 
ˆ 1
0
e mtEv,i
h
e 
´ t
0 r(Zu) {⌧(b)t}
i
dt
= 1i
0 (⇤r+m  G) 1 1  Ev,i
h
e 
´ ⌧(b)
0 (r(Zu)+m)du#˜(Z⌧(b))
i
= 1i
0 (⇤r+m  G) 1 1  wm
⇣
v, i, b, 0, #˜
⌘
where
#˜(k) = 1k
0 (⇤r+m  G) 1 1, k 2 E,
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and w  is specified in (3.3.4). The Laplace transform of (3.4.12) reads
Am2 (v, i, b) =
ˆ 1
0
e mta2 (x, i, b) dt
=
ˆ 1
0
e mtEv,i
h 
1  ⇠  Z⌧(b)   e  ´ ⌧(b)0 r(Zu)du+X⌧(b) {t ⌧(b)}i dt
=
1
m
Ev,i
h 
1  ⇠  Z⌧(b)   e  ´ ⌧(b)0 (r(Zu)+m)du+X⌧(b)i dt
=
1
m
wm (v, i, b, (1  ⇠) , 1)
where 1 is a column vector of ones with the latter equality following directly from
Proposition 3.3.2. Finally, the Laplace transform of (3.4.13) is given by
Am3 (v, i, b) =
ˆ 1
0
a3 (x, i, b) dt
=
ˆ 1
0
ˆ t
0
e mtEv,i
h
e 
´ s
0 r(Zu)du {s<⌧(b)}
i
dsdt
=
1
m
ˆ 1
0
e mtEv,i
h
e 
´ t
0 r(Zu) {t<⌧(b)}
i
dt
=
1
m
Am1 (v, i, b)
which completes the proof.
3.5 Numerical Analysis
3.5.1 Calculation Methodology All calculations were conducted using Mat-
lab. In order to establish the optimised default boundaries, the non-linear system
given (3.4.2) and (3.3.5)-(3.3.7) was first solved using Matlab’s lsqnonlin routine un-
der the assumption that one of the boundaries was greater than the other. Both
the assumption that the regime 1 boundary was greater than the regime 2 boundary
and vice versa were calculated. The resulting calculated boundaries were then com-
pared with the initial assumption, and the calculated boundaries which agreed with
the initial assumption regarding the relative levels of the boundaries, selected as the
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optimised boundary pair. Only one set of calculated boundaries ever agreed with the
prior assumption. Once calculated, the latter optimised boundaries were then used
to calculate the value of equity, the firm and debt using (3.3.1), (3.3.2) and (3.3.3)
respectively. Finally, in order to calculate firm credit spreads, a simple numerical
search procedure was used, repeating the calculations above in order to calculate the
smallest of coupon which satisfied (3.4.6). The Laplace inversions required to calcu-
late term structure credit spreads associated with (3.4.9) were carried out using the
Euler method proposed by Abate and Whitt [1995].
The default parameters used for all calculations are illustrated in Table 3.5.1. The
parameters which were invariant between regimes and the regime 1 parameter values
were taken from Leland [1994b], with the exception of the regime intensities which
were set to 0.3 and 1 for regimes 1 and 2 respectively. The regime 2 parameters
were selected to reflect a recessionary scenario in which interest rates and dividend
payments were assumed to fall but asset volatility and bankruptcy costs assumed to
rise. In addition, in regime 2, the tax rate was assumed to be lower, reflecting a desire
by the fiscal authorities to stimulate growth.
3.5.2 Optimised Capital Structure Table 3.5.2 lists the values of optimised
regime dependent default boundaries, for diﬀerent maturity profiles, but otherwise
using the default parameters in Table 3.5.1. For comparison purposes, boundaries
from Leland [1994b] are also included, calculated using the regime 1 parameters only.
It is notable that regime 1 boundaries are higher than regime 2 boundaries for all ma-
turities. Regime 1 boundaries are also higher than the corresponding Leland [1994b]
for the same maturity profile. However, whereas regime 2 boundaries are higher than
the corresponding Leland [1994b] for the same maturity profile for maturities less
than 5 years, for 5 year maturities and greater, they are lower.
Optimised firm value as a function of leverage for diﬀerent maturity profiles in each re-
gime is illustrated in Figure 3.5.1. Leverage here, and in sequel, is defined as in Leland
[1994b] as total debt value (3.3.3) divided by firm value (3.3.2), D (v, i, b) /F (v, i, b).
Higher leverage was generated in the calculations by increasing the nominal value of
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debt while holding all other parameters constant. The results reflect the findings ob-
served in the literature which indicate that firm value initially increases with leverage
only to reach what appears to be a maximal level and then declines. The levels of
leverage and credit spreads which are associated with the maximum values achieved
in Figure 3.5.1 are calculated in Subsection 3.5.4 below.
Figure 3.5.1 suggests that maximal firm value is achieved at lower levels of leverage
for shorter maturity profiles which is also in line with the findings reported in the
literature (Leland [1994b], Leland and Toft [1996], Hilberink and Rogers [2002], Dao
and Jeanblanc [2012]). Figure 3.5.1 indicates that in regime 1, firm value is maximised
at a leverage equal to approximately 25%, whereas for a 30 year maturity profile, firm
value is maximised at approximately 55%. As regards the eﬀect of regimes, firm value
is lower in regime 2 than regime 1 for all maturity profiles and declines more quickly
as a function of leverage than in regime 1 after having reached its maximal value.
Figure 3.5.2 plots optimised total debt value as a function of leverage in each regime
with higher leverage again, simulated by increasing nominal debt value holding other
parameters constant. As in the case of firm value above, and also reflective of results
reported in the literature, debt value initially increases as a function of leverage only
to decline after reaching an apparent maximal value.
Again, mirroring firm value, maximal debt value is reached at lower levels of leverage
for shorter maturity profiles. Optimised debt values are lower in regime 2 for all
maturity profiles with the value of debt appearing to decline more sharply in regime
2 than regime 1 as leverage increases beyond the level which maximises debt value.
In each maturity profile presented in Figure 3.5.2, maximal debt value appears to be
achieved at lower levels of leverage in regime 2 than in regime 1.
3.5.3 Firm Spreads Firm credit spreads, as described in Subsection 3.4.3, are
presented in Figure 3.5.3 as a function of leverage and by maturity profile and regime.
The results are similar to those reported for the geometric Brownian motion case
Leland [1994b] but lower than those reported for an asset process driven by a double-
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exponential jump diﬀusion in Dao and Jeanblanc [2012]. Firm spreads tend to increase
with leverage for all maturity profiles as would be expected intuitively. Short maturity
profile firm spreads are more sensitive to higher leverage and increase faster as leverage
rises.
Spreads in regime 2 are higher than in regime 1 and increase more rapidly as a
function of leverage. The latter observation is consistent with the familiar hump-
backed term structure of credit spreads which are often observed in the market for
highly leveraged firms, where short dated credit spreads may be observed to be much
higher than longer dated spreads. The latter eﬀect is also visible in calculations of
the term structure of credit spreads presented in Subsection 3.5.5 below.
Figure 3.5.4 illustrates firm credit spreads as a function of coupon for diﬀerent ma-
turity profiles in each regime. Firm credit spreads rise as a function of coupon but
the latter eﬀect is more pronounced for longer maturity profiles than it is for shorter
maturity profiles. Indeed, firm spreads for a 2-year maturity profile exhibit a very low
sensitivity to higher coupons. The latter observation is in accordance with intuition
since for shorter dated bonds, coupon repayments are a smaller proportion of total
repayments than is the case for longer maturity bonds.
Unlike the results reported in Dao and Jeanblanc [2012], positive credit spreads are
observed for zero coupons. In the context of the roll-over debt structure, a zero coupon
amounts to the case where the firm is constantly refinancing itself with discount bonds
of maturity 1/m. Credit spreads in the latter case are higher for shorter maturity
profiles simply because redemptions occur at a higher frequency than is the case for
longer maturity profiles.
An interesting feature of Figure 3.5.4 is that the eﬀect of regime change diﬀers by
maturity profile. Firm credit spreads increase with coupon in both regimes and
increase more steeply with coupon in regime 2. However, the eﬀect of a regime
change is not the same for all maturities. For the 2-year and 5-year maturity profiles,
firm credit spreads are higher in regime 2 than regime 1. However, for a 30-year
maturity profile, firm credit spreads are lower in regime 2 for low coupons but rise
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more steeply than firm credit spreads in regime 1 as coupons increase to the point
where credit spreads are higher in regime 2 than in regime 1 for higher coupons.
3.5.4 Optimised Leverage Table 3.5.3 illustrates the leverage ratio which max-
imises firm value for a selection of maturity profiles within a defined range of nominal
debt values. The optimised leverage ratios were calculated by a simple search pro-
cedure over the range of nominal debt values in the interval (0, 100], which in view of
Figure 3.5.1, was regarded as a reasonable search domain. For each level of nominal
debt, optimised boundaries and the associated value of the firm were calculated. The
maximum firm value was calculated using Matlab’s fminbnd routine using a function
change tolerance of 1e  15.
The results illustrated in Table 3.5.3 are consistent with those reported in the liter-
ature. For example, the leverage and credit spreads in regime 1 are close to those
reported in Leland [1994b]. Optimised leverage increases in both regimes with the
maturity profile parameter as does firm value and firm credit spreads. In regime 1,
firm value is maximised with a 5 year maturity profile at leverage of 0.356 with a
corresponding firm spread of 43bps. In contrast, leverage of 0.545 maximises firm
value for a 30 year maturity profile with a firm credit spread of 129bps.
Optimised leverage and firm value is lower in regime 2 than in regime 1 for all ma-
turities. Firm credit spreads are higher in regime 2 for 0.25-year and 1-year maturity,
for 5-year maturity and over, firm credit spreads are lower in regime 2 than in regime
1. That optimised firm credit spreads appear to be lower for longer maturities may
at first appear surprising in view of the higher asset volatility in regime 2. How-
ever, separate calculations, which increased only volatility in regime 2, indicated a
lower optimised leverage in regime 2 which was, nevertheless, associated with higher
firm credit spreads. The observation that credit spreads are lower in regime 2 for
higher maturities under the default parameters is reflective of parameters other than
volatility having a damping impact on spreads for longer maturities.
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3.5.5 Term Structure of Credit Spreads Figure 3.5.5 illustrates term struc-
ture credit spreads, which were described in Subsection 3.4.4, for selected maturities
between 0.5 and 30 years for diﬀerent values of nominal debt (and therefore leverage)
but otherwise using the default parameters in Table 3.5.1. Spreads are illustrated
for both regimes. Nominal debt values of 55, 60 and 65 corresponded to leverage of
0.515, 0.562 and 0.61 respectively.
For lower levels of leverage, the credit curves illustrated in Figure 3.5.5 have the
familiar upward sloping shape as a function of maturity. Credit spreads increase
across all maturities in both regimes as leverage increases. Shorter maturity spreads
increase more than longer maturity spreads as leverage increases.
As leverage increases, the shape of the spread curve changes. In regime 1 with a
nominal value of debt equal to 65, credit spreads increase with maturity up to 10
years but are fairly flat as a function of maturity in excess of 10 years. In regime 2,
however, with nominal debt of 65, the term structure of credit spreads rises steeply up
to 4 year maturity and then becomes inverted with the credit curve sloping down as
a function of maturity in excess of 4 years. The latter hump-shaped term structure of
credit spreads is a frequently observed market phenomena and is typically associated
with firms in financial distress.
Figure 3.5.6 displays for shorter maturities the term structure of credit spreads using
the same parameters as above. For shorter maturities the term structure of spreads
remains upward sloping in both regimes and as leverage increases. Spreads are higher
in regime 2 than in regime 1 and the term structure steepens sharply in regime 2 for
higher levels of leverage. For low levels of leverage, calculated credit spreads were
close to zero for very short maturities.
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Fixed Parameters
Name Symbol Default Value
Asset Value v 100
Coupon Rate c 0.08
Principal P 50
Average Maturity 1/m 5
(a) Fixed Parameters
Regime Dependent Parameters
Name Symbol Default Value
Regime 1 Regime 2
Asset Volatility   0.2 0.35
Tax Rate ⇡ 0.35 0.15
Bankruptcy Costs ⇠ 0.5 0.75
Interest Rate r 0.075 0.03
Dividend Yield   0.07 0.02
Regime Intensity   0.3 1
(b) Regime Dependent Parameters
Table 3.5.1: Default ParameterValues
The table lists default parameter values for all calculations unless otherwise stated. To
facilitate comparison, fixed and regime 1 parameter values are taken from Leland [1994b].
Regime intensities were set at 0.3 and 1 for regimes 1 and 2 respectively.
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Maturity Leland 94 Regime 1 Regime 2
0.25 Year 77.63 82.63 81.04
1 Year 62.80 67.03 67.25
5 Year 43.29 44.36 42.86
10 Year 36.46 36.90 28.94
20 Year 31.45 32.65 29.71
30 Year 29.38 30.67 28.89
Table 3.5.2: Default Boundaries by Maturity Profile
The table shows optimised boundaries in each regime for selected maturity profiles. For
comparison, boundaries using Leland [1994b] are included which are calculated using re-
gime 1 parameters only. Regime 1 boundaries are higher than regime 2 boundaries for all
maturity profiles. For lower maturities, both regime boundaries are higher than the corres-
ponding Leland [1994b] boundary but for larger maturities, regime 2 boundaries fall below
the corresponding Leland [1994b] boundary.
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Figure 3.5.1: Firm Value by Leverage
The figure shows optimised firm value by leverage in each regime for diﬀerent maturity
profiles but otherwise using the default parameters in Table 3.5.1. Firm value appears to
achieve a maximum value at lower levels of leverage for shorter maturity debt profiles. Firm
value is lower in regime 2 than in regime 1 for equivalent levels of leverage.
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Figure 3.5.2: Debt Value by Leverage
The figure shows optimised total debt value by leverage in each regime for diﬀerent maturity
profiles but otherwise using the default parameters in Table 3.5.1. Debt value appears to
achieve a maximum value at lower levels of leverage for shorter maturity debt profiles.
Optimised debt value is lower in regime 2 than in regime 1 for the same level of leverage and
declines more sharply as a function of leverage in regime 2 than in regime 1 after achieving
its maximum value.
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Figure 3.5.3: Firm Spreads by Leverage
The figure shows optimised firm spreads as a function of leverage in each regime for diﬀerent
maturity profiles but otherwise using the default parameters in Table 3.5.1. Firm spreads
are higher for a shorter dated maturity profile and higher in regime 2 than in regime 1.
Firm spreads increase rapidly in regime 2 as a function of leverage indicating that firms
with shorter maturity profiles are subject to increased default risk during periods of high
volatility.
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Figure 3.5.4: Firm Spreads by Coupon
The figure shows optimised firm spreads as a function of coupon in each regime for diﬀerent
maturity profiles but otherwise using the default parameters in Table 3.5.1. Firm spreads
are higher for a shorter dated maturity profile and higher in regime 2 than in regime 1.
For longer maturity profiles, spreads increase as the coupon rate increases while for shorter
maturity profiles, spreads are relatively insensitive to the level of the coupon rate. Spreads
are positive for discount bonds (zero coupon).
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Maturity Regime 1 Regime 2
Leverage Firm Value Spread Leverage Firm Value Spread
0.25 Year 0.142 103.54 0 0.133 103.35 33
1 Year 0.189 104.70 1 0.179 104.45 40
5 Year 0.356 109.03 43 0.341 108.55 41
10 Year 0.470 112.30 89 0.452 111.65 75
20 Year 0.518 113.85 117 0.500 113.10 95
30 Year 0.545 114.75 129 0.526 113.96 105
Table 3.5.3: Numerically Optimised Firm Value by Maturity
The table shows optimised leverage, firm value and associated firm credit spread for diﬀerent
maturity profiles. Optimised leverage increases with maturity as does firm value and spread.
Optimised leverage is lower in regime 2 than regime 1. Firm credit spreads are higher for
shorter maturities but are lower as the maturity profile increases beyond 5 years. Optimised
leverage was calculated for nominal debt in the range (0, 100].
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Figure 3.5.5: Term Structure Credit Spreads by Leverage
The figure shows optimised term structure credit spreads in each regime for diﬀerent levels
of nominal debt but otherwise using the default parameters in Table 3.5.1. Higher levels of
nominal debt reflect higher levels of leverage. Spreads increase across all maturities with
higher leverage, increasing more for shorter maturity debt. Spreads are higher in regime
2 compared to regime 1. For nominal debt equal to 65, the curve inverts and becomes
downward sloping starting from 4-years to maturity which is a familiar market phenomena
for firms in financial distress.
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Figure 3.5.6: Short Maturity Term Credit Spreads by Leverage
The figure shows optimised short dated term structure credit spreads in each regime for
diﬀerent levels of nominal debt but otherwise using the default parameters in Table 3.5.1.
Higher levels of nominal debt reflect higher levels of leverage. Spreads increase across all
maturities with higher leverage and are higher in regime 2 than regime 1. The term structure
of spreads retains a positive slope as a function maturity even at higher levels of leverage.
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3.6 Auxiliary Results and Proofs
Lemma 3.6.1 below is used in the calculation of total debt and firm value in equations
(3.2.8) and (3.2.10) respectively. Supporting Lemma’s 3.6.2 and 3.6.3 were taken from
Mijatovic and Pistorius [2009].
Lemma 3.6.1. Let Z = {Zt}t 0 be a Markov chain on a finite state space E =
{1, 2, . . . , N}, ⌧ a stopping time measurable with respect to the filtration generated by
Z, h : E ! R and a : E ! R+. If G denotes the generator of Z and ⇤a is a diagonal
matrix of size N with diagonal elements a(i), i = 1, 2, . . . , N, then
ˆ 1
0
Ej
h
e 
´ t
0 a(Zu)duh (Zt) {⌧t}
i
dt = Ej
h
e 
´ ⌧
0 a(Zu)dueh(Z⌧ )i (3.6.1)
where
eh(k) = ˆ 1
0
Ek
h
e 
´ u
0 a(Zs)ds
i
du = 1k
0 (⇤a  G) 1 h, k 2 E,
where h = (h (1) , h (2) , . . . , h (N)), 1 is an N element vector of ones and 1k is a
column vector of size N with one in the kth row equal to one and zero otherwise.
Proof. First note that by the tower property of conditional expectation and the strong
Markov property
Ej
h
e 
´ t
0 a(Zu)duh (Zt) {⌧t}
i
= Ej
h
e 
´ ⌧
0 a(Zu) {⌧t}EZ⌧ ,⌧
h
e 
´ t ⌧
0 a(Zu)duh (Zt)
ii
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so that by Lemma 3.6.2 and Lemma 3.6.3
hˆ (k) =
ˆ 1
⌧
E
h
e 
´ t ⌧
0 a(Zu)duh (Zt) | Z⌧ = k
i
dt
=
ˆ 1
⌧
1k
0e(G ⇤a)(t ⌧)hdt
=
ˆ 1
0
1k
0e(G ⇤a)thdt
= 1k
0 (⇤a  G) 1 h
where h0 = (h (1) , h (2) , . . . , h (N)) with the application of Lemma 3.6.3 in the latter
equality justified by Theorem 2 in Mijatovic and Pistorius [2009] which implies that
all the eigenvalues (⇤a  G) 1 have non-positive real part, completing the proof.
Lemma 3.6.2. Let Z be a Markov chain on a finite state space E = {1, 2, . . . , N}
and let a, h : E ! R. If G denotes the generator of Z and ⇤a is a diagonal matrix of
size N with diagonal elements a(i), i = 1, 2, . . . , N, then
Ej
h
e 
´ t
0 a(Zs)dsh(Zt)
i
=1j
0e(G ⇤a)th (3.6.2)
where 1j is a column vector of size N with one in the jth row and zero otherwise and
h
0
= (h (1) , . . . , h (N)).
Proof. See Mijatovic and Pistorius [2009]
Lemma 3.6.3. Let a 2 C and M a matrix whose eigenvalues all have non-positive
real part. Then the matrix ⇤a  M is invertible and the following formula holds
ˆ 1
0
e at exp (tM) dt = (⇤a  M) 1 .
Proof. See Mijatovic and Pistorius [2009]
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CHAPTER 4 OPTIMAL CAPITAL
STRUCTURE UNDER
REGIME-SWITCHING WITH JUMPS
4.1 Introduction
In this chapter, the model of Chapter 3 is extended to allow the asset price process
of the firm to jump in the negative direction. Moreover, the jump process is also
allowed to be regime-dependent motivated by the conjecture that during times of
economic stress, negative jumps of a firm’s asset process might be expected to be
larger in magnitude. In this chapter, however, the firm is assumed to be financed
by a single infinite maturity, or consol, bond. The latter assumption unfortunately
loses the richness of term structure analysis inherent in the roll-over model, but it
nevertheless implies that the debt profile is fully stationary, which permits an optimal
capital structure to be identified.
The model of this chapter also allows firm asset volatility, risk free interest and
dividend rates as well as tax rates and bankruptcy costs to be regime-dependent. As
in Chapter 3, two regimes are considered. Maximisation of equity on the part of the
firm manifests itself an optimal stopping problem which takes the form of a perpetual
American put option. An interesting feature of the model is, however, that the payout
of the option depends upon the regime. Indeed, the strikes of the put option become
regime-dependent which has the implication that, under certain conditions, it may
never be optimal for a firm to endogenously declare default in certain regimes. The
intuition behind the latter finding is that if the strike in one regime is very far below
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the strike in the other regime, then it may be optimal not to declare bankruptcy in
the former regime, but simply wait for the regimes to switch to collect an expected
larger payout. When an optimal default boundary is known to exist, optimal capital
structure and credit spreads are identified.
The problem of a firm financed by a single infinite maturity bond was first considered
by Black and Cox [1976]. Later, Leland [1994a] examined optimal capital structure
for a firm, financed by an infinite maturity bond, which received tax benefits on
interest payments and where the asset process followed a geometric Brownian motion.
More recently, dynamic capital structure was considered by Elliott and Shen [2015]
incorporating tax benefits and bankruptcy costs with regime-switching dynamics in
the case where the firms asset process was assumed to be a geometric regime-switching
Brownian motion. The model presented in this paper builds on the literature by
adding negative jumps to a regime-switching asset process of a firm financed by a
single infinite maturity bond where both bankruptcy costs and tax relief on interest
payments are also assumed to be regime-dependent.
The outline of this chapter is as follows. The formulation of the model is outlined
in Section 4.2. In Section 4.3, some Wiener-Hopf factorisation results which are
required in sequel to calculate first-passage probabilities are collected. Endogenously
determined optimal default boundaries which maximise equity value are determined
in Section 4.4 and an optimal capital structure identified. Finally, in Section 4.5
some numerical calculations based on the results are presented. Auxiliary results are
collected in Section 4.6.
4.2 Model Formulation
4.2.1 Market Structure The market is assumed to be composed of a savings
account and a single-asset firm whose price processes, {Bt}t 0 and {Vt}t 0, are given
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by
Bt = exp
✓
 
ˆ t
0
r (Zs) ds
◆
, (4.2.1)
Vt = exp (Xt) , (4.2.2)
where E[V1] < 1, r (i) : E0 7! R+\ {0} is the instantaneous risk free interest rate,
{Zt}t 0 is an irreducible Markov process with finite state space E0 = {1, 2} and
intensity matrix G given by
G =
 
  1  1
 2   2
!
with  i > 0, i 2 E and {Xt}t 0 is a regime-switching Lévy process given by
Xt = x+
ˆ t
0
µ (Zs) ds+
ˆ t
0
  (Zs) dWs +
X
i2E0
ˆ t
0
1{Zs=i}dJi (s) , x 2 R, (4.2.3)
where {Wt}t 0 is a Wiener process independent of Z, {Ji(t), t   0} are independent
compound Poisson processes with negative jumps arriving at rate  i, µ (i) ,   (i) :
E0 7! R with   (·) > 0 and 1{A} is the indicator of the set A. Where there is no
scope for ambiguity, the notation ai will be used to denote the value of parameter a
in regime i. The infinitesimal generator of the process (X,Z) is given by
LX,Zw(x, i) =
1
2
 2i
@2w(x, i)
@x2
+ µi
@w(x, i)
@x
+ i (w (x, 3  i)  w (x, i, ))
+ i
ˆ 1
 1
(w (x+ y)  w (x)) fYi (y) dy, i 2 E0, (4.2.4)
for C2 functions w where fYi is the probability density function of the jump process
in regime i.
Jump sizes are assumed to be phase-type distributed (see Asmussen [2000]). A phase-
type distribution F on (0,1) is the distribution of the absorption time of a finite state
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Markov chain with one state absorbing and the remaining states transient. Restricted
to the transient states with generator matrix T and initial distribution given by the
column vector ↵, it follows from Markov chain theory that the density of F is given
by
f(x) =↵0eTxt (4.2.5)
for x > 0, where t = ( T ) 1, 0 denotes transpose and 1 is a column vector of ones.
It is assumed that the stochastic processes V and Z are defined on some filtered
probability space (⌦,F ,P,F) where F = {Ft}t 0 denotes the completed filtration
jointly generated by V and Z. Conditional expectations will be denoted by writing
Ex,i [·] = E [·|X0 = x, Z0 = i]. Furthermore, since it is known (see Jiang and Pistorius
[2008]) that there exists an equivalent martingale measure which is structure pre-
serving, in sequel all expectations can be understood to be taken in the risk neutral
measure.
Theorem 1 in Mijatovic and Pistorius [Preprint] implies that the discounted moment
generating function of the process (X,Z) is given by
E0,i

euXt
Bt
{Zj=j}
 
= 1i
0et(K(u) ⇤r)1j, u 2 R,
where k (u) := G + ⇤ (u), ⇤r is a 2 ⇥ 2 diagonal matrix with diagonal elements r(i)
for i 2 E0 and ⇤ (u) is a 2⇥ 2 diagonal matrix where the ith element is equal to the
characteristic exponent of the process X in regime i 2 E0 given by
 i (u) = uµi +
1
2
 2i u
2 +  i
 
↵0i (⇤u   Ti) 1 ti   1
 
.
It follows, therefore, that if the drift vector µ is chosen such that ⇤ (1) +⇤   ⇤r = 0
then
µi = ri    i   1
2
 2i    i
 
↵0i (I   Ti) 1 ti   1
 
, i 2 E0, (4.2.6)
which implies that the discounted risk neutral drift will be   i, i 2 E0. In sequel,
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therefore, it will be assumed that condition (4.2.6) holds.
4.3 Matrix Wiener-Hopf Factorisation
In this section some Wiener-Hopf factorisation results related to finite state Markov
chains are briefly collected, which are required in sequel to calculate first-passage
probabilities. This section draws heavily on the presentation in Jiang and Pistorius
[2008] which related to the more general case of both positive and negative jumps.
The results have therefore been tailored to the case of negative jumps only since this
will be the focus of this chapter.
4.3.1 Fluid Embedding In sequel applications it will be of great interest to
characterise the boundary crossing times of X given by
⌧ (b) = inf {t   0|Xt  b (Zt)} .
The first step in the latter regard is to reformulate the setting into one of the first
hitting time for a related continuous Markov process. The latter is achieved by
a process of fluid embedding, outlined below, which transforms the path of X by
replacing jumps with linear stretches. As a result, the transformed process always
touches any boundary at first passage. An additional advantage of the latter approach
is that a mechanism is aﬀorded by which to calculate any shortfall or overshoot should
X jump across a boundary.
Define {Yt}t 0 to be an irreducible continuous Markov chain with finite state space
E [ @, where @ is an absorbing cemetery state, and denote by {At}t 0 the Markov
modulated Brownian motion given by
At =A0 +
ˆ t
0
m (Ys) ds+
ˆ t
0
s (Ys) dWs (4.3.1)
where s,m : E [ @ 7! R with s (@) = m (@) = 0.
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The process A is the fluid-embedding of X if the generator of Y restricted to E is
equal to Q0 where, in block notation,
Qa =
 
G Da B
t T
!
, (4.3.2)
with Da an N ⇥N diagonal matrix where (Da)ii =  i + ai and,
B =
 
 1↵01
 2↵02
!
, T =
 
T1
T2
!
, t =
 
t1
t2
!
.
The functions m(·) and s(·) are specified as:
m (j) =
(
µj if j 2 E0
 1 if j 2 E 
, s (j) =
(
 j if j 2 E0
0 otherwise
. (4.3.3)
It is clear from (4.3.2) that Qa admits the partition E = E0 [ E  where E0 is the
state space inherited from Z and E  are the states in which the path of A is linear
and with slope  1. In sequel, the subset of E which corresponds to the ith regime of
X will be denoted as Ei = {i} [E i . The elements of the matrix Qa will be denoted
qij for i, j 2 E0.
4.3.2 Path Transformation While the chain Y is in i 2 E0, A evolves according
to a Brownian motion with drift m (i) and volatility   (i). However, when Y takes
values in E , the path of A is linear with slope  1, with the length of the linear
stretches corresponding to the size of the jumps in X. Informally, therefore, a path
of X can be thought of as being obtained from a path of A by simply replacing the
latter linear stretches with negative jumps in X of the same size as the length of the
linear stretch in E .
More formally, a stochastic process which has the same law as (X,Z) can be obtained
by first time-changing the process (A, Y ) so that A is observed only when Y takes
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values in E0. To proceed, first define
T0 (t) =
ˆ t
0
1{Ys2E0}ds and T
 1
0 (u) = inf {t   0 | T0(t) > u} ,
which correspond to the time spent by chain Y in E0 before time t and its right
continuous inverse.
From the definition of the generator in (4.3.2) it is clear that when Y jumps from
any state in E  to state i 2 E0, it must have been in state i 2 E0 immediately prior
to jumping from E0. It is obvious, therefore, from the generator of Y in (4.3.2) that
the process Y   T 10 is a Markov chain with generator Z because it simply ignores
all excursions from E0. Furthermore, the process A   T 10 is a regime-switching jump
diﬀusion and the process
 
A   T 10 , Y   T 10
 
is equal in law to (X,Z) under Px,i for
all x 2 R and i 2 E0. Furthermore, it holds that for
⌧ˆ (b) = inf
n
t   0 | Yt 2 E0, At  bˆ (Yt)
o
(4.3.4)
that
 
T (⌧ˆ (b)) , A⌧ˆ(b), Y⌧ˆ(b)
  d
=
 
⌧ (b) , X⌧(b), Z⌧(b)
 
and bˆ : E 7! R given by bˆ (j) = b (i)
for j 2 Ei.
State dependent discounting can be incorporated by replacing the generator Q0 with
Qr from which it follows that
Ex,i
h
e 
´ ⌧(b)
0 r(Zu)du+X⌧(b)h
 
Z⌧(b)
 i
=Ex,i
⇥
eA⌧ˆ(b)h
 
Y⌧ˆ(b)
 
1{⌧ˆ(b)<⇣}
⇤
, (4.3.5)
where
⇣ = inf{t   0 | Yt /2 E] (4.3.6)
with inf {?} =1 and Y evolves according to the generator Qr.
4.3.3 Matrix Factorisation The solution of the first-passage problem of the
Markov process (A, Y ) across a constant level is closely related to the up and down-
crossing ladder processes, Yˆ + and Yˆ   respectively, of (A, Y ). The up and down-
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crossing ladder processes are time changes of Y constructed such that Y is observed
only when A is at its maximum and minimum respectively. The up and down-crossing
ladder processes Yˆ + and Yˆ   of (A, Y ) are defined by
Yˆ ±a =
(
Y (⌧±a ) , if ⌧±a <1,
@, otherwise,
(4.3.7)
where @ is a graveyard state and ⌧±a = inf {s   0 | As ? a} with inf {;} =1.
The ladder processes Yˆ + and Yˆ   are again Markov processes with state spaces E0 and
E0 [ E  respectively. Matrix Wiener-Hopf factorisation, in the presence of negative
jumps only, characterises the generator matrices of Yˆ + and Yˆ   denoted Q+a and Q a
along with the initial distribution defined by
⌘+ (i, j) = P0,i[Yˆ +0 = j, ⌧+0 < ⇣] for i 2 E , j 2 E0. (4.3.8)
In the definition of a matrix Wiener-Hopf factorisation given below Q (n) denotes the
set of irreducible n⇥ n generator matrices, P (n,m) the set of n⇥m matrices whose
rows are sub-probability vectors and ⌃ and V denote the 2⇥2 diagonal matrices with
⌃ii = s (i) and Vii = m (i) for i 2 E0 respectively. Since the rows of the matrix Qa
do not sum to zero, the matrix is referred to as transient. Let N  be the number of
elements in E  and set N 0 = 2 +N .
Definition 4.3.1. Let G+, C+ and G  be elements of of the sets Q(2), P(N , 2),
and Q(N 0 ) respectively. A triple (C+, G+,G ) is called a matrix Wiener-Hopf fac-
torisation of (A, Y ) if
⌅
  G+,W+  = O and ⌅  G ,W   = O, (4.3.9)
where
⌅ (S,W ) =
1
2
⌃2WS2 + VWS +QaW (4.3.10)
73
Optimal Capital Structure under Regime-Switching with Jumps
and W+and W  are given in block notation by
W+ =
 
I0
C+
!
, W  =
 
I0 O
O I 
!
, (4.3.11)
where I0 and I  are identity matrices of sizes 2 ⇥ 2 and N  ⇥ N  respectively and
O denotes a zero matrix of appropriate size.
The following Theorem from Jiang and Pistorius [2008] links the previous definition
to a characterisation of the Wiener-Hopf factorisation of (A, Y ).
Theorem 4.3.2. If Q is transient then the quadruple (⌘+, Q+, Q ) is a unique
Wiener-Hopf factorisation of (A, Y ).
4.3.4 First Exit from an Interval The two-sided exit problem of A from an
interval [k, l] with  1 < k < l < +1 is to find the distribution of the process
(A⌧ , Y⌧ ) at the first exit time given by
⌧ = inf {t   0 | At /2 [k, l]} .
The two-sided exit problem can be solved in terms of (⌘+, Q+, Q ), and the matrices,
Z+ =
 
I0
⌘+
!
eQ
+
r (l k), Z  = (1, O+) eQ
 
r (l k), (4.3.12)
and
 + (x) =
⇣
W+eQ
+
r (l x)   eQ (x k)Z+
⌘  
I   Z Z+  , (4.3.13)
   (x) =
⇣
eQ
 (x k)  W+eQ+(l x)Z 
⌘  
I   Z+Z   , (4.3.14)
 0 (a, x) =
 
eaxI   eal + (x) J+   eak   (x)    K (a) 1  , (4.3.15)
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where I is an identity matrix, W+ is given in (4.3.11) with C+ = ⌘+, J+ is the
transpose of W+ with C+ replaced by zeros and
K (a) =
1
2
⌃2a2 + V a+Qr. (4.3.16)
The following Proposition from Jiang and Pistorius [2008] outlines the solution to the
two-sided exit problem.
Proposition 4.3.3. Let h+, h  and h0 be functions that map E0, E0 [E  and E to
R. If
1
2
  (i)2 + µ (i) <  qii, i 2 E,
then it holds for x 2 [k, l] and i 2 E that
Ex,i
⇥
h+ (Y⌧ ) 1{A⌧=l,⌧<⇣}
⇤
= 1i 
+ (x)h+, (4.3.17)
Ex,i
⇥
h  (Y⌧ ) 1{A⌧=k,⌧<⇣}
⇤
= 1i 
  (x)h , (4.3.18)
Ex,i
⇥
eaA⇣ h0 (Y⇣ ) 1{⇣<⌧}
⇤
= 1i 
0 (a, x)⇤h0qr, (4.3.19)
where qr = ( Qr) 1, ⇣ is defined in (4.3.6) and ⇤h0 is a diagonal matrix with elements
h0.
4.4 Optimal Capital Structure
4.4.1 Debt Structure The firm is partly financed by a single consol bond with
face value P upon which the firm may default. The time of default, ⌧ , is assumed to
be endogenously chosen by the firm and will be described further below. On default
a proportion ⇠i 2 [0, 1] of the asset value is lost in regime i during the resulting
reorganisation of the firm and the residual value of the firm’s assets become the
property of the debt holders. The firm’s debt attracts a continuous coupon rate of c
and therefore has total value given by
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D (x, i) =cPEx,i
ˆ ⌧
0
e 
´ t
0 r(Zu)dudt
 
+ Ex,i
h
e 
´ ⌧
0 r(Zu)du (1  ⇠ (Z⌧ ))V⌧
i
=1i
0cP (⇤r  G) 1 1  Ex,i
h
e 
´ ⌧
0 r(Zu)du (⌫ˆ(Z⌧ )  (1  ⇠ (Z⌧ ))V⌧ )
i
, (4.4.1)
where
⌫ˆ(k) = 1k
0cP (⇤r  G) 1 1, k 2 E0, (4.4.2)
⇤a is a 2 ⇥ 2 diagonal matrix with elements equal to a(i), i 2 E0, 1 is a 2 element
vector of ones and 1k is a 2 element vector with 1 in row k and zero in the alternate
row. The expectations in (4.4.1) were calculated using Lemma’s 3.6.1 and 3.6.2.
4.4.2 Value of the Firm The economy’s tax policy is assumed to be regime
dependent and therefore, the firm receives tax relief on the value of coupon payments
made equal to ⇡ (i) 2 [0, 1] , for each regime i 2 E0. It follows that the value of the
firm is comprised of the value of assets at time 0 together with the present value of
future tax relief minus the proportion of assets lost in reorganisation of the firm on
default given by
F (x, i) = ex + cPEx,i
ˆ ⌧
0
e 
´ t
0 r(Zu)du⇡ (Zt) dt
 
  Ex,i
h
e 
´ ⌧
0 r(Zu)du⇠ (Z⌧ )V⌧
i
= ex + 10icP (⇤r  G) 1 ⇡   Ex,i
h
e 
´ ⌧
0 r(Zu)du ( ˆ(Z⌧ ) + ⇠ (Z⌧ )V⌧ )
i
, (4.4.3)
where
 ˆ(k) = 1k
0cP (⇤r  G) 1 ⇡, k 2 E0, (4.4.4)
⇡0 = {⇡ (1) , ⇡ (2)} and where again, Lemma’s 3.6.1 and 3.6.2 were used in the calcu-
lations.
4.4.3 Equity Value The equity value of the firm is taken to be the value of the
firm in (4.4.3) minus the value of debt in (4.4.1),
Q (x, i) = ex   1i0cP (⇤r  G) 1 ⇡ˆ + Ex,i
h
e 
´ ⌧
0 r(Zu)du (ˆ(Z⌧ )  V⌧ )
i
, (4.4.5)
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where
ˆ(k) = 1kcP (⇤r  G) 1 ⇡ˆ, k 2 E0, (4.4.6)
and ⇡ˆ = 1  ⇡. Note that the recovery rates, ⇠ = (⇠ (1) , ⇠ (2))0 do not feature in the
value of equity which is in contrast to the roll-over debt structure. Any residual value
left on default becomes the property of the bond holders and aﬀords no benefit to
the equity holders. The value of equity on default is also identically zero which is in
accordance with the strict priority rule.
4.4.4 Default Decision The time of default, ⌧ , is assumed to be endogenously
chosen by the firm so as to maximise the value of equity in (4.4.5). Since the decision
to default is entirely at the discretion of the firm, there is always the option to
wait (and receive zero). It therefore follows that maximising equity value in (4.4.5)
amounts to solving an optimal stopping problem of the form
w⇤ (x, i) = sup
⌧2T0,1
Ex,i
h
e 
´ ⌧
0 r(Zu)du
 
ˆ(Z⌧ )  eX⌧
 
{⌧<1}
i
= sup
⌧2T0,1
Ex,i
h
e 
´ ⌧
0 r(Zu)du
 
ˆ (Z⌧ )  eX⌧
 +i
= sup
⌧2T0,1
Ex,i
h
e 
´ ⌧
0 r(Zu)dug (X⌧ , Z⌧ )
i
, (4.4.7)
where z+ = max (0, z) , ˆ is given in (4.4.6), V0 = v = ex, T0,1 represents the
set of F-measurable finite stopping times and g (i, x) = (ˆ (i)  ex)+. Following the
established literature, it is assumed that assets in place cannot be liquidated in order
to raise funds to pay debt holders.
Note that since x 7! w⇤ (x, i) , i 2 E0 is convex, implying that w⇤ (x, ·) is C0 in R,
and (X,Z) is a Markov process, the general theory of optimal stopping in Peskir and
Shiryaev [2006] implies a continuation region associated with the optimal stopping
problem in (4.4.7) reads as
C =  (x, i) 2 R⇥ E0 | w⇤ (x, i) > g (x, i) (4.4.8)
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with the stopping region defined as
S =  (x, i) 2 R⇥ E0 | w⇤ (x, i) = g (x, i) (4.4.9)
and the stopping time ⌧B defined by
⌧B = inf {t   0|Xt 2 S} (4.4.10)
being optimal in (4.4.7) providing ⌧B is finite. The following Theorem characterises
a candidate value function for (4.4.7) and stopping time for (4.4.10).
Theorem 4.4.1. Let (b⇤i , i 2 E0) 2 R and w : R ⇥ E0 ! R be bounded such that
w(·, i), i 2 E0 is C1 on R and C2 on R\{b⇤i } and the following system is satisfied:
LX,Zw   rw  0 x  b⇤i , i 2 E0, (4.4.11)
w(x, i)   g(x, i) x > b⇤i , i 2 E0, (4.4.12)
LX,Zw   qw = 0 x > b⇤i , i 2 E0, (4.4.13)
w(x, i) = g(x, i) x  b⇤i , i 2 E0, (4.4.14)
then w = w⇤ and a stopping time that achieves the supremum in (4.4.7) is given by
⌧ (b⇤) = inf {t   0|Xt  b⇤ (Zt)} . (4.4.15)
Proof. The optimality of w and b⇤ can be proved by standard means as follows1. An
application of a generalised version of Itô’s formula to e 
´ t
0 r(Zu)duw (x, i) obtains
e 
´ t
0 r(Zu)duw (Xt, Zt) = w (x, i) +
ˆ t
0
e 
´ s
0 r(Zu)du⇧X,Zw (Xs, Zs) {Xs 6=b(Zs)}ds+Mt
(4.4.16)
where ⇧X,Zf := LX,Zf rf andMt can be shown to be a martingale. Using (4.4.13),
1See for example Peskir [2005], Theorem 25.1.
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(4.4.11), (4.4.12) and (4.4.14) it follows that
e 
´ t
0 r(Zu)dug (Xt, Zt)  e 
´ t
0 r(Zu)duw (Xt, Zt)  w (x, i) +Mt.
Defining {⌧n}n 1 as a localisation sequence of bounded stopping times for M, then
for every stopping time ⌧ of (X,Z) it follows that
e 
´ ⌧^⌧n
0 r(Zu)dug (X⌧^⌧n , Z⌧^⌧n)  w (x, i) +M⌧^⌧n , n   1,
taking Px,i expectations, noting that Ex,i [M⌧^⌧n ] = 0 for all n (as a consequence of
the optional sampling theorem) and letting n!1 yields by Fatou’s lemma that
Ex,i
h
e 
´ ⌧
0 r(Zu)dug (X⌧ , Z⌧ )
i
 w (x, i) .
Finally, taking the supremum over all stopping times obtains that w⇤(x, i)  w (x, i).
Next, using (4.4.16) and again using (4.4.13) along with the optional sampling the-
orem it follows that
Ex,i
h
e 
´ ⌧(b⇤)^⌧n
0 r(Zu)duw
 
X⌧(b⇤)^⌧n , Z⌧(b⇤)^⌧n
 i
= w (x, i) , n   1.
Letting n!1 and noting that
e 
´ ⌧(b⇤)
0 r(Zu)duw
 
X⌧(b⇤), Z⌧(b⇤)
 
= e 
´ ⌧(b⇤)
0 r(Zu)dug
 
X⌧(b⇤), Z⌧(b⇤)
 
it follows by dominated convergence that
Ex,i
h
e 
´ ⌧(b⇤)
0 r(Zu)dug
 
X⌧(b⇤), Z⌧(b⇤)
 i
= w (x, i)
which shows that ⌧ (b⇤) in (4.4.15) is optimal in (4.4.7) and that w (x, i) = w⇤ (x, i)
for all (x, i) 2 R⇥ E0 completing the proof.
Remark 4.4.2. It is intuitive that if the regime dependent strikes of the put option
payoﬀ in (4.4.7) are far away from each other, that in the regime with the lower strike,
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for low asset values, it may be optimal to defer declaring default until the regime with
the higher strike to achieve a much higher payoﬀ. The parameters eﬀecting the regime
strike values are the risk free interest rate and the tax rate. The latter would suggest
that monetary and fiscal policies targeted at reducing interest and tax rates may
well be eﬀective in deferring default decisions. It is worth noting that if the risk free
interest rate and tax rate are the same in both regimes, the strike is constant across
regimes and (4.4.7) reduces to the case of a standard perpetual put with a regime-
switching asset process. In sequel, the focus is to the case that the lowest boundary
is finite.
4.4.5 First Passage Below Regime Dependent Levels In view of Theorem
4.4.1, solving for the optimal value of equity in (4.4.5) amounts to identifying the first
passage time of X below a regime dependent level and finding a function of the form
⇥a,b (x, i, h) = Ex,i
h
e 
´ ⌧(b)
0 r(Zu)du+aX⌧(b)h
 
Z⌧(b)
 i
(4.4.17)
with h : E0 7! R where
⌧ (b) = inf {t   0|Xt  b (Zt)} . (4.4.18)
The solution (4.4.17) is identified in the following Lemma by considering the fluid
embedding of the process X and the associated matrix Wiener-Hopf factorisation
results outlined in Section 4.3. Note that since the regime dependent levels in (4.4.18)
are given, without loss of generality, it will be assumed that b1 > b2.
Lemma 4.4.3. Let X = {Xt}t 0 be defined in (4.2.3) and ⌧ (b) be defined in (4.4.18)
with b1 > b2 and assume that 12  (i)
2 + µ (i) <  qii for i 2 E0 then
Ex,i
h
e 
´ ⌧(b)
0 r(Zu)du+aX⌧(b)h
 
Z⌧(b)
 i
:= ⇥a,b (x, i, h) (4.4.19)
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with
⇥a,b (x, i, h) =
8<:10ieQ
 
r (x b1)hˆ, x > b1,
10i 
+
2 (x)C + 
 
2 (x) h˜+ 
0
2 (a, x)⇤h˜q
(2) b1   x > b2
(4.4.20)
where Qr is defined in (4.3.2), q(i) =
⇣
 Q(i)r 1
⌘
with Q(i)r the restriction of Qr to state
i, Q r satisfies ⌅ (Q r ) = O with ⌅ given in (4.3.10),  
 
2 , +2 and  02 are defined in
(4.4.27)-(4.4.29), the vectors h˜ and hˆ are given in block notation by
h˜ =
 
h2e
b2
 
1, (I   T2) 1 t2
  0
, (4.4.21)
hˆ =
n 
h1eb1 , C, h1eb1 (I   T1) 1 t1, D
  0, (4.4.22)
C is a constant and D a vector of constants of appropriate size jointly determined by
⇥0a,b (b1+, 2, h) = ⇥
0
a,b (b1 , 2, h) , (4.4.23)
⇥a,b (b1+, k, h) = ⇥a,b (b1 , k, h) , k 2 E 2 (4.4.24)
where f (x+) and f (x ) represent the right- and left- limits of the function f at x
and f 0 denotes diﬀerentiation of f with respect to x.
Proof. By embedding state-dependent discounting at rate r(i) when Yt = i 2 E0 into
the generator of A. it follows from (4.3.5) that
⇥a,b (x, i) := Ex,i
h
e 
´ ⌧(b)
0 r(Zu)du+aX⌧(b)h
 
Z⌧(b)
 i
= Ex,i
⇥
eaA⌧ˆbh (Y⌧ˆb) {⌧ˆb<⇣}
⇤
(4.4.25)
where
⌧ˆb = ⌧ˆ (b) = inf
n
t   0 | Yt 2 E0, At  bˆ (Yt)
o
,
Y = {Yt}t 0 is a Markov process which evolves according to the generator Qr =
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Q  ⇤r, bˆ : E 7! R given by bˆ (j) = b (i) for j 2 Ei and
⇣ = inf{t   0 | Yt /2 E]
with inf {?} = 1. Note that the expectations in (4.4.25) are of the form Ex,i [·] =
E [·|A0 = x, Y0 = i].
Using the down-crossing ladder process Y˜   of (A, Y ) defined in (4.3.7), it follows
from Theorem 4.3.2 that, since Qr is evidently transient, the generator of Y˜   is given
by the unique matrix, Q r , which solves ⌅ (Q r ) = O defined in (4.3.10). The strong
Markov property then implies that when x > b1, the payoﬀ of hitting the level b1,
having started in state i, will be given by
⇥a,b (x, i, h) = Ex,i
⇥
⇥a,b
 
b1, Y⌧ˆ(b1), h
 
{⌧ˆ(b1)<⇣}
⇤
= Ex,i
⇥
h 
 
Y⌧ˆ(b1)
 
{⌧ˆ(b1)<⇣}
⇤
= 10ie
Q r (x b1)h  (4.4.26)
which yields the first part of (4.4.19) for some vector h j .
For the second part of (4.4.19), note that the first passage over b can only happen
when Y 2 E0 and it therefore follows that when b1 > x > b2, Y can only exit the
interval [b2, b1] in one of two ways: Either A hits the level b2 while in state 2, or, Y
jumps back into state 1. Thus when b1 > x > b2, one is led to consider the generator
of the process Y (2) being Y restricted to state 2. Clearly, Y (2) is also a Markov process
with an associated generator Q(2)r being Qr restricted to state 2. The associated two-
sided exit probabilities of x from the interval [b2, b1] are identified in Lemma 4.4.4
below. Then once again applying the strong Markov property yields for b1 > x > b2
⇥a,b (x, i, h) = Ex,i
⇥
⇥a,b (b2, Y⌧ˆ , h) {⌧ˆ<⇣,A⌧ˆ=b2}
⇤
+Ex,i
⇥
⇥a,b (b1, Y⌧ˆ , h) {⌧ˆ<⇣,A⌧ˆ=b1}
⇤
+Ex,i
⇥
⇥a,b (A⇣ , Y⇣ , h) {⇣<⌧ˆ}
⇤
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with ⌧ˆ = inf {t   0 | Yt 2 E0, At /2 [b2, b1]} from which invoking Proposition 4.3.3
yields for b1 > x > b2
⇥a,b (x, i, h) = 1
0
i
⇣
 +2 (x)h
+
2 + 
 
2 (x)h
 
2 + 
0
2 (a, x)⇤h02q
(2)
⌘
where   2 , +2 and  02 are defined in (4.4.27)-(4.4.29) and for some vectors h 2 , h+2 and
h02.
To verify that the vectors in (4.4.21) and (4.4.22) are in the correct form, first note that
in regime k, if At exits the interval at bk in E0k , the payoﬀ will be h (k) ebk . If, however,
At exits the interval at bk in l 2 E k , the payoﬀ will be 1l0h (k) ebk (I   Tk) 1 tk which
accounts for h˜ (l) and hˆ (l) for l 2 Ek = E0k [ E k . The remaining constants are
determined by insisting on appropriate smoothness across the boundaries in (4.4.23)
and (4.4.24). The fact that ⇥a,b (·, i, h) , i 2 E is C1 on R at b was proved in Jiang
and Pistorius [2008] and is therefore omitted.
Lemma 4.4.4. Let X = {Xt}t 0 be defined in (4.2.3), ⌧ (b) be defined in (4.4.18)
with b1 > b2 then, assuming that 12  (2)
2+µ (2) <  q22, restricted to state 2, it follows
that the two-sided exit probabilities of X from the interval [b2, b1] satisfy
 +2 (x) =
⇣
W+eQ
(2)+
r (b1 x)   eQ(2) (x b2)Z+
⌘  
I   Z Z+  , (4.4.27)
  2 (x) =
⇣
eQ
(2) (x b2)  W+eQ(2)+(b1 x)Z 
⌘  
I   Z+Z   , (4.4.28)
 02 (a, x) =
 
eaxI   eab1 + (x) J+   eab2   (x)    K (a) 1  , (4.4.29)
where Q(2) r satisfies ⌅
⇣
Q(2) r
⌘
= O with ⌅ given in (4.3.10), Q(2)+r =  y where y is
the scaler given by the positive root of
1
2
 22y
2 + µ2x  q(2)   B2 (T2   xI) 1 t2 = 0 (4.4.30)
with ⌘+ =  
⇣
T2 +Q
(2)+
r I
⌘ 1
t2.
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Proof. Restricted to state 2, the generator of the process Y (2) is given by
Qa =
 
 2   r2    2 B2
t2 T2
!
from which, using Definition 4.3.1, it is clear that Q(2)+r =  y where y is a scaler
given by the positive root of
1
2
 22y
2 + µ2y   q(2)   B2⌘+ = 0,
where ⌘+ satisfies
 ⌘+   Q(2)+r   = t2 + T2⌘+
which yields (4.4.30). The fact that Q(2) r satisfies ⌅
⇣
Q(2) r
⌘
= O with ⌅ given in
(4.3.10) follows directly from Theorem 4.3.2. Equations (4.4.27)-(4.4.29) follow from
(4.3.12) and (4.3.13)-(4.3.15) with Q+ = Q(2)+r and Q  = Q(2) r .
4.4.6 Optimal Capital Structure Drawing on the results above, conditions
under which the optimal default boundaries in (4.4.15) exist are identified below in
Theorem 4.4.5 and the optimal value of equity value in (4.4.5) identified in Theorem
4.4.6 when optimal boundaries b⇤ = (b⇤1, b⇤2) exist and b⇤1 > b⇤2. The results where
b⇤2 > b
⇤
1, which follow by symmetry, are entirely analogous and are therefore omitted.
Theorem 4.4.5. Let wb⇤ : R⇥ E0 ! R be given in
wb⇤ (x, k, ˆ) = Ex,i

e 
´ ⌧(b⇤)
0 r(Zu)du
 
ˆ(Z⌧(b⇤))  V⌧(b⇤)
  
, k 2 E0, (4.4.31)
and assume that there exists a solution b⇤ = (b⇤1, b⇤2) to the system
wb⇤(x, k, ˆ)  g(x, k)   0, x > b⇤k, k 2 E0, (4.4.32)
w
0
b⇤ (b
⇤
k, k, ˆ) =  eb⇤k , k 2 E0, (4.4.33)
84
Optimal Capital Structure under Regime-Switching with Jumps
which satisfies
 ke
b⇤k   rkˆk +  k
 
ˆ3 k   eb⇤3 k   ˆk + eb⇤k
 
< 0, k 2 E0, (4.4.34)
where ˆ is defined in (4.4.6), then if wb⇤(·, k, ˆ), k 2 E0 is bounded, C1 on R and C2
on R\{b⇤i } then wb⇤ (x, k, ˆ) = w⇤ (x, k) for x 2 R and k 2 E0.
Proof. First note from the form of the function in (4.4.31) and by a standard Dynkin’s
formula type argument, (4.4.13) and (4.4.14) are satisfied. Next fix k 2 E0 and assume
that b⇤k > b⇤3 k from which using (4.2.4) and (4.2.6), it follows that for b⇤3 k < x  b⇤k,
⇧X,Zg (x, k) =  ke
x   rkˆk +  k (wb⇤ (x, 3  k, ˆ)  ˆk + ex) ,
where g (k, x) = (ˆ (k)  ex) k 2 E0 and ⇧X,Zg := LX,Zg   rg, which implies,
⇧X,Zg (b
⇤
k, k) =  ke
b⇤k   rkˆk +  k
 
wb⇤ (b
⇤
k, 3  k, ˆ)  ˆk + eb⇤k
 
  keb⇤k   rkˆk +  k
 
wb⇤
 
b⇤3 k, 3  k, ˆ
   ˆk + eb⇤k 
=  ie
b⇤k   rkˆk +  k
 
ˆ3 k   eb⇤3 k   ˆk + eb⇤k
 
since wb⇤ (b⇤k, 3  k, ˆ) < wb⇤
 
b⇤3 k, 3  k, ˆ
 
. Therefore, if
 ke
b⇤k   rkˆk +  k
 
ˆ3 k   eb⇤3 k   ˆk + eb⇤k
   0
then, since x 7!  kex +  k (wb⇤ (x, 3  k, ˆ)  ˆk + ex) is increasing in x, it follows
that ⇧X,Zw⇤b (x, k, ˆ)  0 for all x  b⇤k, k 2 E0, which verifies that (4.4.34) holds
true when b⇤3 k < x  b⇤k. When x  b⇤3 k, by an entirely analogous argument to the
above,
⇧X,Zg
 
b⇤3 k, 3  k
    keb⇤3 k   r3 kˆ3 k +  3 k  ˆk   eb⇤k   ˆ3 k + eb⇤3 k  ,
which implies that (4.4.34) also holds when x  b⇤3 k. It follows that LX,Zwb⇤ rwb⇤ 
0 for x  b⇤k, k 2 E0 which proves (4.4.11). Finally, (4.4.12) holds true by assumption
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which completes the proof.
Theorem 4.4.6. Assuming that 12  (j)
2 + µ (j) <  qjj, j 2 E0 and that there exists
a solution b⇤ = (b⇤1, b⇤2) with b⇤1 > b⇤2 to the system (4.4.32)-(4.4.33) which satisfies
(4.4.34), the value of equity in (4.4.5) under the default time ⌧ (b⇤) in (4.4.15) is
given by
Qb⇤ (x, i) = e
x   1i0cP (⇤r  G) 1 ⇡ˆ + wb⇤ (x, i, ˆ) , i 2 E0, (4.4.35)
where ⇡ˆ = 1  ⇡,
wb (x, 1, ˆ) =
8<:101eQ
 
r (x b1)hˆ, x > b1,
11
0cP (⇤r  G) 1 ⇡ˆ   ex, x  b1,
wb (x, 2, ˆ) =
8>>>>>>><>>>>>>>:
102e
Q r (x b1)hˆ, x > b1,
12
0
⇣
 +2 (x)C + 
 
2 (x) h˜
+( 02 (0, x)⇤ˆ2   02 (1, x)) q(2)
⌘
, b1   x > b2,
12
0cP (⇤r  G) 1 ⇡ˆ   ex, x  b2,
Qr is defined in (4.3.2), q(i) =
⇣
 Q(i)r 1
⌘
with Q(i)r the restriction of Qr to state i,
Q r satisfies ⌅ (Q r ) = O with ⌅ defined in (4.3.10),  
 
2 , +2 and  02 are defined in
(4.4.27)-(4.4.29), the vectors h˜ and hˆ are given in block notation as
h˜ =
 
ˆ2   eb2
 
1, (I   T2) 1 t2
  0
,
hˆ =
n 
ˆ1   eb1 , C, ˆ1   eb1 (I   T1) 1 t1, D
  0,
ˆ is defined in (4.4.6), C is a constant and D a vector of constants of appropriate
size jointly satisfying (4.4.23) and (4.4.24) with with wb (x, ·, ˆ) := ⇥0,b (x, ·, ˆ)  
⇥1,b (x, ·, 1) .
Proof. Upon assuming that a solution b⇤ = (b⇤1, b⇤2) with b⇤1 > b⇤2 to Theorem 4.4.5
exists, the result then follows from an application of Lemma 4.4.3 to (4.4.31) with
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⌧ (b⇤) given in (4.4.15) together with (4.4.5) .
Providing the optimal default boundaries (b⇤1, b⇤2) with b⇤1 > b⇤2 exist, an application of
Lemma 4.4.3 to (4.4.1) yields the optimal value of debt as outlined in the following
Corollary. The optimal firm value in (4.4.3) when b⇤1 > b⇤2 is outlined in Corollary
4.4.8 below.
Corollary 4.4.7. Assuming that 12  (j)
2 + µ (j) <  qjj, j 2 E0 and that there exists
a solution b⇤ = (b⇤1, b⇤2) with b⇤1 > b⇤2 to the system (4.4.32)-(4.4.33) which satisfies
(4.4.34), the optimal value of debt in (4.4.1) under the default time ⌧ (b⇤) in (4.4.15)
is given by
Db⇤ (x, i) = 1i
0cP (⇤r  G) 1 1  db⇤ (x, i, ⌫ˆ) , i 2 E0, (4.4.36)
where
db (x, 1, ⌫ˆ) =
8><>:1
0
1e
Q r (x b1)hˆ, x > b1,
11
0cP (⇤r  G) 1 1  (1  ⇠1) ex, x  b1,
db (x, 2, ⌫ˆ) =
8>>>>>>><>>>>>>>:
102eQ
 
r (x b1)hˆ1, x > b1,
12
0
⇣
 +2 (x)C + 
 
2 (x) h˜
+
 
 02 (0, x)⇤⌫ˆ2   02 (1, x)⇤1
 
q(2)
⌘
, b1   x > b2,
12
0cP (⇤r  G) 1 1  (1  ⇠2) ex, x  b2,
where Qr is defined in (4.3.2), q(i) =
⇣
 Q(i)r 1
⌘
with Q(i)r the restriction of Qr to state
i, Q r satisfies ⌅ (Q r ) = O with ⌅ defined in (4.3.10),  
 
2 , +2 and  02 are defined in
(4.4.27)-(4.4.29), the vectors h˜ and hˆ are given in block notation as
h˜ =
 
⌫ˆ2   (1  ⇠2) eb2
 
1, (I   T2) 1 t2
  0
,
hˆ =
n 
⌫ˆ1   (1  ⇠1) eb1 , C, ⌫ˆ1   (1  ⇠1) eb1 (I   T1) 1 t1, D
  0,
⌫ˆ is defined in (4.4.2), C is a constant and D a vector of constants of appropriate size
jointly satisfying (4.4.23) and (4.4.24) with db (x, ·, ⌫ˆ) := ⇥0,b (x, ·, ⌫ˆ) ⇥1,b (x, ·, 1).
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Proof. Upon assuming that a solution b⇤ = (b⇤1, b⇤2) with b⇤1 > b⇤2 to Theorem 4.4.5
exists, the result follows from an application of Lemma 4.4.3 to (4.4.1) with ⌧ = ⌧ (b⇤)
in (4.4.15).
Corollary 4.4.8. Assuming that 12  (j)
2 + µ (j) <  qjj, j 2 E0 and that there exists
a solution b⇤ = (b⇤1, b⇤2) with b⇤1 > b⇤2 to the system (4.4.32)-(4.4.33) which satisfies
(4.4.34), the optimal value of the firm in (4.4.3) under the default time ⌧ (b⇤) in
(4.4.15) is given by
Fb⇤ (x, i) = e
x + 10icP (⇤r  G) 1 ⇡   fb⇤ (x, i,  ˆ) , i 2 E0, (4.4.37)
where
fb (x, 1,  ˆ) =
8><>:1
0
1e
Q r (x b1)hˆ, x > b1,
11
0cP (⇤r  G) 1 ⇡ + ⇠1ex, x  b1,
fb (x, 2,  ˆ) =
8>>>>>>><>>>>>>>:
102eQ
 
r (x b1)hˆ, x > b1,
12
0
⇣
 +1 (x)C + 
 
2 (x) h˜1
+
 
 02 (0, x)⇤ ˆ2   02 (1, x)
 
q(2)
⌘
, b1   x > b2
12
0cP (⇤r  G) 1 ⇡ + ⇠2ex, x  b2,
where Qr is defined in (4.3.2), q(i) =
⇣
 Q(i)r 1
⌘
with Q(i)r the restriction of Qr to state
i, Q r satisfies ⌅ (Q r ) = O with ⌅ defined in (4.3.10),  
 
2 , +2 and  02 are defined in
(4.4.27)-(4.4.29), the vectors h˜ and hˆ are given in block notation as
h˜ =
 
 ˆ2 + ⇠2e
b2
 
1, (I   T2) 1 t2
  0
,
hˆ =
n 
 ˆ1 + ⇠1eb1 , C,  ˆ1 + ⇠1eb1 (I   T1) 1 t1, D
  0,
 ˆ is defined in (4.4.4), C is a constant and D a vector of constants of appropriate size
jointly satisfying (4.4.23) and (4.4.24) with fb (x, ·,  ˆ) := ⇥0,b (x, ·,  ˆ) +⇥1,b (x, ·, 1).
Proof. Upon assuming that a solution b⇤ = (b⇤1, b⇤2) with b⇤1 > b⇤2 to Theorem 4.4.5
exists, the result follows from an application of Lemma 4.4.3 to (4.4.3) with ⌧ = ⌧ (b⇤)
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in (4.4.15).
The optimal values of equity, debt and firm value are given in Propositions 4.6.1, 4.6.2
and 4.6.3 of Section 4.6 respectively when the optimal default boundaries identified
in Theorem 4.4.6 are identical.
4.4.7 Firm Credit Spreads Unlike the firm endowed with the roll-over debt
structure in Chapter 3, a firm financed by consol debt provides no information in
regards to the term structure of debt. However, in an analogous manner to Subsection
3.4.2, it is possible to calculate the coupon rate, c, which would encourage investors
to purchase the firm’s debt at face value, P , when the firm is initially created. The
credit spread of the firm’s debt can be regarded as the excess of the latter coupon
over the risk free rate.
When the firm is set up and debt is first issued, it is assumed that the parameters of
the firm are constrained such that at the coupon rate, c, the market value of debt,
Db⇤ (v, i) given in (4.4.36) is equal to the face value of debt, P . If the asset value
when the firm is V0 = ex, the latter constraint requires that the coupon rate, c, be
the smallest solution to the equation
Db⇤ (x, i) = P, i 2 E0, (4.4.38)
where Db⇤ is defined in Corollary 4.4.8
The regime dependent coupon which solves (4.4.38) will be denoted c˜⇤ (x, i, b⇤) , i 2
E0. Similarly to Chapter 3, the framework of this chapter does not provide a closed
form solution for the optimal barrier b⇤. However b⇤ may be calculated numerically
for a given set of startup parameters for the firm, including the coupon rate, and
then used to evaluate (4.4.38) from which it is possible to search for c˜⇤ numerically.
Calculations based on the latter procedure are presented in the next section. The
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firm’s credit spread when the firm is solvent is then given by
s˜⇤ (v, i, b⇤) = c˜⇤ (v, i, b⇤)  rˆ (i) , (x, i) 2  x > b⇤i , i 2 E0 , (4.4.39)
where rˆ (i) is defined as
rˆ (i) =
 
1i
0 (⇤r   E) 1 1
  1
, i 2 E0. (4.4.40)
4.5 Numerical Analysis
4.5.1 Calculation Methodology The default parameters used in the calcula-
tions in this section are described in Table 4.5.1. As in Chapter 3, the parameter
values invariant between regimes and the non-jump related parameter values in re-
gime 1 were taken from Leland [1994b]. The regime intensities, set to 0.3 and 1 for
regimes 1 and 2 respectively, were also taken from Chapter 3. The only exception
was the principal value, P , which was set to a value of 100. The jump intensities and
the jump distribution in regime 1 were taken from Kou and Wang [2003].
Regime 2 parameters were selected to reflect a recessionary scenario with interest
rates, tax rates and dividend rates assumed to fall and bankruptcy costs assumed to
rise. Asset volatility and the size of jumps was also assumed to rise in regime 2. The
average jump sizes in regime 2 were assumed to be -5% and -10% with probability
0.75 and 0.25 respectively, compared with a single jump of average size equal to -3%
in regime 1. Default parameter values were used in all calculations unless otherwise
stated.
To identify the optimal boundaries, the system of equations given by (4.4.23), (4.4.24)
and the smooth fit equation, (4.4.32), was solved using Matlab’s lsqnonlin routine.
Each of the three assumptions, b⇤1 < b⇤2, b⇤1 > b⇤2 and b⇤1 = b⇤2 were tested and the
resulting calculated boundaries which agreed with the prior assumption selected as
the optimal pair. In no cases, did more than one pair of calculated optimal boundaries
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agree with the prior assumption. It was found that the speed of convergence in
the latter calculation was helped by first excluding jumps and calculating optimal
boundaries for the geometric Brownian motion case, and then using the calculations
as an initial guess for the calculation including jumps. The drift of the asset process
for all calculations was calibrated to the martingale condition required in (4.2.6).
Calculated optimal boundaries were tested against conditions (4.4.32) and (4.4.34)
and to verify optimality. Figure 4.5.1 plots numerical verifications of condition
(4.4.32) for selected combinations of parameter values. In each subplot of Figure
4.5.1 calculations were based on the default parameter values in Table 4.5.1 unless
specified in the sub-title of each respective plot. All of the cases presented in Figure
4.5.1 indicate that condition (4.4.32) was verified. The parameter values chosen for
display in Figure 4.5.1 represent the extreme of the parameter values used for the
rest of the calculations in this section. Condition (4.4.34) was also tested for every
calculation reported in this section and found to hold. However, the existence of op-
timal boundaries was found to be sensitive to asset volatility. For example, condition
(4.4.34) failed with an asset volatility of 0.35 in regime 2 where other parameters were
set to their default values. The latter indicates that the mixture of parameters, some
which may encourage a firm to default sooner and some later, may be important in
terms of the existence of optimal boundaries.
Once established, the optimal boundaries were then used to calculate optimal equity,
firm and debt values using (4.4.5), (4.4.3) and (4.4.1) using Theorem 4.4.6, Corol-
lary 4.4.8 and Corollary 4.4.7 respectively. The smallest of coupons which satisfied
(4.4.38) were calculated by a simple numerical search procedure which repeated the
calculations above from which firm credit spreads were calculated using (4.4.39).
The generator matrices of the up-crossing and down-crossing ladder processes re-
quired in Lemmas 4.4.3 and 4.4.4 for the above calculations were obtained as follows.
Noting that if h is an eigenvector of the down-crossing generator matrix, Q r , which
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is associated with an eigenroot ✓, then since Q r satisfies (4.3.10),
1
2
⌃2
 
Q r
 2
+ V Q r +Qr = 0, (4.5.1)
it follows that post-multiplying (4.5.1) by h implies✓
1
2
⌃2✓2 + V ✓ +Qr
◆
h = 0. (4.5.2)
The eigenroots and eigenvectors of the polynomial eigenvalue problem (4.5.2) were
then calculated using Matlab’s polyeig function. The positive root of (4.4.30) was
identified using Matlab’s fsolve routine.
4.5.2 Optimal Capital Structure The optimal boundaries for the default para-
meters in Table 4.5.1 were calculated to be 48.13 and 42.29 in regime 1 and regime 2
respectively. Note that unlike Chapter 3 for a finite maturity debt profile, for consol
debt, the level of bankruptcy cost has no eﬀect on the optimal boundary, since bank-
ruptcy costs do not enter into the optimal value of equity in (4.4.35). The optimal
value of debt and of the firm are, however, impacted by changes in bankruptcy costs.
Figure 4.5.3 illustrates firm value as a function of leverage and 3 diﬀerent assumed
levels of bankruptcy costs, 0.25, 0.5 and 0.75, in regime 2. Following the literature,
leverage was defined as total debt value (4.4.36) divided by firm value in (4.4.37).
Leverage was generated by modulating the principal value over the range [30, 180].
The results illustrated in Figure 4.5.3 follow a similar pattern to those reported in
Chapter 3 for finite maturity debt and to those reported in the literature. Firm value
initially increases with leverage only to reach what appears to be a maximal value
in a leverage range of approximately 0.6 to 0.8 before declining sharply as leverage
approaches 1. The results appear broadly consistent with those reported by Leland
[1994a] which indicated firm value being maximised at a leverage of approximately
0.7 for default costs equal to 0.5, albeit with slightly diﬀering parameters. As regards
regimes, in Figure 4.5.3, firm value reaches a higher maximum value in regime 1
as compared to regime 2. After reaching it’s maximum value in Figure 4.5.3, firm
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value declines more quickly in regime 1 as compared to regime 2 as leverage increases
further for a given level of bankruptcy costs. Higher bankruptcy costs in regime 2
lower firm value relative to regime 1 for the same level of leverage.
Figure 4.5.3 illustrates firm value for diﬀerent levels of coupon and bankruptcy costs.
Coupons were modulated in a range of [0.02, 0.14]. Firm value initially increases with
coupon and then declines as coupons increase. As reported in Leland [1994a], there
appears to be a coupon level which maximises firm value. In Subsection 4.5.4 below,
the coupon rate which maximises firm value over a range of coupons is calculated.
Higher bankruptcy costs in regime 2 reduce firm value for a given level of coupon.
Firm value reaches a maximum value in Figure 4.5.3 at lower levels of coupon in
regime 2 than in regime 1. However, when bankruptcy costs are 0.25, after reaching
its maximum value, firm value declines more slowly in regime 2 than in regime 1. The
latter does not appear to be the case for a bankruptcy level of 0.75.
Debt value as a function of coupon for diﬀerent levels of bankruptcy costs is illustrated
in Figure 4.5.5. Once again, the relationship between coupon and debt value is similar
to that which has been reported in the literature. In Figure 4.5.5, debt value initially
increases in value as coupons rise only to reach a maximum value and then decline.
Debt value is lower for higher bankruptcy costs in regime 2 for equivalent levels of
coupon. Mirroring the results for firm value, after achieving its maximum in Figure
4.5.5 in regime 2, for lower bankruptcy costs, debt value diminishes more slowly in
regime 2 than is the case in regime 1. Similar results are reported for debt value
as a function of leverage and bankruptcy costs in Figure 4.5.5. Debt value achieves
a higher maximum level in regime 1 and is lower in regime 2 for the same level of
bankruptcy costs. In addition, Figure 4.5.5 suggests that for bankruptcy costs of
0.25, debt value achieves its maximum at higher levels of leverage in regime 2 than
in regime 1. For bankruptcy costs of 0.75, however, debt value achieves its maximum
in Figure 4.5.5 at lower levels that is the case in regime 1.
4.5.3 Firm Credit Spreads Figure 4.5.7 illustrates firm credit spreads as a
function of leverage for diﬀerent levels of bankruptcy costs. Leverage was again
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generated by modulating the principal value over the range [30, 180]. As might be
expected, firm credit spreads exhibit an increasing relationship with leverage in both
regimes. Firm credit spreads were higher in regime 2 than regime 1 for equivalent
levels of leverage.
Firm credit spreads by coupon rates between 0.05 and 0.14 for diﬀerent levels of
bankruptcy costs are displayed in Figure 4.5.6. For bankruptcy costs of either 0.5
or 0.75 in regime 2, firm credit spreads are higher in regime 2 than in regime 1 and
increase with coupon rate. However, interestingly, with bankruptcy costs of 0.25 in
regime 2, while firm credit spreads are higher in regime 1 than regime 2 for low coupon
rates, for a coupon rate of 0.14, firm credit spreads are higher in regime 1 than in
regime 2. This is consistent with Figures 4.5.4 and 4.5.3 which indicate that, with
bankruptcy costs of 0.25, at a coupon rate of 0.14, both debt value and firm value
is higher in regime 2 than regime 1. The latter observation may also be consistent
with findings reported in the literature2 that suggest for highly leveraged firms, or
so called junk or high-yield firms, bond holders may start to behave more like equity
investors as the recovery rate on default becomes an important determinant of the
value of debt.
Figure 4.5.7 illustrates firm credit spreads as a function of leverage for diﬀerent levels
of bankruptcy costs. Firm credit spreads demonstrate an increasing relationship with
leverage as might be expected. Firm credit spreads are higher in regime 2 than in
regime 1 and increase more quickly in regime 2 as a function of leverage than in
regime 1.
4.5.4 Optimised Leverage As mentioned above, Figure 4.5.3 suggests that
there may be a coupon rate which maximises firm value. In order to examine this, a
simple search procedure was conducted over the range the of coupon rates in Figure
4.5.3, and the coupon which maximised firm value identified. The results are reported
2Black and Cox [1976] identified that the level of bankruptcy costs could have an important
impact on the value of bonds and the behaviour of a firm’s securities. Leland [1994a] reported that
the behaviour of junk bonds can diﬀer significantly from the behaviour of investment grade bonds.
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in Table 4.5.2 for 2 diﬀerent levels of bankruptcy costs. The results indicate that in
general, optimised firm and debt value is higher and leverage lower in regime 1 than in
regime 2. With bankruptcy costs of 0.25, optimised leverage falls from 0.699 in regime
1 to 0.679 in regime 2 and the coupon rate falls from 0.072 to 0.067. Credit spreads
are also lower, falling from 218bps in regime 1 to 215bps in regime 2. As indicated
in Table 4.5.2, conducting the optimisation while in regime 1 versus conducting the
optimisation in regime 2 generates diﬀerent optimal boundaries, which are associated
with the optimised coupon rates for each regime. The optimised boundaries for both
regimes are lower in regime 2 than in regime 1.
When bankruptcy costs are 0.75 in regime 2, the results are similar but more exagger-
ated. Debt and firm value fall further between regime 1 and regime 2 than is the case
with lower bankruptcy costs. Leverage also falls more, 0.646 to 0.621, between regime
1 and regime 2 respectively. With lower leverage, firm credit spreads are lower in re-
gime 2 than in regime 1, falling from 203bps to 194 bps. Optimised coupon rates fall
from 0.064 to 0.059. The findings are consistent with what might be expected with
firms tending to reduce balance sheet exposure in diﬃcult economic circumstances.
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Name Symbol Default Value
Asset Value v 100
Coupon Rate c 0.08
Principal P 100
(a) Fixed Parameters
Name Symbol Default Value
Regime 1 Regime 2
Asset Volatility   0.15 0.30
Tax Rate ⇡ 0.35 0.25
Bankruptcy Costs ⇠ 0.5 0.75
Interest Rate r 0.075 0.03
Dividend Yield   0.07 0.02
Regime Intensity   0.3 1
Jump Intensity   3 3
Phase Jump Generator T  1/.03
 
 1/.05 0
0  1/.1
!
Initial Distribution ↵ 1 (.75, .25)0
(b) Regime Dependent Parameters
Table 4.5.1: Default Parameter Values
Default parameter values for all calculations unless otherwise stated. All fixed and non-jump
related regime 1 parameter values are taken from Leland [1994b]. The jump intensities and
jump distribution in regime 1 is taken from Kou and Wang [2003]. Regime 2 parameter
values were selected to reflect a recessionary regime.
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Figure 4.5.1: Numerical Optimality Verification
The above figures plot selected numerical verifications of condition (4.4.32) in the calculation
of optimal boundaries. Each plot evaluates the left-hand side of condition (4.4.32) for
default parameters with the exception the parameter value indicated in the subtitle of each
respective figure. The display was chosen to reflect the range of parameter values utilised
for numerical calculations in this chapter. The charts indicate that optimality (4.4.32) was
satisfied in the above cases.
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Figure 4.5.2: Firm Value by Leverage and Bankruptcy Costs
The figure shows optimal firm value for diﬀerent levels of bankruptcy costs and leverage, sim-
ulated by modulating P, but otherwise using the default parameters in Table 4.5.1. Higher
bankruptcy costs tend to reduce the leverage at which firm value achieves its maximum as a
function of leverage. Firm value reaches a higher maximum value in regime 1 as compared
to regime 2 for the same level of leverage and bankruptcy costs.
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Figure 4.5.3: Firm Value by Coupon and Bankruptcy Costs
The figure shows optimal firm value for diﬀerent levels of coupon and bankruptcy costs but
otherwise using the default parameters in Table 4.5.1. Higher bankruptcy costs tend to
reduce the leverage at which firm value achieves its maximum as a function of coupon. Firm
value reaches a higher maximum value in regime 1 as compared to regime 2 for the same
level of coupon and bankruptcy costs.
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Figure 4.5.4: Debt Value by Coupon and Bankruptcy Costs
The figure shows the optimal value of debt for diﬀerent levels of coupon under diﬀerent
regimes for three diﬀerent regime 2 bankruptcy cost values. Other parameters are set at
their default values in Table 4.5.1. Debt value reaches a higher maximum value in regime 1
as compared to regime 2 for the same level of coupon and bankruptcy costs. As in Leland
[1994a], there appears to be a coupon level which maximises debt value.
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Figure 4.5.5: Debt Value by Leverage and Bankruptcy Costs
The figure shows optimal debt value for diﬀerent levels of bankruptcy costs and leverage,
simulated by modulating P, but otherwise using the default parameters in Table 4.5.1.Higher
bankruptcy costs tend to reduce the leverage at which debt value achieves its maximum
value. Debt value reaches a higher maximum value in regime 1 as compared to regime 2 for
the same level of leverage and bankruptcy costs.
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Figure 4.5.6: Firm Credit Spreads by Coupon and Bankruptcy Costs
The figure shows optimal credit spreads for diﬀerent levels of coupon and bankruptcy costs
but otherwise using the default parameters in Table 4.5.1. Higher coupons and leverage lead
to increased credit spreads in both regimes. Spreads are typically larger in regime 2 than in
regime 1.
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Figure 4.5.7: Firm Credit Spreads by Leverage and Bankruptcy Costs
The figure shows optimal firm credit spreads for diﬀerent levels of bankruptcy costs and
leverage, simulated by modulating P, but otherwise using the default parameters in Table
4.5.1. Higher bankruptcy costs and leverage naturally tend to increase credit spreads in
both regimes. Spreads in regime 2 are typically higher than in regime 1 for higher levels of
leverage.
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Regime 2 ⇠ = 0.25 Regime 2 ⇠ = 0.75
Regime 1 Regime 2 Regime 1 Regime 2
Firm Value 120.33 119.06 118.02 116.81
Debt Value 84.13 80.88 76.21 72.53
Leverage 0.699 0.679 0.646 0.621
Credit Spread (bps) 218 215 203 194
Coupon 0.072 0.067 0.064 0.059
Regime 1 Boundary 43.20 40.21 38.55 35.36
Regime 2 Boundary 40.21 35.33 33.87 31.08
Table 4.5.2: Optimised Leverage
The table shows the coupon rates which maximise firm value in each respective regime along
with associated debt value, leverage, credit spreads and default boundaries for diﬀerent levels
of bankruptcy costs but otherwise using the default parameter values. The maximal firm
value was calculated for coupon rates in the range [.03;.14].
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4.6 Auxiliary Results and Proofs
The following results relate to the special case where the default boundaries are the
same.
Proposition 4.6.1. Assuming that there exists a solution b⇤ = (b⇤1, b⇤2) with b⇤1 = b⇤2 to
the system (4.4.32)-(4.4.33) and which satisfies (4.4.34), the optimal value of equity
in (4.4.5) under the default time ⌧ (b⇤) in (4.4.15) is given by
Q˜b⇤ (x, i) = e
x   1i0cP (⇤r  G) 1 ⇡ˆ + w˜b⇤ (x, i, ˆ) , i 2 E0,
where ⇡ˆ = 1  ⇡,
w˜b (x, i) =
8<:10ieQ
 
r (x bi)hˆ, x > bi,
1i
0cP (⇤r  G) 1 ⇡ˆ   ex, x  bi,
Qr is defined in (4.3.2) and satisfies ⌅ (Q r ) = O with ⌅ given in (4.3.10), the vector
hˆ is given in block notation by hˆ =
⇣
hˆ1, hˆ2
⌘0
where
hˆk =
 
ˆk   ebk
 
1, (I   Tk) 1 tk
  0
, k = 1, 2,
ˆ is defined in (4.4.6).
Proof. Upon assuming that a solution b⇤ = (b⇤1, b⇤2) with b⇤1 = b⇤2 to Theorem 4.4.5
exists, the result then follows from an application of Lemma 4.4.3 to (4.4.5) with
⌧ = ⌧ (b⇤) in (4.4.15).
Proposition 4.6.2. Assuming that there exists a solution b⇤ = (b⇤1, b⇤2) with b⇤1 = b⇤2
to the system (4.4.32)-(4.4.33) and which satisfies (4.4.34), the optimal value of debt
in (4.4.1) is given by
D˜b⇤ (x, i) = 1i
0cP (⇤r  G) 1 1  d˜b⇤ (x, i, ⌫ˆ) , i 2 E0,
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where
d˜b (x, i, ⌫ˆ) =
8<:10ieQ
 
r (x bi)hˆ, x > bi,
1i
0cP (⇤r  G) 1 1  (1  ⇠i) ex, x  bi,
where Qr is defined in (4.3.2) and satisfies ⌅ (Q r ) = O with ⌅ defined in (4.3.10),
the vector hˆ is given in block notation by hˆ =
⇣
hˆ1, hˆ2
⌘0
where
hˆk =
 
⌫ˆk   (1  ⇠k) ebk
 
1, (I   Tk) 1 tk
  0
, k = 1, 2,
and ⌫ˆ is defined in (4.4.2).
Proof. After assuming that there exists a solution b⇤ = (b⇤1, b⇤2) with b⇤1 = b⇤2 to The-
orem 4.4.5 the result follows from an application of Lemma 4.4.3 to (4.4.1) with
⌧ = ⌧ (b⇤) in (4.4.15).
Proposition 4.6.3. Assuming that there exists a solution b⇤ = (b⇤1, b⇤2) with b⇤1 = b⇤2
to the system (4.4.32)-(4.4.33) and which satisfies (4.4.34), the optimal value of the
firm in (4.4.3) is given by
F˜b⇤ (x, i) = e
x + 10icP (⇤r  G) 1 ⇡   f˜b⇤ (x, i,  ˆ) , i 2 E0,
where
f˜b (x, i,  ˆ) =
8<:10ieQ
 
r (x bi)hˆ, x > bi,
1i
0cP (⇤r  G) 1 ⇡ + ⇠iex, x  bi,
Qr is defined in (4.3.2) and satisfies ⌅ (Q r ) = O with ⌅ defined in (4.3.10), the vector
hˆ is given in block notation by hˆ =
⇣
hˆ1, hˆ2
⌘0
where
hˆk =
 
 ˆk + ⇠ke
bk
 
1, (I   Tk) 1 tk
  0
, k = 1, 2,
and  ˆ is defined in (4.4.4).
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Proof. After assuming that there exists a solution b⇤ = (b⇤1, b⇤2) with b⇤1 = b⇤2 to The-
orem 4.4.5 the result follows from an application of Lemma 4.4.3 to (4.4.3) with
⌧ = ⌧ (b⇤) in (4.4.15).
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CHAPTER 5 OPTIMAL DEFAULT FOR
FINITE MATURITY DEBT
5.1 Introduction
In Chapters 3 and 4 the assumption of a time-homogeneous debt structure was used
to analyse aspects of corporate capital structure that persist through time. Such
approaches have the objective of gaining insights into what determines an optimal
long-term stationary capital structure for a firm financed by debt. However, while
models which assume a stationary debt structure aﬀord analytical tractability, the fact
of the matter is, that the vast majority of lending agreements observed in the financial
market mature at a fixed date. Virtually all debt issued by corporate entities mature
at a fixed finite maturity date. Indeed, finite maturity debt contracts are prevalent
in many other areas of financial interest such as private equity, infrastructure finance
and the insurance industry. The implication is that there may also be significant
time dependencies to consider in relation to the determination of capital structure.
Motivated by the latter observation, the focus of this chapter turns to the default
decision of a firm, or possibly other financial entities, financed by finite maturity
debt.
As has been the case in the earlier chapters, the firm is assumed to be endowed with a
single asset value process, which is, however, unlike the earlier chapters, modelled by
a geometric Brownian motion. The firm pays a positive dividend, receives tax relief
on interest payments made during the lifetime of its debt and is assumed to choose
a default policy which maximises the equity value up until maturity of the debt. On
default, the firm incurs bankruptcy costs. The main implication of time dependence
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in the structure of debt is that the endogenously determined level of asset at which
to declare default is also time dependent. The primary focus of the analysis in this
chapter, is therefore, to identify the time dependent default boundary.
The setting of a firm financed by a finite maturity bond paying a fixed coupon was
first studied by Black and Cox [1976] and later considered by Leland and Toft [1996]
as a building block for the roll-over debt structure. Chen et al. [2009] extended the
model of Black and Cox [1976] to include jumps in the asset process of a firm to
derive an integral equation satisfied by a finite maturity bond. More recently, Elliott
and Shen [2015] studied the price of a finite maturity bond for a firm not facing tax
benefits and bankruptcy costs in a regime-switching setting. The optimal default
boundary of a firm financed by finite maturity debt was considered Surya [2012] by
in the general setting with the firm’s asset price process driven by a Lévy process.
The case of a firm financed by a roll-over debt structure was treated as a numerical
example.
The contribution of this chapter is that the case where a firm is financed by finite
maturity debt, is analysed and conditions identified under which the existence of an
optimal boundary can be verified. In addition, it is assumed that the firm can default
and incur bankruptcy costs at maturity. The motivation for the latter assumption is
that the model might later be extended to one where debt is refinanced at maturity.
The outline of this chapter is as follows. The model structure is outlined in Section
5.2. In Section 5.3, the setting articulated by Leland [1994a] of firm financed by a
consol bond where the firm’s asset process is modelled as a geometric Brownian is
presented as a precursor to the analysis of finite maturity debt. In Section 5.4, the
case of finite maturity debt is analysed. Finally, Section 5.5 presents some numerical
calculations.
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5.2 Model Structure
Throughout this Chapter it will be assumed that there exists a firm endowed with a
single asset having a value process, V = {Vt}t 0, which evolves under the risk neutral
measure according to a geometric Brownian motion
Vt+s = ve(
r    12 2)s+ Ws (5.2.1)
where r > 0 is the compound risk free interest rate,   > 0 is the dividend rate,
W = {Wt}t 0 is a standard Brownian motion, Vt = v and   > 0 is the volatility
coeﬃcient.
The process V is well known to be a strong Markov diﬀusion with infinitesimal gen-
erator given by
LVf (x) = (r    ) x@f (x)
@x
+
1
2
 2x2
@2f (x)
@x2
. (5.2.2)
The firm is partly financed by debt, with notional value, P , which attracts a continu-
ous coupon rate of c and the firm receives tax relief the value of coupon payments
equal to ⇡ 2 [0, 1]. The firm may choose to default on its debt by ceasing to make
scheduled repayments, in which case, a proportion ⇠ 2 [0, 1] of the asset value is lost
in the resulting reorganisation and the residual value of the firms assets become the
property of the debt holders. The firm is assumed to choose a default strategy, in
the form of a default time ⌧ , with the objective of maximising the value of equity
which is defined as equal to the value of the firm’s assets less the value of the firm’s
debts. Following the established literature, it is assumed that assets in place cannot
be liquidated in order to raise funds to pay debt holders.
It is assumed that the stochastic process V is defined on some filtered probability
space (⌦,F ,P,F) where F = {Ft}t 0 denotes the completed filtration generated by
V .
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5.3 Consol Debt
The results in this section, in the case of consol debt, have already been derived by
Black and Cox [1976] and Leland [1994a]. A brief review of these results is presented
in the context of an optimal stopping problem as a precursor to the the main focus
of this chapter which is to study the case of a firm financed by finite maturity debt.
The value of the firm is given by the value of the assets together with the discounted
value of tax rebates earned on coupon payments, prior to default minus the expected
loss in the value of assets on default and is given by
F (v) = v + Ev
ˆ 1
0
cP⇡e ru {u<⌧}du
 
  ⇠Ev
⇥
e r⌧V⌧
⇤
(5.3.1)
where Ev [·] = E [· | V0 = v] and {A} is the indicator function of the event A.
In the case of consol or perpetual debt, the firm is partly financed by debt paying a
continuous fixed coupon which never matures (and therefore pays no principal). In
these circumstances the value of the firm’s debt is equal to the discounted value of
coupon income paid before default plus the residual value of the firm’s assets, should
default occur
D (v) = Ev
ˆ 1
0
cPe ru {u<⌧}du
 
+ (1  ⇠)Ev
⇥
e r⌧V⌧
⇤
. (5.3.2)
The firm is assumed to choose the default strategy which maximises equity value
given by
Q (v) = F (v) D (v)
= v   cˆ+ Ev
⇥
e r⌧ (cˆ  V⌧ )
⇤
, (5.3.3)
where cˆ := cP (1 ⇡)r .
Note from (5.3.3) that, on default, the value of equity is zero, in accordance with the
strict priority rule. Since the firm always has the option not to declare default and
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wait for a payoﬀ of zero, it follows that the consol debt case therefore amounts to
solving an infinite horizon optimal stopping problem of the form
w⇤ (v) = sup
⌧2T0,1
Ev
⇥
e r⌧ (cˆ  V⌧ ) {⌧<1}
⇤
= sup
⌧2T0,1
Ev
⇥
e r⌧g (V⌧ )
⇤
(5.3.4)
where the gain function g (v) = (cˆ  v) + and T0,1 denotes the set of F measurable
finite stopping times with the usual assumption that inf {;} =1.
The optimal stopping problem in (5.3.4) can be solved by first making a guess at a
solution which will then be verified. A solution will be sought under the assumption
that there is a level b such that the stopping time
⌧b = inf {t   0 | Vt  b} (5.3.5)
is optimal in (5.3.4). Note that by well known first passage probabilities for Brownian
motion to a fixed boundary1, Ev [e  ⌧b ] > 0 for   > 0, and hence ⌧b is finite P-a.s. for
v > b.
Standard arguments based on the strong Markov property, lead to the formulation
of the following free-boundary problem for the unknown value function w := w⇤ in
(5.3.4) and the unknown level b in (5.3.5),
LVw = rw for v > b (5.3.6)
w (v) = cˆ  v for v = b (5.3.7)
w0 (v) =  1 for x = b (smooth fit) (5.3.8)
w (v) > cˆ  v for v > b (5.3.9)
w (v) = cˆ  v for 0 < v < b (5.3.10)
where w0 and w00 denote the first and second derivative respectively.
1See for example Borodin and Salminen [2002]
112
Optimal Default for Finite Maturity Debt
Using (5.2.2) and (5.3.6) it can be seen that the value function solves the Cauchy-
Euler equation given by
1
2
 2v2w00 (v) + (r    ) vw0 (v)  rw =0 (5.3.11)
and seeking a solution of the form w (v) = vp obtains a quadratic equation
p2  
✓
1  2 (r    )
 2
◆
p  2r
 2
=0 (5.3.12)
which has two roots
p± =
⇣
1  2(r  ) 2
⌘
±
r⇣
1  2(r  ) 2
⌘2
+ 8r 2
2
. (5.3.13)
It follows that the general solution to (5.3.11) may be written
w (v) =A1v
p+ + A2v
p  (5.3.14)
where A1 and A2 are undetermined constants.
The fact that w (v)  cˆ for all x > 0 combined with the observation that p+ > 0
implies that A1 = 0. Equations (5.3.7) and (5.3.8) then form a system of two algebraic
equations in two unknowns, the boundary level b and the unknown constant A2, which
have the solutions
b =
cˆ
1  1p
(5.3.15)
A2 =  1
p
 
k
1  1p
!
(5.3.16)
where p := p  has been used for notational convenience. Note that b < cˆ.
113
Optimal Default for Finite Maturity Debt
Inserting (5.3.16) into (5.3.14) and using that A1 = 0 obtains the solution to (5.3.4),
w⇤ (v) =
8><>:
vp
p
✓
cˆ
1
p 1
◆
if v 2 (b,1)
cˆ  v if v 2 (0, b] .
(5.3.17)
It is easily verified by a simple calculation that (5.3.15) is the same boundary derived
by Black and Cox [1976], Leland [1994a]. The optimality of (5.3.17) and (5.3.5) may
be verified by standard means2.
Plugging (5.3.17) into (5.3.3) obtains an explicit expression for the value of equity
Q (v) =
8><>: v   cˆ+
vp
p
✓
cˆ
1
p 1
◆
if v 2 (b,1)
0 if v 2 (0, b] .
(5.3.18)
It is again easily verified that (5.3.18) accords with Black and Cox [1976], Leland
[1994a]. Explicit expressions for the value of the firm, (5.3.1), and the value of
the firm’s debt, (5.3.2), can also easily be obtained using well known first passage
probabilities for Brownian motion.
5.4 Finite Maturity Debt
The firm is partly financed by debt with face value fixed at P which pays a continuous
fixed coupon rate, c, until maturity, is not callable and matures at time T > 0
whereupon the firm is obligated to repay the face value. The value of the firm at
time t is given by the value of the assets together with tax rebates earned on coupon
payments, at rate ⇡ 2 [0, 1], prior to default minus the expected loss in the value of
the assets on default
F (t, v) = v + cP⇡Et,v
ˆ T
t
e r(u t) {u<⌧}du
 
  ⇠Et,v
⇥
e r(⌧ t)V⌧ {⌧T}
⇤
. (5.4.1)
2See for example Theorem 25.1 in Peskir [2005]
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The value of the firm’s debt at time t is equal to the discounted value of the face
value of the debt and coupon payments made before default, plus the residual value
of the firm’s assets should default occur before time T
D (t, v) = Pe r(T t)Et,v
⇥
{T<⌧}
⇤
+ cPEt,v
ˆ T
t
e r(u t) {u<⌧}du
 
+(1  ⇠)Et,v
⇥
e r(⌧ t)V⌧ {⌧T}
⇤
. (5.4.2)
The firm chooses the default strategy (the default time ⌧) which maximises equity
value, Q (t, x) = F (t, x) D (t, x), which after some simple calculations reduces to
Q (t, v) = v   cˆ  1  e r(T t)   Pe r(T t)
+Et,v
⇥
e r(⌧ t)
 
cˆ
 
1  e r(T ⌧) + Pe r(T ⌧)   V⌧  {⌧T}⇤ (5.4.3)
where cˆ = cP (1 ⇡)r . Note that on default the value of equity is always zero which is
consistent with the strict priority rule. If the firm does not choose to default, the
value of the firm at time T would be Q (T, VT ) = VT   P .
It follows from (5.4.3) that in order to maximise equity value, the firm’s default
strategy should be chosen to solve the optimal stopping problem given by
w⇤(t, v) = sup
⌧2T0,1
Et,v
⇥
e r(⌧ t)
 
cˆ
 
1  e r(T ⌧) + Pe r(T ⌧)   V⌧  {⌧T}⇤
= sup
⌧2Tt,T
Et,v
⇥
e r(⌧ t)g (⌧, V⌧ )
⇤
(5.4.4)
where g (t, v) =
 
cˆ
 
1  e r(T t) + Pe r(T t)   v +, a+ = max (a, 0) and TB the set
of F measurable stopping times in the set B. The latter equality follows from the
fact that the firm can always choose not to default in the interval [0, T ] and receive
a payoﬀ of at least zero.
The optimal stopping problem in (5.4.4) is similar to that of an American put option
with the exception that the strike price of the option is time dependent. In order
to analyse and solve the problem, it will be convenient to convert the payoﬀ into
a standard American call option on a stochastic process with a time inhomogeneity
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embedded into its drift, as outlined in the following proposition.
Proposition 5.4.1. The stockholders endogenous bankruptcy problem in the case of
finite maturity debt is is given by w⇤(t, v) = vv⇤(t, x) with x = pˆ(t)/v where v⇤(t, x)
is given by
v⇤ (t, x) = sup
⌧2T[0,T t]
E˜t,x
⇥
e  ⌧g (Xt+⌧ )
⇤
(t, x) 2 E (5.4.5)
with
g(x) = (x  1)+ (5.4.6)
where E = {(t, x) 2 [0, T ]⇥ (0,1)}, ⌧ is a stopping time of the process X = {Xt}t 0
which has dynamics under P˜ for t < s and 0  s  T   t given by
Xt+s = x
pˆ (t+ s)
pˆ (t)
e(  r)s 
1
2 
2s+ W˜s (5.4.7)
with W˜ = {W˜t}t 0 a standard Brownian motion under P˜,  , r,   > 0, Xt = x and
extended infinitesimal generator given by
LXf(x) =
✓
   
✓
r   pˆ
0(t)
pˆ(t)
◆◆
x
@f (t, x)
@x
+
1
2
 2x2
@2f (t, x)
@x2
(5.4.8)
for C1,2 functions f where pˆ (s) = cˆ
 
1  e r(T s) + Pe r(T s) and pˆ0 = @pˆ/@t.
Proof. Defining the probability measure P˜ by dP˜ = exp( WT   12 2T )dP so that
by Girsanov’s theorem W˜t =  t   Wt is a standard Brownian motion under P˜ for
0  t  T it follows from (5.4.4) that
w⇤ (t, v) = sup
⌧2Tt,T
Et,v
⇥
e r(⌧ t) (pˆ (⌧)  V⌧ )+
⇤
= sup
⌧2Tt,T
Et,v
"
V⌧e
 r(⌧ t)
✓
pˆ (⌧)
V⌧
  1
◆+#
= sup
⌧2Tt,T
vE˜t,x
⇥
e  (⌧ t) (X⌧   1)+
⇤
(5.4.9)
= sup
⌧2T0,T t
vE˜t,x
⇥
e  ⌧ (Xt+⌧   1)+
⇤
(5.4.10)
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where X = {Xt}t 0 is defined by Xt = pˆ(t)/Vt for 0  t  T . An application of Itô’s
quotient rule yields the stochastic dynamics of X to be
dXt
Xt
=
✓
   
✓
r   pˆ
0 (t)
pˆ (t)
◆◆
dt+  dW˜t (5.4.11)
from which Itô’s formula implies that
Xt+s = x
pˆ (t+ s)
pˆ (t)
e(  r)s 
1
2 
2s+ W˜s ,
with Xt = x, which completes the proof.
Remark 5.4.2. Note that since cˆ   0 it follows that,
r   pˆ
0 (s)
pˆ (s)
= r
✓
1  e
 r(T s) (P   cˆ)
e r(T s) (P   cˆ) + cˆ
◆
> 0,
implying that the quantity r  pˆ0(t)pˆ(t) in (5.4.11), which may be given the interpretation
of an instantaneous rate of dividend yield, cannot be negative. That means to say,
that the drift of X under P˜ when discounted by   is never positive.
Remark 5.4.3. The dynamics of X in (5.4.11) may be rewritten as
dXt
Xt
=
 pˆ(t)  c(1  ⇡)/r
pˆ(t)
dt+  W˜t (5.4.12)
from which it follows that if c = 0, the stock holders’ problem reduces to the form of a
standard American call option on a non-dividend paying asset. Since it is well known
that an American call option on a zero dividend asset under positive discounting is
never optimally exercised early, if c = 0, the option to declare bankruptcy prior to
maturity will never be taken.
In the following propositions, some properties of the value function, v⇤, are estab-
lished.
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Proposition 5.4.4. The map x 7! v⇤ (t, x) is (a) increasing and (b) convex.
Proof. For part (a), let ⌧ ⇤0 to be optimal for (t, x0) in (5.4.5) and define
Xs (t, x) := x
pˆ (t+ s)
pˆ (t)
e(  r)s 
1
2 
2s+ W˜s
noting that x 7! Xs (t, x) is obviously increasing and convex. Then, for x0 < x1, it
follows that
v⇤ (t, x0) = E˜t,x0
h
e  (⌧
⇤
0 t)g
 
X⌧⇤0 (x0, t)
 i
< E˜t,x1
h
e  (⌧
⇤
0 t)g
 
X⌧⇤0 (x1, t)
 i
 v⇤ (t, x1) ,
where the first inequality follows from the observation that X⌧⇤ (t, x0) < X⌧⇤ (t, x1),
and the second, from the fact that ⌧ ⇤0 is may be sub-optimal starting from x1 implying
that x 7! v⇤ (t, x) is increasing.
For (b), define x✓ = ✓x0 + (1  ✓) x1 for ✓ 2 [0, 1] and let ⌧ ⇤✓ be optimal for (t, x✓)
in (5.4.5). Noting that convexity of the map x 7! Xs (t, x) implies that x 7!
g (X⌧⇤ (t, x0)) is also convex yields,
g
 
X⌧⇤✓ (t, x✓)
   ✓g  X⌧⇤✓ (t, x0) + (1  ✓) g  X⌧⇤✓ (t, x0)  ,
from which, multiplying by e  (⌧⇤ t) and taking expectations, obtains
v⇤ (t, x✓)  ✓v⇤ (t, x0) + (1  ✓) v⇤ (t, x1) ,
where the latter inequality results from the observation that, starting from either
(t, x0) or (t, x1), ⌧ ⇤✓ is possibly sub-optimal. The latter inequality shows that the map
x 7! v⇤ (t, x) is convex, which completes the proof.
Proposition 5.4.5. The value function in (5.4.5) (a) dominates the gain function:
v⇤ (t, x)   g (x), and (b), continuous on E.
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Proof. Part (a) follows from the fact that one can always take ⌧ = t. For part (b),
continuity follows directly from Proposition 2.2 in Jaillet et al. [1990] since the process
X is continuous and therefore bounded over a finite interval. Note also that continuity
of the map x 7! v⇤ (t, x) is also implied by convexity in Proposition 5.4.4.
Proposition 5.4.6. (Smooth Fit) The function x 7! v⇤ (t, x) is C1 at b (t) and v⇤x =
gx.
Proof. The proof follows from well known arguments. First fix (t, x⇤) on the boundary
so that X⇤t = b (t) > 1 then (5.4.13) and (5.4.14) imply that for all " > 0
@+v⇤ (t, x⇤)
@x
= lim
"#0
v⇤(t, x⇤ + ")  v⇤(t, x)
"
= lim
"#0
g(x⇤ + ")  g(x⇤)
"
= 1
and
@ v⇤ (t, x⇤)
@x
= lim
"#0
v⇤(x⇤   ")  v⇤(x⇤)
 "
  lim
"#0
g(x⇤   ")  g(x⇤)
 "
= 1,
where the derivatives, @
±v⇤(t,x)
@x , exist by virtue of the convexity of the mapping
x 7! v⇤(t, x) established in Proposition 5.4.4. Since v⇤ is convex, it is left and right
diﬀerentiable and therefore @ x v⇤  @+x v⇤. Since @+x v⇤ = 1 and @ x v⇤   1 , it follows
that, @ x v⇤ = @+x v⇤ = 1.
Proposition 5.4.7. The value function satisfies @+x v⇤, @ x v⇤ 2 [0, 1]
Proof. The derivative in x of v⇤ is increasing, since v⇤ is convex, and non-negative,
since v⇤ is increasing. Moreover for (t, x) 2 E such that x > b(t), v⇤x = 1.
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Since v⇤ and g are continuous Corollary 2.9 Peskir and Shiryaev [2006] implies a
stopping region, defined as the set of pairs (t, x) at which immediate declaration of
bankruptcy is an optimal policy, is given by
S¯ = {(t, x) 2 [0, T ]⇥ (0,1) | v⇤ (t, x) = g (x)} (5.4.13)
with the continuation region defined as
C = {(t, x) 2 [0, T )⇥ (0,1) | v⇤ (t, x) > g (x)} . (5.4.14)
Furthermore, the stopping time ⌧B defined by
⌧B = inf
 
u 2 [t, T ] |Xt 2 S¯
 
(5.4.15)
is optimal in (5.4.5). The following proposition establishes the existence of a boundary
which separates the stopping and continuation regions.
Proposition 5.4.8. There exists a boundary t 7! b(t) such that the continuation
region equals
C = {(t, x) 2 [0, T )⇥ (0,1) | x < b (t)} (5.4.16)
and the stopping region S¯ is the closure of the set
S = {(t, x) 2 [0, T )⇥ (0,1) | x > b (t)} (5.4.17)
together with the remaining points (T, x) for x   b (T ).
Proof. Fix t 2 [0, T ) and suppose 0 < x < 1, then since Pt,x (Xt+s > 1) > 0 for some
s 2 [0, T   t), immediate exercise is suboptimal implying (t, x) 2 [0, T )⇥ (0, 1) are in
the continuation region. The solution to the finite horizon problem (5.3.4) implies that
there exists a boundary b > 1 such that the stopping time ⌧ = inf {s > 0 | Xs   b}
is optimal in (5.3.4), which implies that all points (t, x) with x   b for t 2 [0, T ]
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belong to the stopping region. Furthermore, the considerations above, and the fact
that x 7! v⇤ (t, x) is convex on (0,1), implies that there exists a function t 7! b (t)
satisfying 1  b (t)  b for all t 2 [0, T ) which separates the continuation and stopping
regions. Since v⇤ is continuous, C is open.
Proposition 5.4.9. At time T , the exercise boundary in Proposition 5.4.8 equals 1.
Proof. Assume that b (T ) > 1 and consider (T, x⇤) such that x⇤ 2 (1, b (T )). Since
x⇤ 2 C, it follows from (5.4.14) that v⇤ (T, x⇤) > g (T, x⇤). However, the latter is
contradicted by fact that v⇤ (T, x⇤) = g(x⇤) because x⇤ > 1 by assumption. The
observation that, by the form of the gain function, B (T ) is clearly not less than 1,
completes the proof.
Remark 5.4.10. Note that since the instantaneous benefit of stopping is given by
(r   pˆ0 (t) /pˆ (t)) x   , it might be conjectured that for,
X (T ) < lim
t"T
 ⇣
r   pˆ0(t)pˆ(t)
⌘
=
 
c (1  ⇡)
stopping may be suboptimal, since the instantaneous gain would be negative. The
latter suggest that there might be a discontinuity in the boundary at maturity. Nu-
merical calculations presented in Section 5.5 are suggestive of such a discontinuity.
Collecting the results above, together with the fact that the value function in (5.4.5)
is the solution to a PDE with constant coeﬃcients3 in C, and is therefore C1,2 2 C, the
following verification theorem presents a free boundary formulation satisfied by the
value function. Proposition 5.4.12 below then presents an integral equation which the
boundary satisfies. Finally, Theorem 5.4.13 verifies that the boundary is the unique
solution to the latter identified integral equation under certain assumptions.
3See for example Friedman [1964].
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Theorem 5.4.11. Let w be continuous on E, C1,2 on E\  (b (t)), for every t 2 [0, T ]
w(t, ·) be C1 on R+, wx 2 [0, 1] and solve the following system of partial diﬀerential
equations,
wt + LXw    w  0 (t, x) 2 S (5.4.18)
w(t, x)   g(x) (t, x) 2 C (5.4.19)
wt + LXw    w = 0 (t, x) 2 C (5.4.20)
w(t, x) = g(x) (t, x) 2 S¯ (5.4.21)
where   (b (t)) = {(t, x) 2 E | x = b (t)} and
b (t) = inf
 
x 2 R+ | w (t, x) < g (x) 
then w = v⇤ in (5.4.5) and the stopping time given by
⌧b = inf {s 2 [0, T   t] | Xt+s > b (t+ s)} (5.4.22)
is optimal in (5.4.5).
Proof. It follows from an application of a generalised version of Itô’s formula that,
for   2 T0,T t,
e   g (Xt+ )  e   w (t+  , Xt+ )
= w (t, x) +
ˆ  
0
e  s⇧w (Xt+s) ds+M 
where ⇧f = ft + LXf   qf and M  is a Pt,x martingale by Proposition 5.4.6 with
the first inequality following from (5.4.19) and (5.4.21). Taking Pt,x expectations and
using (5.4.18) and (5.4.20) obtains
Et,x
⇥
e   g (Xt+ )
⇤
= w (t, x) +
ˆ  
0
Et,x
⇥
e  s⇧w (Xt+s) ds
⇤
 w (t, x) .
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As a consequence, since   was chosen arbitrarily, taking the supremum over all stop-
ping times in T0,T t yields
sup
 2T0,T t
Et,x
⇥
e   g (Xt+ )
⇤
= v⇤ (t, x)  w (t, x)
implying v⇤ (t, x)  w (t, x).
For the alternate inequality, first note that by applying a version of Itô’s formula to
the function e  sw (t+ s,Xt+s), setting s = u ^ ⌧b, where u 2 [0, T   t] and ⌧b is
defined in (5.4.22) yields
w (t, x) = e  (u^⌧b)w (t+ u ^ ⌧b, Xt+u^⌧b) 
ˆ u^⌧b
0
e  s⇧w (Xt+s) ds Mu^⌧b .
Taking Pt,x expectations obtains
w (t, x) = Et,x
⇥
e  (u^⌧b)w (t+ u ^ ⌧b, Xt+u^⌧b)
⇤
= Et,x
⇥
E
⇥
e  ⌧bg (Xt+⌧b) | Fu
⇤⇤
= Et,x
⇥
e  ⌧bg (Xt+⌧b)
⇤
 sup
⌧2T0,T t
Et,x
⇥
e  ⌧g (Xt+⌧ )
⇤
= v⇤(t, x)
where the first equality follows from (5.4.20) and the fact that Mu^⌧b is again a
Pt,x martingale, the second equality from an application of the Markov property and
(5.4.21) implying w = g at ⌧b, and the final equality from the tower property. Taking
supremum over all stopping times in T0,T t therefore obtains that v⇤ (t, x)   w (t, x)
completing the proof.
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Proposition 5.4.12. The boundary in Theorem 5.4.11 admits a representation as a
solution to the free boundary equation given by
b (t)  1 = ⇢ (t, T   t) e r(T t)  (⇠1 (⇢ (t, T   t) , 1, T   t))
  e  (T t)  (⇠2 (⇢ (t, T   t) , 1, T   t))
+
ˆ T t
0
e rs⇢ (t, s)   (t+ s)  (⇠1 (⇢ (t, s) , b (t+ s) , s)) ds
   
ˆ T t
0
e  s  (⇠2 (⇢ (t, s) , b (t+ s) , s)) ds (5.4.23)
with b (T ) = 1 where
⇢ (u, s) = x
pˆ (u+ s)
pˆ (u)
,
  (u) = r   pˆ
0 (u)
pˆ (u)
,
⇠1 (x, y, u) =
log (x/y) +
 
    r + 12 2
 
u
 
p
u
,
⇠2 (x, y, u) = ⇠1 (x, y, u)   
p
u
and   (·) is the standard normal distribution.
Proof. The optimal default boundary in (5.4.5) may be characterised by applying a
version of Itô’s formula to the function e  uw (t+ u,Xt+u) where w solves (5.4.18)-
(5.4.21) whereupon taking P˜t,x expectations obtains that
w (t, x) = e  uw (t+ u,Xt+u) 
ˆ u
0
e  sE˜t,x [⇧w (Xt+s)] ds
+ E˜t,x
ˆ u
0
e  s Xt+swxdW˜t+s
 
(5.4.24)
where the operator ⇧ is defined as ⇧f = ft + LXf    f .
Noting that (5.4.20) implies ⇧w = 0 in C and (5.4.21) implies w(t, x) = g(x) in S¯,
obtains from (5.4.8) that ⇧g (x) =     (r   pˆ0/pˆ)x for Xt   b(t). It follows that by
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setting u = T   t and   (u) := r   pˆ0(u)pˆ(u) , and noting that, since (5.4.21) implies that
w(t, x) = g(x) = x   1 for x 2 S¯, results in the so called early exercise premium
representation of the value function given by
x  1 = e  (T t)E˜t,x
⇥
(XT   1)+
⇤
+
ˆ T t
0
e  s  (t+ s) E˜t,x
⇥
Xt+s {Xt+s b(t+s)}
⇤
ds
   
ˆ T t
0
e  sE˜t,x
⇥
{Xt+s b(t+s)}
⇤
ds (5.4.25)
holds for x 2 (0, b (t)] and t 2 [0, T ].
Equation (5.4.25) represents a family of boundaries t 7! b(t), one for each value of
x. A natural candidate free boundary equation can be obtained by inserting x = b (t)
into (5.4.25) whereupon using (5.4.7) obtains (5.4.23). The fact that b (T ) = 1 is
contained in Proposition 5.4.9 which completes the proof.
Theorem 5.4.13. Assuming that the boundary (5.4.22) is continuous and
⇧g (x) = (gt + LXg    g) (x) < 0 2 S¯, (5.4.26)
the boundary in Theorem 5.4.12 is the unique solution to the free boundary equation
(5.4.23).
Proof. The following argument is an adaption of one found in Peskir [2005]. Suppose
that (vc, c) is another solution pair to the free boundary problem (5.4.18)-(5.4.21) and
⌧c = inf {s 2 [0, T   t] | Xt+s   c (t+ s)}
then an application of a generalised version of Itô’s formula to e  uvc (t+ u,Xt+u)
implies that
e  uvc (t+ u,Xt+u) = vc (t, x) +
ˆ u
0
e  s⇧g (Xt+s) {Xt+s c(t+s)}ds
+
ˆ u
0
e  s Xt+svcxdWt+s, (5.4.27)
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where ⇧g = gt + LXg    g in S¯. After taking Pt,x expectations, the final martingale
term in the latter equality vanishes, whereupon inserting u = ⌧c obtains
vc (t, x) = Et,x
⇥
e  ⌧cvc (t+ ⌧c, Xt+⌧c)
⇤
 Et,x
ˆ ⌧c
0
e  s⇧g (Xt+s) {Xt+s c(t+s)}ds
 
= Et,x
⇥
e  ⌧cvc (t+ ⌧c, Xt+⌧c)
⇤
= Et,x
⇥
e  ⌧cg (Xt+⌧c)
⇤
for all (t, x) 2 E, where the latter equality follows from the fact that, by (5.4.21),
vc (t, x) = g(x) for Xt   c (t). Note that it follows immediately from (5.4.5) that
vc (t, x)  v⇤ (t, x) (5.4.28)
for (t, x) 2 E.
By an analogous argument to that above, applying a generalised version of Itô’s
formula to e  uv (t+ u,Xt+u) obtains
e  uv⇤ (t+ u,Xt+u) = v⇤ (t, x) +
ˆ u
0
e  s⇧g (Xt+s) {Xt+s b(t+s)}ds
+
ˆ u
0
e  s Xt+sv⇤xdWt+s. (5.4.29)
Letting (t, x) 2 E such that x > max (b (t) , c (t)) and inserting the stopping time
defined by
 b = inf {s 2 [0, T   t] | Xt+s  b (t+ s)}
into (5.4.27) and (5.4.29) and after taking Pt,x expectations obtains
Et,x
⇥
e   bvc (t+  b, Xt+ b)
⇤
= g (t, x)
+Et,x
ˆ  b
0
e  s⇧g (Xt+s) {Xt+s c(t+s)}ds
 
(5.4.30)
Et,x
⇥
e   bv⇤ (t+  b, Xt+ b)
⇤
= g (t, x) + Et,x
ˆ  b
0
e  s⇧g (Xt+s) ds
 
. (5.4.31)
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Combining (5.4.30) and (5.4.31) with (5.4.28) yields
Et,x
ˆ  b
0
e  s⇧g (Xt+s) ds
 
  Et,x
ˆ  b
0
e  s⇧g (Xt+s) {Xt+s c(t+s)}ds
 
,
which, since c and b are continuous and ⇧g < 0, by assumption, implies that c (t) 
b (t).
To show that c (t) = b (t), first assume that there exists t 2 (0, T ) such that c (t) < b (t)
and let x 2 (c (t) , b (t)). Insert ⌧b from (5.4.22) into (5.4.27) and (5.4.29) and take
Pt,x expectations to obtain
vc (t, x) = Et,x
⇥
e  ⌧bg (Xt+⌧b)
⇤
 Et,x
ˆ  b
0
e  s⇧g (Xt+s) {Xt+s c(t+s)}ds
 
v⇤ (t, x) = Et,x
⇥
e  ⌧bg (Xt+⌧b)
⇤
from which, using again (5.4.28), implies that
Et,x
ˆ  b
0
e  s⇧g (Xt+s) {Xt+s c(t+s)}ds
 
  0,
which cannot be true since, c and b are continuous and ⇧g < 0 by assumption,
implying that (t, x) cannot exist, which, by the contradiction together with the facts
above, implies c (t) = b (t), completing the proof.
5.5 Numerical Analysis
5.5.1 Method of calculation In this section, numerical calculations of default
boundaries are presented for varying parameter values. The calculations are included
for illustrative purposes, recognising that the uniqueness of the boundary character-
ised in (5.4.23) has not been verified. The equation in (5.4.23), which the boundary
associated with (5.4.5) satisfies, is a non-linear Volterra integral equation of the second
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kind. Numerical calculations for the boundaries presented in this section are derived
using a simple bootstrap method where the starting point for calculation at time T
is taken from Proposition 5.4.9 to be b(T ) = 14. Starting from the latter known
point, one can work backwards in time by successive approximations. The boundary
derived from (5.4.23) is in terms of the process X. The firm’s underlying default
boundary associated with (5.4.4) in terms of the process V is then calculated from
the call boundary simply using the definition of Xt = pˆ(t)/Vt in Proposition 5.4.1.
The default parameter values used for the calculations were P=100, r=7.5%,  =20%,
⇡=20% and  =7% and c = 10%. These values are in accordance with Leland [1994a]
with the exception of the tax rate.
5.5.2 Eﬀect of coupons Figure 5.5.1 illustrates the eﬀect of higher coupons on
the calculated underlying call option boundary. As can be observed in Figure 5.5.1,
the call boundary tends to be higher, and decrease even more rapidly, as a function
of time as the coupon rate increases.
Figure 5.5.2 displays the calculated default boundary associated with the same para-
meter values as Figure 5.5.1. As might be expected, the default boundary shifts
upwards with higher coupons, which would naturally tend to increase the probability
that a firm would declare bankruptcy prior to maturity and would therefore be ex-
pected to be associated with higher credit spreads. For the default parameter values,
the net coupon rate exceeds the dividend rate and therefore the calculated bound-
ary at maturity is equal to the principal. However, for coupon rates less than 14%,
the default boundary appears to be upward sloping as a function of time, naturally
implying an increasing likelihood of default as time passes towards maturity.
However, as Figure 5.5.3 indicates, that for high coupon rates relative to other para-
meters, the calculated default boundary initially declines as a function of time before
increasing as a function of time prior to maturity. The latter observation has the
obvious consequence that firms financed by high coupon bonds may be encouraged
4See Linz [1985].
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to declare default well before maturity of their debt.
5.5.3 Eﬀect of dividends and interest rates Numerical calculations suggest
that lower dividends raise the default boundary as illustrated in Figure 5.5.4. Nat-
urally, higher cash flows to equity holders are likely to encourage equity holders to
wait longer before declaring bankruptcy. As noted in Remark 5.4.10, numerical cal-
culations also suggest that, if the dividend rate exceeds the net of tax coupon rate,
there may be a discontinuity in the default boundary at maturity, with the default
boundary being below the principal value of the debt immediately prior to maturity.
Figure 5.5.5 displays the impact of diﬀerent levels of risk free interest rate on the cal-
culated default boundary. Higher interest rates tend to lower the default boundary,
although the sensitivity of the boundary to interest rate changes appears to be rel-
atively small. The latter observation is consistent with credit spreads being inversely
related to risk free interest rates which is often observed in market data.5
Finally, Figure 5.5.6 displays a calculated boundary with a net coupon rate which
is less than the risk free interest rate. It is interesting to observe that numerical
calculations suggest that if the net coupon rate is lower than the risk free interest
rate in this model, the default boundary is very low when there is a long time left to
maturity, and then steepens dramatically prior to maturity. The obvious implication
of the latter is, that default would be far more likely as maturity approaches, which
is consistent with the finding in Remark 5.4.3, in which it was noted that, it would
never be optimal to declare bankruptcy prior to maturity for a zero coupon finite
maturity bond.
5 The structural model of Merton [1974] indicates such a negative relationship between interest
rates and credit spreads.
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Figure 5.5.1: Call Boundary Calculations for Diﬀerent Levels of Coupon
The figure shows shows calculated call boundaries for P=100, r=7.5%,  =20%, ⇡=2% and
 =7% for diﬀerent levels of coupon, c. The boundary appears to flatten as a function of
time as the coupon rate increases.
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Figure 5.5.2: Default Boundary Calculations for Diﬀerent Levels of Coupon
The figure shows calculated default boundaries for P=100, r=7.5%,  =20%, ⇡=2% and
 =7% for diﬀerent levels of coupon rate, c.
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Figure 5.5.3: Default Boundary Calculations for Diﬀerent Levels of Coupon
The figure shows calculated default boundaries for P=100, r=7.5%,  =20%, ⇡=20% and
 =7% for diﬀerent levels of coupon, c. When the coupon is relatively very high, the boundary
as a function of time can initially slope downwards, only to slope upwards immediately prior
to maturity.
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Figure 5.5.4: Default Boundary Calculations for Diﬀerent Levels of Dividend Yield
The figure shows calculated default boundaries for P=100, r=7.5%,  =20%, ⇡=20% and
c=10% for diﬀerent levels of dividend yield,  . An increasing level of dividend yield on the
underlying asset may make it less likely for the stockholders to declare default. When the
dividend yield on the asset is greater than the net coupon rate, calculations suggest that
there is a discontinuity at maturity with b (T ) = P .
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Figure 5.5.5: Default Boundary Calculations for Diﬀerent Levels of Interest Rate
The figure shows calculated default boundaries for P=100,  =7%,  =20%, ⇡=20% and
c=10% for diﬀerent levels of interest rate, r. A falling interest rate tends to increase the
level of the boundary with the eﬀect greatest the longer the time left until maturity. The
latter would be consistent with lower interest rates increasing credit spreads.
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Figure 5.5.6: Default Boundary Calculations for Diﬀerent Levels of Tax Rate
The figure shows the numerical boundary calculations for P=100, r=7.5%,  =20%, c=10%
and  =7% for diﬀerent levels of tax rate, ⇡. An increasing tax rate lowers the boundary
since the net coupon rate is lower. If the net coupon rate is less than the interest rate,
numerical calculations suggest the boundary may steepen dramatically prior to maturity if
the net coupon rate falls below the interest rate, the boundary.
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CHAPTER 6 CONCLUDING REMARKS
AND FUTURE RESEARCH
The models presented in Chapters 3 and Chapter 4 have demonstrated that regime
shifts can have significant eﬀects on firm capital structure decisions and associated
financing costs. Numerical calculations suggest that in a recessionary economic envir-
onment, where interest, dividend, and tax rates are assumed to fall, and bankruptcy
costs and asset volatility assumed to rise, corporate entities would generally choose
to adopt lower level of leverage, and, equity, firm and debt value would tend to be
lower.
For firms starting up in a recessionary environment, at a lower level of leverage, debt
financing costs are also likely to be lower. However, for existing firms, with a set
capital structure, debt financing costs in a recessionary environment might well be
higher as a result of increased asset volatility. The latter eﬀects would naturally be
exacerbated in the presence of negative asset value jumps. Certainly the results of
Chapter 3, in relation to the roll-over debt structure, suggest that shifting regimes
may have a substantial impact on the term structure of credit spreads for existing
firms.
However, it is clear from the results of Chapter 4, that further work is required,
to fully understand the optimal behaviour of firms in a regime-switching setting.
While conditions were identified under which optimal boundaries exist in the case of
infinite maturity debt, questions still remain in generality. Since the strikes from the
American put-style payout of the optimal stopping problem, associated with equity
maximisation under regime-switching are regime dependent, it is not guaranteed that
an optimal stopping time will exist in all regimes.
Concluding Remarks and Future Research
In the case of two regimes, where the strike in one regime is far below the strike
in the other regime, it is intuitively plausible that it might be optimal to wait for
a regime-change before exercising the option to default. Understanding the latter
behaviour might be important for policy makers who may be motivated in guiding
macroeconomic policies in such a way, as to create a regime in which to avoid de-
faults occurring. However, once the regime switches again, there could potentially be
unintended consequences.
Regime-switching models arguably, therefore, provide a rich framework for model-
ling complex financial behaviour in a straightforward manner. It is also clear that,
the general mixing of parameters in a regime-switching setting, can potentially ac-
commodate a wide variety of scenarios. Ultimately, however, it will be required to
calibrate the models to market data to determine the capital structure decisions that
would be made under empirically identifying regimes. Future research activity should
include calibrating the models to market data.
In the above regard, while the focus of this thesis has been to try and identify default
boundaries, which, in some sense maximise equity value, in many practical applica-
tions, exogenously determined boundaries are used by practitioners to calibrate credit
models to financial market data. Well known examples include the KMV model. Typ-
ically, such models are based on the assumption that a firm’s asset price follows a
geometric Brownian motion. However, clearly the results in relation to exogenously
determined boundaries contained in this thesis may well find applications in the latter
regard.
All the models presented in this thesis could also be enhanced further by incorpor-
ating tax thresholds for asset value, below which firms do not benefit from tax relief
on interest payments, which has been typical in the literature. While in a regime-
switching setting, a lower tax rate in a regime, will, to a certain extent, discourage
firms from undertaking leverage, modelling the availability of tax relief on interest
payments directly is an important feature of structural models of credit risk. There-
fore, enhancing the models presented in this thesis to incorporate a tax threshold is
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also an intended future area of research.
Adding positive jumps to the models presented is also an objective for future research.
While, for default purposes, negative jumps are arguably more important than pos-
itive jumps, there may be circumstances in which positive jumps have a meaningful
role to play. For investment grade bonds, the primary risk is to the downside in
terms of the value of debt should the credit quality of a firm deteriorate. In the latter
circumstance, negative jumps clearly play a positive role. However, for more highly
leveraged firms, the positive surprise of a credit quality improvement may also have
an important implications for capital structure valuation.
There is further work to be done in Chapter 5 to verify analytically the properties
of the default boundary and the framework could also be extended by incorporating
jumps into the asset value process. In addition, the eﬀects of the introduction of
regime switching into the asset value process could be examined. Furthermore, the
question at to whether the firm would refinance at maturity and how this would be
achieved needs to be explored. Eﬃcient methods for the valuing the capital structure
associated with the finite maturity debt boundary, along with the associated credit
spreads, is an additional area of potential future research.
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